# People v. Nieves

> Illinois Supreme Court · November 16, 2000 · 193 Ill. 2d 513

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9732225

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. HECTOR NIEVES, Appellant
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** November 16, 2000
- **Citations:** 193 Ill. 2d 513; 251 Ill. Dec. 155; 739 N.E.2d 1277; 2000 Ill. LEXIS 1704
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Miller
- **Judges:** Rathje, Heiple, Bilandic, Miller
- **Cited by:** 175 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9732225

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the improper introduction of other-crimes evidence was harmless because any prejudicial effect “was overshadowed by the substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt—most notably, his own uncontested statement” (emphasis added)
- recognizing that the improper admission of other crimes evidence is subject to harmless error review and that any such error is harmless where the defendant suffers no prejudice is not denied a fair trial
- finding that prejudicial effect from isolated reference to defendant’s criminal activity in another state was overshadowed by the substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt
- finding evidence of defendant’s guilt was “substantial enough that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty” even without the State’s improper argument
- finding the potential prejudicial effect “produced by this one isolated and cryptic reference to defendant's criminal activity in New York was overshadowed by the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt”

## Opinion text

JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that the defendant’s conviction for first degree murder must be affirmed. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s separate holding that the defendant was not properly found eligible for the death penalty. In my view, the evidence was sufficient to sustain that finding.
The State based the defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty on the multiple-murder aggravating circumstance found in section 9 — 1(b)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(b)(3) (West 1996)). That statute authorizes imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who has been found guilty of first degree murder under the following conditions:
“[T]he defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another[.]”
The defendant was convicted in New York in 1994 of manslaughter in the. first degree. At the sentencing hearing below, the State contended, and the trial judge agreed, that the New York statute under which the defendant was convicted was substantially similar to the Illinois first degree murder statute. The trial judge therefore ruled that the defendant’s New York conviction could be used together with the conviction for first degree murder in the present case to establish the defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty under section 9 — 1(b)(3). At the conclusion of the first stage of the hearing, after the introduction of evidence of the defendant’s New York conviction, the jury found that the defendant was eligible for the death penalty under the multiple-murder aggravating circumstance.
Regarding the jury’s eligibility finding, the majority believes that the evidence did not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant’s conviction in New York of an offense similar to the Illinois offense of first degree murder. I disagree. The State introduced a certified copy of the defendant’s New York conviction for manslaughter in the first degree. Although the document did not reveal which particular subsection of the New York statute formed the basis for the defendant’s conviction, an assistant District Attorney from New York, Cynthia Sippnick, testified that the defendant was convicted under subsection (1).
The New York statute defining the offense of manslaughter in the first degree provides:
“A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
(1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or
(2) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
(3) He commits upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks an abortional act which causes her death, unless such abortional act is justifiable ***; or
(4) Being eighteen years or more and with intent to cause physical injury to a person less than eleven years old, the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury to such person and thereby causes the death of such person.” N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20 (McKinney 1998).
In the proceedings below, the trial judge ruled that the defendant’s conviction had to be based on subsection (1) of the New York statute if the State was to use it to establish the defendant’s commission of an offense substantially similar to the Illinois offense of first degree murder. I believe that the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s conviction under subsection (1). Assistant District Attorney Sippnick testified, without objection, that that provision formed the basis for the defendant’s conviction. It is clear that the defendant’s New York homicide did not involve the circumstances described by subsections (3) or (4) of the statute — the defendant was not performing an abortional act, and the victim was not under the age of 11. In addition, the defendant’s conviction under subsection (1), as testified to by Sippnick, is entirely consistent with the circumstances of the offense. According to the statements the defendant later gave authorities, the victim in the New York case was another homeless man, called Cano, whom the defendant had known for several weeks. The two resided in Central Park. On the day of the homicide, the defendant and Cano got into an argument when Cano refused to share his drugs with the defendant. Cano, armed with a knife, threatened to kill the defendant unless the defendant left. The defendant backed away, and Cano put down the knife and injected himself with drugs. The defendant then returned, picked up Cano’s knife, and stabbed Cano in the neck.
In discounting the State’s evidence, the majority opinion poses a number of questions regarding the foundation for Assistant District Attorney Sippnick’s testimony. 193 111. 2d at 537. These are all matters that the defendant could have raised at the sentencing hearing, but did not. Although the burden rests on the State to establish a defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty, in this case the defendant’s failure to raise any objection to the State’s mode of establishing the conviction is significant and should result in the waiver of the hearsay objection he now makes to the evidence. Notably, the defendant does not dispute the accuracy of the assistant District Attorney’s testimony that he pleaded guilty to, and was convicted under, subsection (1) of the statute. There is nothing inherently improper about the State’s proof of the defendant’s conviction under that provision of the New York statute; unchallenged at the hearing, the evidence should be considered sufficient on review.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9732225. Public record. Not legal advice.