# Krueger v. Lewis > Appellate Court of Illinois · August 4, 2005 · 359 Ill. App. 3d 515 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9736431 ## Case - **Full name:** PATRICIA KRUEGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARY ANN LEWIS, Defendant-Appellee - **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois - **Decided:** August 4, 2005 - **Citations:** 359 Ill. App. 3d 515; 295 Ill. Dec. 876; 834 N.E.2d 457; 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 781 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Greiman - **Judges:** Greiman, Theis - **Cited by:** 11 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9736431 ## Opinion text JUSTICE GREIMAN, specially concurring: I concur with the majority. However, such concurrence is based on the very narrow limited facts of this case. Here, the Board of Trustees of the Village of Lyons conducted a televised meeting which contained an audience crowded with citizens of Lyons. The trustees spoke among themselves during portions of the meeting, but allowed statements from the audience in general and responded to members of the audience when they raised issues. It was, in essence, a free-for-all meeting. Nonetheless, that is the format of the meeting which the Village of Lyons determined to conduct. Generally, legislative meetings are conducted with some sense of order. Witnesses who wish to testify are often provided forms to indicate such a desire and then are called upon by the presiding officer. Generally the testimony of such witnesses is absolutely privileged; provided that the statements which are complained of are relevant to the issue at hand. It must be acknowledged that the privilege extends to statements made while a witness or otherwise within the process of legislative committees; 2 municipal finance committees; 3 resolution relating to the suspension of city clerk; 4 a congressional subcommittee; 5 judicial proceedings; 6 proceedings before municipal disciplinary boards relating to fire and police; 7 and even to quasi-judicial arbitration proceedings. 8 However, in none of these cases are we able to discern that there was anything other than an orderly process, witnesses being called, a chairman in charge, identified witnesses responding to the process. In none of the cases cited by the majority is there any suggestion that without some appropriate process the privilege would be extended. In the case at bar, while the process was certainly loose and seemingly undisciplined, it nonetheless was a process where citizens were invited to speak and the trustees responded. The majority properly cites the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides “[a] witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter as part of a legislative proceeding in which he is testifying or in communications preliminary to the proceeding, if the matter has some relation to the proceeding.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 590A, at 254 (1977). Particular attention should be paid to the reference in section 590A that the privilege extends to defamatory matters published “as part of a legislative proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) We may ask is a voice from the back of a room “part of a legislative proceeding?” I do not believe that a citizen, whether well intentioned or not, may rise in the gallery of the Illinois General Assembly and make defamatory statements notwithstanding their relevance to the matter under debate nor do I believe a person in the audience in a legislative or municipal or government or judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding is able to yell out defamatory material beyond the process of the hearing and enjoy the privilege. Accordingly, the privilege afforded an individual is conditional in that it must be part of a legislative proceeding. Such a limitation on the privilege does not offend the public policy of encouraging citizen participation in legislative proceedings. While I do not intend to set forth the process necessary to invoke the privilege, it is clear that the testimony may be voluntary or subpoenaed, invited or unsolicited, under oath or without oath, in response to panel members or comments made or thought not necessarily responsive to a question. What is crucial is that the statement be “part of a legislative proceeding.” Vultaggio v. Yasko, 215 Wis. 2d 326 , 572 N.W.2d 450 (1998). In the previous consideration of the case at bar in Krueger v. Lewis, 342 Ill. App. 3d 467 (2003), the court considered the existence of absolute privilege extended to statements to a municipal subcommittee and noted that the statements in several Illinois cases had created conditional privileges and further suggested: “To so hold would cloak with complete immunity from liability any person who is motivated by malice toward a public official and knows the statement to be false, so long as the statement was made in a room where a legislative meeting was in progress. This interpretation is not in accordance with the narrow application of the absolute privilege.” (Emphasis in original.) Krueger v. Lewis, 342 Ill. App. 3d 467, 474 (2003). Riddle v. Perry, 40 P.3d 1128 (Utah 2002). Joseph v. Collis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 200 (1995). Larson v. Doner, 32 Ill. App. 2d 471 (1961). Yip v. Pagano, 606 F. Supp. 1566 (D. N.J. 1985). Malevitis v. Friedman, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1129 (2001). Hartlep v. Torres, 324 Ill. App. 3d 817 (2001). Bushell v. Caterpillar, Inc., 291 Ill. App. 3d 559 (1997). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9736431. Public record. Not legal advice.