# Piper v. Board of Trustees

> Appellate Court of Illinois · August 25, 1981 · 99 Ill. App. 3d 752

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9730169

## Case

- **Full name:** NELDA PIPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT NO. 514, Defendant-Appellee
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** August 25, 1981
- **Citations:** 99 Ill. App. 3d 752; 55 Ill. Dec. 287; 426 N.E.2d 262; 1981 Ill. App. LEXIS 3219
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Trapp
- **Judges:** Webber, Trapp
- **Cited by:** 16 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9730169

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that under Illinois law, resignation after resign-or-be-fired ultimatum is involuntary termination

## Opinion text

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting:
I would affirm the order of the trial court for the reason that the amended complaint alleged only conclusions of the pleader upon the issue of duress in procuring the resignation of the plaintiff. The allegations here pleaded are no more allegations of fact than those found in People ex rel. Marcoline v. Ragen (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 523 , 270 N.E.2d 643 , or Whitaker v. Pierce (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 148 , 358 N.E.2d 61 . In the latter case the court stated:
“When one voluntarily submits a resignation, he thereby divests himself of any legal interest in his former employment. (Cf. Bauer.) It is conceivable that one could present sufficient facts to indicate that a resignation was involuntarily coerced and thus was legally equivalent to a discharge. (See, e.g., Moreno v. Cairns (1942), 20 Cal. 2d 531 , 127 P.2d 914 .) However, plaintiff does not do so here. He merely alleges that his resignation was demanded by Hillborn and that he was ‘acting under the coercion and wrongful influence’ of Hillborn when he submitted it. In the light of the indicated voluntariness of his letter of resignation2 which was before the trial court, and because the aforesaid allegations are conclusory, we think that a showing of ultimate probable success was not made.” 44 Ill. App. 3d 148, 151 , 358 N.E.2d 61, 64 .
The opinion in Ragen discloses allegations of fact substantially more specific than those pleaded here. The opinion states, nevertheless:
“The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s amended complaint, on the ground that the allegations of duress and coercion were conclusions only, and that the complaint was insufficient since it did not allege facts from which it would have been inferred that the resignation was the product of duress perpetrated by defendants. * * * We agree that the allegations of duress in plaintiff’s amended complaint are mere conclusions and do not disclose facts to support a finding that his resignation was the product of duress and coercion.” 132 Ill. App. 2d 523, 525 , 270 N.E.2d 643, 644 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9730169. Public record. Not legal advice.