# Watson v. Department of Rehabilitation

> California Court of Appeal · August 8, 1989 · 212 Cal. App. 3d 1271

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9729426

## Case

- **Full name:** JOYCE WATSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** August 8, 1989
- **Citations:** 212 Cal. App. 3d 1271; 261 Cal. Rptr. 204; 56 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,626; 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1203; 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 814
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Lillie
- **Judges:** Newman, Lillie
- **Cited by:** 50 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

LILLIE, P. J., Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the majority opinion except for part VIII in which the award of damages is upheld. From this I respectfully dissent.
While a reviewing court must uphold an award of damages whenever possible (Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal. 3d 43, 61 [ 118 *1295 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 , 65 A.L.R.3d 878 ]), “‘[w]hen the award as a matter of law appears excessive, or where the recovery is so grossly disproportionate as to raise a presumption that it is the result of passion or prejudice, the duty is then imposed upon the reviewing court to act.’ [Citation.]” (Cunningham v. Simpson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 301, 308-309 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 461 P.2d 39 ].) “There is no precise mechanical rule by which an appellate court can measure a personal injury award to determine if it is a just and fair one or is excessive. As the court remarked in Daggett [v. Atchison, T. & S. F Ry. Co. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 655 ( 313 P.2d 557 , 64 A.L.R.2d 1283 )], supra, each case must be determined on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. This simply means that we must look to the record to see if there is evidence to support the jury’s verdict, whatever the amount of the verdict may be.” (Henninger v. Southern Pacific Co. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 872, 883 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 76 ].) “[W]hether it is so great as to shock the conscience of appellate judges and necessarily implies passion and prejudice on the part of the jury depends upon the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries, his pain, suffering and humiliation, and the amount of special damages that may have been incorporated in the total award.” (Id., at pp. 882-883.)
Plaintiff’s past and future lost earnings, plus prejudgment interest on past earnings, amounted to a maximum of $383,574. Reasonable charges for medical services rendered to plaintiff were estimated to be $14,410. Plaintiff’s economic damages thus totaled $398,000 in round figures. Deducting that sum from the award of $1.5 million leaves us with $1,102,000 attributable to noneconomic items of damage. As to those items the evidence showed: Because of the stress in plaintiff’s work environment she contracted a severe psychotic disorder which had grown progressively worse since 1981 so that at the time of trial (1987) she suffered from “a major depressive disorder with psychotic features.” Her chief physical complaint was headaches; she also complained of nausea, loss of sleep, loss of appetite, difficulty in swallowing, choking feelings, chest pains, heart flutter, gastrointestinal problems and dizziness. While plaintiff’s medical expert testified that such physical symptoms are “consistent with the kind of vague complaints that people have who are under some kind of stress,” they are relatively trivial complaints some of which are commonly experienced by many people. Further, there was no expert testimony that plaintiff’s physical complaints or her psychotic disorder are permanent. It is true that plaintiff also was subjected to harassment and discrimination by defendant for a period of eight years. Nevertheless, it is my view on this record that compensation of $1,102,000 for pain, discomfort, fear, anxiety and other mental and emotional distress is excessive as a matter of law. The size of the verdict attributable to noneconomic factors strongly suggests that the jury improperly determined to punish defendant for its treatment of plaintiff.
*1296 While the jury is given wide discretion in determining the amount of damages to be awarded (Bertero v. National General Corp., supra, 13 Cal.3d 43, 64 ), its award must be supported by the evidence. The award of over $ 1 million for noneconomic damages lacks support. It is “so excessive as to indicate that it was prompted by passion, prejudice, whim, or caprice.” (Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498, 509 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 364 P.2d 337 ] (dis. opn. of Traynor, J.), fn. omitted.)
I would reverse that portion of the judgment ordering that plaintiff recover the sum of $1.5 million from defendant, with directions that the trial court retry the issue of damages.
The petition of appellant Department of Rehabilitation for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 2, 1989.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9729426. Public record. Not legal advice.