# Hull v. Cason

> California Court of Appeal · January 7, 1981 · 114 Cal. App. 3d 344

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9729488

## Case

- **Full name:** GLENN HULL Et Al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DALLAS CASON Et Al., Defendants and Appellants; DAVID T. ANDRADE Et Al., Interveners and Appellants; JAMES MICHAEL RECORDS Et Al., Claimant-Interveners and Appellants
- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** January 7, 1981
- **Citations:** 114 Cal. App. 3d 344; 171 Cal. Rptr. 14; 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,627; 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 1282
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Racanelli
- **Judges:** Elkington, Racanelli
- **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9729488

## Opinion text

RACANELLI, P. J.
I concur in the judgment for the following reasons:
Since the record is barren of any evidentiary or factual basis to support the constitutional or statutory claim of unlawful discrimination in the hiring and promotional practices of the Oakland Fire Department, no valid justification is demonstrated for the imposition of *376 judicially fashioned affirmative relief to ameliorate or dissipate the effects of past discriminatory practices. But while the array of federal precedents extensively discussed by the majority would generally condemn a “quota” form of relief based solely upon racial considerations, I do not understand those holdings or the majority opinion to categorically proscribe any race conscious plan or program voluntarily initiated and carefully designed to remedy or alleviate the pervasive effect of past discriminatory practices particularly in the market place of business and job opportunities.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied January 26, 1981, and the following opinion was then rendered:
THE COURT. *
Our opinion of January 7, 1981, is modified by adding thereto the following:
The judgment of reversal renders moot any claim of jurisdictional defect based upon grounds of nonjoinder of indispensable parties.
Nor need we determine those “injured” by this regrettably protracted litigation of seven years’ standing, during which time the City’s fire department has apparently been without fire fighter appointments or promotions. Additionally, there is no necessity to reconstruct the uncertain past, and fix and order restoration of the “status quo.”
Finally, we find no uncontroverted evidence of present or recent racial discrimination because a minority member fire fighter job seeker was disqualified for inability to accomplish the required “pullups” test notwithstanding a similar inability on the part of a nonminority employee (lieutenant) of long standing. No legal requirement exists, to test current employees in the same manner as new applicants are tested absent evidence of prior discrimination resulting in a denial of opportunity to qualify under less stringent standards previously in force. (Hardy v. Stumpf (1978) 21 Cal.3d 1, 10 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 176 , 576 P.2d 1342 ], see also fn. 4, p. 10.)
Claims asserted for intervention and “full standing” as parties may be renewed in any future proceedings which we may properly assume *377 will be conducted according to law thus rendering added “directions” unnecessary.
As our opinion is so modified, the several petitions for rehearing are denied.
Before Racanelli, P. J., Elkington, J., and Newsom, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9729488. Public record. Not legal advice.