# Williams v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

> California Court of Appeal · June 10, 1960 · 181 Cal. App. 2d 691

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9734940

## Case

- **Full name:** MELVIN L. WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (A Corporation), Appellant
- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** June 10, 1960
- **Citations:** 181 Cal. App. 2d 691; 5 Cal. Rptr. 585; 1960 Cal. App. LEXIS 2046
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Van Dyke
- **Judges:** Schottky, Van Dyke
- **Cited by:** 15 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9734940

## Opinion text

VAN DYKE, P. J.
I dissent. The major issue involved in the trial was whether or not the Pacific Gas and Electric Company violated certain provisions of Public Utilities Commission General Order Number 95 by the manner in which it had constructed the transposition jumper with which the telephone line came in contact. The manner of the construction of the transposition jumper was not in dispute. Its form, shape, composition and position were clear from numerous photographs, from diagrams and from the testimony. The transposition jumper was not insulated and there was undisputed testimony that had it been insulated respondent would not have suffered injury when the telephone line came in contact with it. Respondent contended throughout the trial that the general order required the jumper wire to be insulated. Appellant contended to the contrary.
General Order Number 95 contains the rules for overhead electric line construction. The order is the product of many years of study. After its first promulgation, practical experience in the application of it was followed by further study and some changes were made. The general order has the force and effect of a statute (Viner v. Civil Service Com., 59 Cal.App.2d 458, 465 [ 139 P.2d 88 ] ; Lertora v. Riley, 6 Cal.2d 171 [ 57 P.2d 140]; Snyder v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 44 Cal.2d 793 [ 285 P.2d 912 ]), and generally the same principles govern the construction of such a regulation as govern the interpretation of statutes. (2 Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 82, p. 164.) The rules are not so clear that a single *712 meaning can certainly be found by a mere reading. It follows that the construction of General Order Number 95 was a matter for the court; and since the facts were undisputed, the applicability of the order was equally a matter of law. {Estate of Madison, 26 Cal.2d 453, 456 [ 159 P.2d 630 ].) A significant application of these rules is found in Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [ 109 P.2d 935 ]. There the statute under consideration provided that an employee should not be eligible for benefits under the unemployment law if “he left his work because of a trade dispute.” The applicants for benefits had absented themselves from work because the members of a union not their own were on strike against the common employer. The commission had interpreted the law as meaning that the absence from work must be voluntary and that in view of the trade dispute the refusal of the applicants to cross the picket lines of the striking union was not voluntary. Said the court, at pages 324, 326:
“The main issue is one of statutory interpretation. It is necessary to determine the meaning of the legislative declaration that a workman is disqualified if he left his work because of a trade dispute. . . .
“. . . The ultimate interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power. . . . The judicial power is conferred upon the courts by the Constitution and, in the absence of a constitutional provision, cannot be exercised by any other body.”
Notwithstanding the administrative interpretation resulting in findings by the commission the court in that case said such findings made “no pretense at finality” and that “it is the duty of this court, when such a question of law is properly presented, to state the true meaning of the statute finally and conclusively, even though this requires the overthrow of an earlier erroneous administrative construction.”
We have here a situation where the trial court was required to determine as a matter of law whether the governing law had been violated. This action was requested and refused, the court taking the position that it was for the jury to decide the issue. Finally, appellant requested instructions which would have adopted appellant’s contentions that there had been no violation and the court refused to give them.
At the request of respondent the court instructed the jury that various provisions of the general order were in force *713 and effect at the time of the accident to the respondent, which provisions were read to the jury. The trial court told the jurors they were to determine from the evidence “which of these statutes, orders, rules and definitions are applicable in this ease ’ ’ and that they were to "apply only those which ’ ’ the jury found applicable. The court told the jury that the Public Utilities Commission had promulgated its General Order Number 95 with the purpose of formulating uniform requirements for overhead electrical line construction for the purpose of insuring adequate service and of securing safety to persons engaged in the construction, maintenance, operation and use of overhead electrical lines; that the Public Utilities Act required that every public utility should obey every requirement of every order, rule or regulation prescribed by the commission and that if a public utility failed to do so it should be liable to any person affected thereby for all loss, damages or injuries resulting from such failure.
The court said: “I am going to read to you certain statutes and official orders and rules of regulatory bodies of the State of California, and certain definitions contained therein. All these are applicable to the general field involved in this ease, or some aspect of it. But whether or not a particular statute, order, rule or definition is applicable to the facts in this case, depends in some instances at least, upon what you find the facts to be. In other words, you must determine, after hearing all the evidence, which of these statutes, orders, rules and definitions are applicable in this case; and you will apply only those which you do find applicable.” It is clear that the court left to the jury both the interpretation of the law and the application thereof. This was error.
Respondent contended throughout the trial and reiterated the contention in argument to the jury that the transposition jumper wire came within the definition of a vertical run as that term was used in the orders, that therefore the law required that it be insulated, which it was not, and that this violation of the orders convicted appellant of negligence as a matter of law. On the contrary, appellant contended throughout that the transposition jumper was not a vertical run as that term is used in the orders, that therefore it was not required to be insulated and that there had been no violation of any part of the general order of the commission. The trial court had before it the general order and also the opinions of four persons who were thoroughly familiar with *714 overhead line construction as practiced in the field, some of whom had been directly engaged in the formulation of the general order and in its later revision. Three of them were of the opinion the jumper wire was properly installed. One said it was not. Although their opinions as to the proper interpretation of the term “vertical runs” as used in the orders was given in the form of expert testimony, it obviously cannot be classified as evidence since it is addressed to a question of law which the court had to resolve. No objection was made by either side to this method of bringing to the court the aid of these men. But after their opinions and their reasons therefor had been received, the court failed to perform its judicial function of interpreting the applicable provisions of the general order and, in the light of the undisputed facts, declaring that there had, or had not, been a violation of law by leaving the jumper wire uninsulated. This necessitates a reversal of the judgment.
Since the interpretation and application of the general order provisions governing the installation of the jumper wire were questions of law for the trial court they are likewise questions of law now presented to this court. My study of the orders and the record leads me to the conviction that there was no violation, that the law did not require the jumper to be insulated. In short, I believe the experts presented by the appellant correctly construed the law. I would reverse the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 6, 1960. Van Dyke, P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 3, 1960. Sehauer, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9734940. Public record. Not legal advice.