# Wooley v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · June 25, 2008 · 273 S.W.3d 260

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9733907

## Case

- **Full name:** Jason Earl WOOLEY, Appellant v. the STATE of Texas
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** June 25, 2008
- **Citations:** 273 S.W.3d 260; 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 762; 2008 WL 2512843
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Meyers
- **Judges:** Hervey, Price, Womack, Keasler, Holcomb, Meyers, Keller, Johnson, Cochran
- **Cited by:** 207 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9733907

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that ―appellant‘s due-process rights were violated when the court of appeals affirmed his conviction under the unsubmitted theory that he aided ‗another‘ to murder the complainant‖; the jury charge actually given authorized conviction as a party by aiding a named indiv…
- holding that factual sufficiency, like legal sufficiency, should be measured “by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge”
- holding that remedy of new trial "sweeps too broadly" and is "inappropriate remedy" to be granted because defendant received windfall in jury instruction
- explaining distinction between due process rule and an evidentiary sufficiency rule

## Opinion text

MEYERS, J.,
concurring.
The factual-sufficiency review standard has been continuously criticized for being virtually indistinguishable from the legal-sufficiency standard of review. See Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim.App.2006). Now, the majority unnecessarily muddles the waters even more by applying the Malik 1 rule to factual sufficiency. I agree with the statement in Judge Hedges’ concurring opinion that, “The reasoning in Malik — that the issue in legal sufficiency review is whether the evidence establishes the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt — is a poor fit in factual sufficiency analysis....” 2 Although we have never explicitly stated that the Malik rule applied only to legal sufficiency, it seems obvious that a hypothetically correct jury charge has no place in a factual-sufficiency review. When performing a factual-sufficiency analysis, the reviewing court has already determined that, the evidence is legally sufficient as compared to a hypothetically correct jury charge, so there is no need to examine the elements of the jury charge again. The reviewing court’s sole concern when performing a factual-sufficiency review should be whether, when weighing all of the evidence, the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak as to render the verdict clearly wrong or manifestly unjust, or whether, considering conflicting evidence, the jury’s verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).
Although I disagree with adjusting the factual-sufficiency review standard once again, I do agree that, after examining all of the evidence presented at trial and viewed in a neutral light, the evidence was factually sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. Therefore, I concur with the majority’s judgment, but not its reasoning.
. 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
. Wooley v. State, 223 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9733907. Public record. Not legal advice.