# Evans v. State

> Indiana Supreme Court · December 7, 1990 · 563 N.E.2d 1251

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9729591

## Case

- **Full name:** Charles EVANS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 7, 1990
- **Citations:** 563 N.E.2d 1251; 1990 Ind. LEXIS 253; 1990 WL 204259
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by DeBRULER
- **Judges:** Givan, Pivarnik, Dickson, Debruler, Shepard
- **Cited by:** 33 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Modified by Evans v. State, 1992 Ind. LEXIS 204 (1992).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9729591

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Witherspoon while also quoting the statute

## Opinion text

*1265 DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
After abusing and killing the victim, appellant cut her hair and applied cosmetics to her face. He then walked to a nearby phone booth and called police, waiting at the phone booth until they arrived. He was taken into custody and gave a full confession. By immediately reporting his own crime, he effectively removed himself as a dangerous threat to the community. This conduct is entitled to substantial mitigating weight in the process of determining whether the death penalty should be given, and was not.
Appellant’s personal history is punctuated by events involving verbal threats towards the opposite sex and attempted attacks, followed by conduct insuring his arrest. He had previously also demanded arrest, had been charged with threatening to rape a member of the police force, and had grabbed two women in the federal court house. On the night of the crime, according to the manager of the bar visited by appellant and the victim, appellant was filthy and unkempt and didn’t look as if “he was all there.” In appellant’s medical records he is termed:
a) anti-social
b) psychopathic
c) with a personality disorder
d) having a chaotic fantasy life
e) severe personality disorder
f) suicidal
It is apparent from the record that appellant suffered from an extreme emotional disturbance when he killed, which arose as the product of a long-standing disorder. This also was entitled to substantial mitigating weight in the process of determining whether the death penalty should be given, but was not. When the weight of these additional mitigators is added to the mitigator found by the trial judge, the weight of the aggravator here does not preponderate. I would affirm the convictions, but set aside this death sentence and order that a sentence of sixty-years be given in lieu thereof.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9729591. Public record. Not legal advice.