# Harris v. Gower, Inc.

> Appellate Court of Illinois · March 19, 1987 · 153 Ill. App. 3d 1035

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9737339

## Case

- **Full name:** DOROTHY HARRIS, Special Adm’r of the Estate of Royce Wayne Harris, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOWER, INC., D/B/A the Barbary Coast Tavern, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** March 19, 1987
- **Citations:** 153 Ill. App. 3d 1035; 106 Ill. Dec. 824; 506 N.E.2d 624; 1987 Ill. App. LEXIS 2248
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Karns
- **Judges:** Welch, Karns
- **Cited by:** 18 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9737339

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding a proper claim for common-law negligence existed where a tavern employee escorted a *258 patron to his car, left the patron in the car, and the patron froze to death while unconscious
- finding a proper claim for common-law negligence existed where a tavern employee escorted a patron to his car, left the patron in the car, and the patron froze to death while unconscious

## Opinion text

PRESIDING JUSTICE KARNS, dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff’s complaint states a cause of action for common law negligence. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that “plaintiff’s decedent was a customer and patron of defendants’ establishment,” that “plaintiff’s decedent consumed drinks and became intoxicated and unconscious,” and that “while intoxicated and unconscious” decedent was removed from the tavern by defendants’ agents and employees. In so pleading, plaintiff went beyond alleging a breach of duty stemming from defendants’ status as a possessor of land. In Lessner v. Hurtt (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 195, 197 , 371 N.E.2d 125, 126 , the court examined the pleadings and emphasized that “plaintiff’s amended complaint made no reference or allegation regarding whether defendant Hurtt purchased liquor at Ramada or became intoxicated by reason thereof.” In concluding that Lessner is distinguishable on this basis, I do not believe that form has been elevated over substance. See Zeh v. Wheeler (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 266, 278 , 489 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 .
Examination of the pleadings leads to the inescapable conclusion that plaintiff’s action is predicated on the sale or supply of liquor. It is well established that the Dramshop Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 43, par. 135) is the exclusive remedy against tavern owners and operators for injuries caused by an intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication of any person (Wimmer v. Koenigseder (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 435 , 484 N.E.2d 1088 ), and it was undisputed at oral argument that plaintiff had indeed recovered a settlement pursuant to the Dramshop Act. The supreme court has taken an expansive view of the Dramshop Act and has failed to recognize common law liability for the negligent sale or supply of liquor, concluding that the Act is plaintiff’s exclusive remedy where the sale or supply of liquor leads to injury. (See Wimmer v. Koenigseder (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 435, 442 , 484 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 ; Cunningham v. Brown (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 73, 77 , 174 N.E.2d 157, 160 .) The trial court correctly granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Cardinal Glass Co. v. Board of Education (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 442, 444 , 447 N.E.2d 546, 547 .

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9737339. Public record. Not legal advice.