# HOUSING AUTHORITY OF TOWN OF MORRISTOWN v. Little > Supreme Court of New Jersey · April 11, 1994 · 135 N.J. 274 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9735305 ## Case - **Full name:** Housing Authority of the Town of Morristown, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Cathy Little, Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey - **Decided:** April 11, 1994 - **Citations:** 135 N.J. 274; 639 A.2d 286; 1994 N.J. LEXIS 296 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Garibaldi - **Judges:** Stein, Garibaldi - **Cited by:** 376 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9735305 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that because the tenant paid all monies due within three days after execution of the warrant of removal, had five minor children, and the Housing Authority was a publicly- subsidized housing provider that was "subject to public-policy responsibilities not generally imp… - recognizing that the statute's purpose was to provide landlords with "an expedited procedure to regain possession of leased premises, thereby avoiding the delays ordinarily associated with common-law ejectment actions" - finding "[b]ecause of the importance that we attach to the finality of judgments, relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) is available only when 'truly exceptional circumstances are present'" - explaining that a determination of whether relief from a final judgment is appropriate under Rule 4:50-1 "requires a trial court to weigh carefully all relevant evidence" - stating "[t]he only remedy that can be granted in a summary- A-4287-19 8 dispossess proceeding is possession; no money damages may be awarded" ## Opinion text GARIBALDI, J., concurring. I agree with the Court’s holding today that N.J.S.A 2A:42-10.6 of the Tenant Hardship Act, which grants courts the power to stay an eviction up to a maximum of six months, does not preclude a court from vacating a judgment of possession on equitable grounds pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. Likewise, I agree with the Court, and emphasize here, that vacating a judgment of possession on equitable grounds pursuant to Rule 4:50-1 is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly and only under truly exceptional situations. Ante at 289, 639 A.2d at 293. My narrow disagreement with the majority stems from its wholly unnecessary discussion of the Prevention of Homelessness Act, N.J.S.A 52:27D-280 to -287, and that Act’s effect on the Housing Authority’s public-policy responsibilities. According to the majority, the trial court’s exercise of discretion to vacate the judgment evicting Little was valid in part because it “reflected a pragmatic recognition that the State’s homelessness prevention policies would be disserved by the eviction of a tenant in public housing who had demonstrated satisfactorily her ability to fulfill *295 her rental obligations.” Ante at 293, 639 A.2d at 295. More specifically, the majority argues that the discretionary ruling by the trial court to vacate the judgment of possession is bolstered by the fact that failure to do so would result in an unseemly and incongruous situation in which one public authority (the Housing Authority) would be seeking to evict Little, while another (the Emergency Assistance Program) would be seeking to provide her with housing. In effect, the majority holds that tenants in public housing have a better argument against eviction than do tenants in private housing. In the two relevant statutes addressing the eviction and dispossession of tenants, the Legislature has not distinguished between tenants in public housing and tenants in private housing. The Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12, protects all tenants—both public-housing tenants and private-housing tenants—from eviction without good cause. One of the enumerated statutory grounds for eviction is failure to pay rent. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1a. The Legislature did not exempt public-housing tenants from potential eviction for failure to pay rent, nor did it say that the landlords of public-housing tenants should have a greater burden than private landlords in seeking eviction on those grounds. Similarly, nothing in N.J.S.A 2A:42-10.16 of the Tenant Hardship Act indicates a legislative intent to distinguish between public-housing and private-housing tenants for the purposes of summary dispossession. Although the possibility that a dispossessed tenant may become homeless is an equitable consideration that a trial court should take into account in deciding whether to vacate a judgment of possession pursuant to Rule 4:50-1, that possibility should be given exactly the same weight regardless of whether a tenant is dispossessed by a private landlord or a public-housing authority. I am as sympathetic to the plight of the homeless as the majority. I am also as committed as the majority to allowing trial courts to consider the possibility of homelessness in deciding whether to vacate a judgment of possession pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. Howev *296 er, the Legislature should strike the proper balance between providing public housing, providing assistance to dispossessed tenants, and ensuring that tenants who fail to pay rent are subject to eviction. The relevant statutes do not distinguish between public-housing tenants and' private-housing tenants; neither should this Court. Justice HANDLER joins in this concurrence. HANDLER and GARIBALDI, JJ., concurring in result. For reversal—Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN—7. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9735305. Public record. Not legal advice.