# State v. Courchesne

> Supreme Court of Connecticut · June 15, 2010 · 296 Conn. 622

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9728476

## Case

- **Full name:** State of Connecticut v. Robert Courchesne
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Connecticut
- **Decided:** June 15, 2010
- **Citations:** 296 Conn. 622; 998 A.2d 1; 2010 Conn. LEXIS 227
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Palmer
- **Judges:** Zarella, Rogers, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille, Zareila, Schaller
- **Cited by:** 77 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9728476

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting claim that death sentence was arbitrary for ‘‘the same essential reasons that we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the imposition of the death penalty under our capital sentencing scheme’’

## Opinion text

Opinion
PALMER, J.
At approximately 11 p.m. on September 15, 1998, the defendant, Robert Courchesne, and an *627 acquaintance, Demetris Rodgers, were seated in the defendant’s car in the parking lot of Webster Bank located on the comer of Chase and Wigwam Avenues in Waterbury, arguing over a drug debt that the defendant owed Rodgers’ boyfriend. When Rodgers became upset upon learning that the defendant was unable to pay the debt, the defendant took a serrated kitchen knife that he kept in his car and repeatedly stabbed Rodgers with it in her chest and back. Rodgers, who was approximately eight and one-half months pregnant, managed to escape from the car and to mn a short distance before collapsing in the street as a result of her wounds. The defendant fled the scene in his car. About fifteen minutes later, a passerby discovered Rodgers. Shortly thereafter, a police officer arrived at the scene and called for emergency medical personnel, who attempted to revive Rodgers. Rodgers then was transported to Waterbury Hospital (hospital), where she was pronounced dead. An emergency department physician performed an emergency cesarean section on Rodgers and delivered her baby, Antonia Rodgers. 1 After Antonia was delivered, she immediately was subject to further resuscitation efforts and then placed on life support. Antonia remained on life support for forty-two days, at which time life support was removed. Within hours of removal, Antonia was pronounced dead. The cause of death was lack of oxygen to her brain, which she had suffered in útero as a result of the death of her mother.
The defendant was apprehended and charged in connection with the deaths of Rodgers and Antonia. Specifically, the defendant was charged with two counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) 2 *628 for the intentional killings of Rodgers and Antonia, 3 one count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54b (8) 4 for the murder of two or more persons in the course of a single transaction, and one count of capital felony in violation of § 53a-54b (9) 5 for the murder of a person under sixteen years of age, namely, Antonia. The trial court, Damiani, J., held a probable cause hearing in accordance with article first, § 8, of the state constitution, as amended by article seventeen of the amendments, 6 and General Statutes § 54-46a (a), 7 following which the court found probable *629 cause to believe that the defendant had committed the crimes with which he was charged. 8 Thereafter, the defendant waived a jury trial with respect to the guilt phase of the proceedings and elected to be tried by a three judge panel (panel), which consisted of West, Cofield and D’Addabbo, Js. The panel found the defendant guilty on all counts, and, thereafter, the trial court, D’Addabbo, J., 9 conducted a penalty phase hearing before a jury in accordance with General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-46a. 10 At the conclusion of the penalty *630 phase healing, the jury returned a special verdict, fmd *631 ing, with respect to the defendant’s conviction of capital felony under § 53a-54b (8), the existence of an aggravating factor, namely, that the defendant had committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved *632 manner within the meaning of § 53a-46a (i) (4), 11 and finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factor outweighed any potential mitigating factor or factors. In accordance with the panel’s finding of guilt and the jury’s special verdict, the trial court, D’Addabbo, J., rendered judgment of guilty and sentenced the defendant to death. 12
On appeal to this court, 13 the defendant challenges the panel’s finding of guilt and his death sentence. With respect to the guilt phase of the proceedings, he claims, inter alia, that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to suppress his written confessions and other evidence linking him to the murders, (2) denied his motion to dismiss the murder and capital felony charges relating to the death of Antonia because the court improperly invoked the common-law bom alive rule 14 *633 in concluding that Antonia was a “person” for purposes of this state’s murder and capital felony statutes, (3) denied his motion to dismiss after concluding that both the murder and capital felony charges relating to the death of Antonia lawfully could be predicated on the doctrine of transferred intent, and (4) permitted the state to proceed under the bom alive mle and the doctrine of transferred intent in violation of his rights under the due process and ex post facto clauses of the United States constitution. In addition, the defendant claims that, even if the trial court properly recognized the existence of the bom alive rale for purposes of our Penal Code, (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Antonia was, in fact, bom alive and, therefore, a “person” within the meaning of this state’s murder and capital felony statutes, and (2) the state’s “novel integration” of the bom alive rule and the transferred intent principle embodied in § 53a-54a (a) 15 violated his constitutional right to fair notice that his conduct with respect to the death of Antonia fell within the murder and capital felony statutes. With respect to the penalty phase of the proceedings, the defendant claims, inter alia, that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the murder of Rodgers in an “especially heinous, cmel or depraved manner” within the meaning of § 53a-46a (i) (4), and (2) the jury reasonably could not have found that the aggravating factor outweighed any mitigating factor or factors. 16
*634 For the reasons that follow, we reject the defendant’s guilt phase claims and the penalty phase claims that we address. We nevertheless conclude that the panel applied the wrong evidentiary standard in finding that the state had established beyond a reasonable doubt that Antonia was bom alive. Specifically, the panel improperly failed to consider whether, in accordance with State v. Guess, 244 Conn. 761, 764, 780 , 715 A.2d 643 (1998), Antonia was brain dead at the time of her delivery due to the irreversible cessation of brain function even though her circulatory and respiratory systems were maintained by artificial means for forty-two days after her delivery. Accordingly, with respect to the murder charge arising out of the death of Antonia and both capital felony charges, all of which are predicated on the state’s contention that, because Antonia was bom alive, she was a person within the meaning of our Penal Code, we conclude that the defendant is entitled to a new trial at which the state will be required to prove that Antonia was not brain dead at the time she was bom. If, upon retrial, the defendant is found guilty of the capital felony charge concerning the murder of Rodgers and Antonia in the course of the same transaction, the defendant also is entitled to a new penalty phase hearing. Finally, we affirm the defendant’s conviction for the murder of Rodgers.
I
SUPPRESSION CLAIMS
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain statements that he made to the police implicating himself in Rodgers’ murder in violation of his rights under the fourth, 17 *635 eighth 18 and fourteenth 19 amendments to the United States constitution. 20 The defendant contends that the trial court improperly rejected his claims that he was seized by the police, that the seizure exceeded the bounds of a Terry 21 stop and that, following that stop, he did not voluntarily consent to accompany the police to the Waterbury police department for questioning. The defendant further contends, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, that the fruits of these constitutional improprieties, including his oral and written statements in which he confessed to murdering Rodgers, must be suppressed. We disagree.
The following facts are necessary to our resolution of the defendant’s suppression claims. The defendant filed a motion to suppress all oral and written statements that he had made to the police — in which he allegedly confessed to murdering Rodgers — on the ground that those statements had been obtained illegally. Thereafter, the trial court, O’Keefe, J., conducted *636 a suppression hearing at which both defense counsel and the state presented evidence. The state called as witnesses Detective John Kennelly and Sergeant Gary Pelosi, both members of the criminal investigations division of the Waterbury police department. The defense witnesses included the defendant’s girlfriend in 1998, Jacqueline Wilson, the defendant’s neighbors, Tamara Oliver and Sydney Vega, and Paul Ariola, a detective with the Waterbury police department. No two witnesses gave the exact same account of events relating to the defendant’s alleged seizure by the police.
The state’s first witness, Kennelly, testified that, sometime in the early morning hours of September 16, 1998, Waterbury police received information that the defendant was the last person to be seen with Rodgers before she was found mortally wounded. Acting on this information, Kennelly and Ariola set up a surveillance of the defendant’s house on Sumac Street in Waterbury at approximately 8 a.m. that day. The officers, who were not in uniform, positioned their unmarked police car a short distance away from the defendant’s house so that they could observe any vehicles coming down the street. At approximately 10:15 a.m., the defendant pulled up to the front of his house in a Ford Escort with a female passenger later identified as Wilson. According to Kennelly, at that point, he and Ariola immediately exited their police vehicle and approached the defendant’s vehicle. After identifying himself and Ariola, Kennelly informed the defendant that they were investigating Rodgers’ death and asked the defendant if he “would be kind enough” to go with them to the police station to answer some questions. The defendant replied, “sure, no problem,” and exited his vehicle without being asked to do so. Kennelly characterized the defendant’s demeanor as “calm, cooperative [and] rational,” and further observed that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. *637 The officers neither handcuffed nor arrested the defendant, and they did not tell him that he was under arrest because, according to Kennelly, there was no probable cause to arrest him at that time.
The defendant then entered Kennelly’s vehicle, and Kennelly transported him to the station. Although Kennelly did not tell the defendant that he did not have to go to the station, Kennelly testified that the defendant was, in fact, free to decline to do so. After the defendant had arrived at the station, he was placed in an interview room and read his Miranda 22 warnings from a printed card. After the defendant was advised of his rights, he signed and dated the card. The defendant then was asked whether he knew anything about Rodgers’ death. The defendant immediately broke into tears and confessed that he had killed Rodgers. He then made a full oral and written confession to the murder, which included the disclosure of the location where he had disposed of the murder weapon.
Pelosi testified for the state that, in the early morning hours of September 16, 1998, Waterbury police learned from Rodgers’ mother and Rodgers’ boyfriend that Rodgers had been with the defendant immediately prior to her death and that Rodgers knew that the defendant was a narcotics user. Sometime between 9 and 10 a.m. that morning, Pelosi drove his unmarked police car to the defendant’s Sumac Street address to participate in the surveillance. Upon his arrival there, Pelosi parked his vehicle at the other end of the street from where Kennelly and Ariola were parked and waited for the defendant. At approximately 10 a.m., Pelosi observed the defendant and Wilson pull into the defendant’s driveway. At that time, Kennelly and Ariola exited their vehicle and approached the defendant’s vehicle. Kennelly then spoke briefly to the defendant. According to *638 Pelosi, Kennelly told the defendant that he wanted to speak to him at the police station about Rodgers’ death and asked him if he would be willing to do so. Pelosi further testified that none of the officers was in uniform, no guns were drawn when they approached the defendant’s vehicle, the defendant was not told that he was under arrest, and he was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained. Pelosi described the defendant’s demeanor as “very quiet, calm . . . . [H]e looked worried, concerned.” Pelosi also stated that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Kennelly then drove the defendant to the police station for questioning. At some point, Pelosi asked Wilson if she would accompany him to the station for questioning. She replied that she would and got into the front passenger seat of Pelosi’s vehicle. The entire encounter, from the time the defendant and Wilson arrived on Sumac Street until they left in separate vehicles for the police station, lasted no more than five minutes.
Wilson testified at the suppression hearing for the defendant. She explained that, at approximately 10 a.m. on the day following Rodgers’ murder, she and the defendant, with whom she resided, arrived on Sumac Street in her Ford Escort and noticed that many people in the neighborhood were standing in front of then-houses. Before reaching his residence, the defendant pulled over to ask one of his neighbors whether she had seen Rodgers. The neighbor responded, “[N]o, cause you all murdered her.” The defendant then proceeded to drive down the street toward his residence. When he arrived there, a police car appeared. According to Wilson, the defendant immediately attempted to turn around and to leave, but the police told him “to stop,” and then “blocked him in.” Wilson further testified that the police “made” her and the defendant get out of the vehicle. When asked if she had any choice in the matter, she replied, “I didn’t know. I just did what they told *639 me.” Wilson also explained, however, that, after exiting the vehicle, she went to the police station vohmtarily.
Oliver testified that she was standing outside her house on Sumac Street in the morning hours of September 16, 1998, when she saw the defendant and Wilson drive up the street. The defendant pulled his vehicle over next to Oliver, and Wilson asked Oliver if she had seen Rodgers. Oliver responded that she had not. The defendant then continued driving toward his house, but a police car was parked nearby. When the defendant saw the police car, he tried to back up and to leave. At that point, however, the police car pulled up beside the defendant’s car, causing him to stop. Oliver could not hear any conversation but observed the defendant exit his vehicle and subsequently enter the officer’s car. Shortly thereafter, Wilson also got out of the vehicle and entered another police car that also had arrived at the scene. Both police cars then departed.
Ariola testified that the only car participating in the surveillance was the car that he and Kennelly were driving and that the officers had parked their car about three houses beyond the defendant’s house on the opposite side of the street. After the defendant arrived with Wilson in Wilson’s Ford Escort, the defendant pulled in front of his residence, waited “[a] few seconds” and then started to drive away. Before the defendant could drive away, however, Ariola moved his car into the middle of the street and stopped so close to the defendant’s car that the defendant could not get by him. The defendant made no further attempts to drive away. Ariola testified that, if the defendant had asked the officers to move, there would have been “no reason” to prevent him from backing up. The officers then exited their car and approached the defendant’s vehicle; Kennelly approached along the driver’s side and Ariola approached along the passenger’s side. After the officers identified themselves, Kennelly told the defendant *640 that he wanted the defendant to accompany him to the police station to talk about Rodgers. Neither officer had his gun drawn. Ariola further testified that there was no probable cause at that time to arrest the defendant and that the officers merely had wanted to question him because they had information that he was with Rodgers shortly before her death. The officers asked the defendant and Wilson to exit their vehicle, and, shortly thereafter, Pelosi arrived at the scene. The officers then called a tow truck for the defendant’s car. Ariola testified that “everybody,” including the defendant, was a suspect at the time, and the officers’ intention was to question, not to arrest, the defendant. After Kennelly and Pelosi left the scene in separate cars with the defendant and Wilson, respectively, Ariola stayed behind to secure the area and to guard the defendant’s vehicle until it could be towed away.
The final defense witness was Vega, the defendant’s next-door neighbor. Vega testified that, on the morning of the surveillance, he was standing in his front yard and saw four “marked” police cars block the defendant’s vehicle as the defendant approached his home. According to Vega, the police officers opened the defendant’s car door, “pointed a gun at [the defendant],” and “pulled him out” of the car. Immediately thereafter, the defendant, who was not handcuffed, was placed in one of the police vehicles. Vega stated that he was approximately 600 feet from the scene when he observed the events that formed the basis of his testimony.
Following this testimony, the trial court, O’Keefe, J., denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. In an oral ruling, the court found that the “confrontation or . . . meeting” between the police and the defendant on the morning of September 16,1998, did not have the “indicia of an arrest.” In support of this conclusion, the court observed that the officers did not run up to the defendant or draw their weapons when they approached him. *641 The court stated that Vega’s testimony that the officers had drawn their weapons was not credible, noting that, of all the witnesses, Vega was the only one to testify that the police were brandishing guns when they approached the defendant. The court also found that, although the officers “did stop [the defendant’s] car,” their actions were reasonable under the circumstances because it might not have been possible for the officers otherwise to have captured the defendant’s attention to alert him to the fact that they wanted to speak with him. The court further found that the confrontation between the defendant and the police was not a seizure for constitutional purposes, and, even if it was, it was based on a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that the defendant was involved in Rodgers’ death because her murder had occurred only a few hours earlier and the defendant had been identified as the last person to be seen with Rodgers while she was still alive. The court made no other specific findings with respect to the issue of whether the police had exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry stop. The court did note, however, that police officers are paid to speak with people in furtherance of criminal investigations and, therefore, that the officers in the present case had every right to try to speak with the defendant. Finally, the court found that the defendant had gone to the police station voluntarily. In support of this conclusion, the court observed that the defendant may have done so out of feelings of remorse or shame for what he had done because, as soon as he arrived at the station, he immediately began to cry and confessed to stabbing Rodgers. The court concluded, on the basis of the defendant’s behavior, that he did not “sound like somebody who is really resistant to the efforts of the police to talk to him.” Although the court stated that it would expand on its *642 oral ruling in a written memorandum of decision to follow, no such memorandum ever was issued. 23
“Our standard of review of a trial court’s findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record .... [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision .... We undertake a more probing factual review when a constitutional question hangs in the balance. ... In the present case, in which we are required to determine whether the defendant was seized by the police, we are presented with a, mixed question of law and fact that requires our independent review.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836, 843-44 , 955 A.2d 43 (2008). “When considering the validity of a . . . stop, our threshold inquiry is twofold. . . . First, we must determine at what point, if any . . . the encounter between [the police officer] and the defendant constitute [d] an investigatory stop ór seizure. . . . Next, [i]f we conclude that there was such a seizure, we must then determine whether [the police officers] possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion at the time the seizure occurred.” (Citations *643 omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495, 503 , 838 A.2d 981 (2004).
“Under the fourth amendment to the United States [constitution ... a police officer is permitted in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to detain an individual for investigative purposes if the officer believes, based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity, even if there is no probable cause to make an arrest. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31 , 110 S. Ct. 2412 , 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990); Terry v. Ohio, [ 392 U.S. 1, 22 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)]; State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 194-95 , 527 A.2d 1168 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927 , 108 S. Ct. 293 , 98 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1987). Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion.
“[I]n justifying [a] particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 21 .... In determining whether a detention is justified in a given case, a court must consider [whether], relying on the whole picture, the detaining officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. When reviewing the legality of a stop, a court must examine the specific information available to the police officer at the time of the initial intrusion and any rational inferences to be derived therefrom. ... A recognized function of a constitutionally permissible stop is to maintain the status quo for a brief period of time to enable the police to investigate a suspected crime. . . . State v. Lipscomb, 258 Conn. 68, 75-76 , 779 *644 A.2d 88 (2001); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972) ([a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time).
“In addition, [e]ffective crime prevention and detection . . . [underlie] the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for proposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 22 . Therefore, [a]n investigative stop can be appropriate even [when] the police have not observed a violation because a reasonable and articulable suspicion can arise from conduct that alone is not criminal. ... In evaluating the validity of such a stop, courts must consider whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the police officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 149-50 , 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848 , 126 S. Ct. 102 , 163 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2005).
This court also has recognized that “[t]he test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court [regarding] whether an investigative stop passes constitutional muster balances the nature of the intrusion [on] personal security against the importance of the governmental interest inducing the intrusion. See United States v. Hensley, [ 469 U.S. 221, 228 , 105 S. Ct. 675 , 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985)]. A strong law enforcement interest has been particularly recognized in the context of felonies or violent crimes, because ‘it is in the public interest that the crime be solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible.’ Id., 229 . Furthermore, when the situation in which a suspect has been detained has *645 afforded him a lesser expectation of privacy . . . fourth amendment protections have been deemed to be correspondingly less stringent.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Mitchell, supra, 204 Conn. 196 . Because the intrusion resulting from an investigative stop is minimal, the reasonable suspicion standard is not onerous.
“The determination of whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists rests on a two part analysis: (1) whether the underlying factual findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous; and (2) whether the conclusion that those facts gave rise to such a suspicion is legally correct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santos, supra, 267 Conn. 504 — 505.
The state does not directly address the propriety of the court’s finding that the encounter between the defendant and the police officers in the street in front of the defendant’s house did not constitute a seizure. The state contends, however, that, even if we assume, arguendo, that the officers’ conduct did constitute a seizure, the court properly concluded that the seizure was a lawful Terry stop. In particular, the state contends that the stop satisfied the requirements of Terry because it was based on the officers’ reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant was involved in Rodgers’ murder and because the stop was limited in scope and duration, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate its purpose of inquiring whether the defendant would be willing to answer some questions about Rodgers and the circumstances surrounding her death. The defendant does not challenge the court’s finding that the facts in existence at the time of the stop gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion on the part of the police officers to justify a Terry stop. 24 The defendant *646 claims, rather, that the officers’ detention of him “was marked by such intrusiveness, displays of force and coercion that it exceeded the bounds of a stop permitted by Terry” and, therefore, constituted a de facto arrest, which required probable cause. In support of his claim that the officers used undue force in detaining him, the defendant asserts that, in addition to blocking his vehicle, two or three armed officers surrounded him and ordered him out of the vehicle, behaved in a “blunt and forceful manner” toward him, and conveyed such urgency when they sought to have the defendant accompany them to the station that he was forced to abandon his vehicle in the middle of the road.
In response, the state maintains that the only aspect of the stop that even arguably could be characterized as involving a degree of compulsion or force was the officers’ use of their unmarked police vehicles to prevent the defendant from driving away. The state contends, however, that, when viewed in light of the totality of circumstances, the officers’ blocking the defendant’s vehicle so that he could not leave before the officers were able to speak to him was a reasonable means of maintaining the status quo so that the officers could complete the purpose of the investigatory stop. In other words, the state asserts that the challenged police action did not transform the stop into an arrest.
*647 For purposes of this appeal, we assume, arguendo, that the police seized or detained the defendant when they approached him and confronted him with the request that he accompany them to the station. We conclude, however, that the trial court properly determined that the seizure of the defendant by the police constituted a lawful Terry stop.
“A Terry stop that is justified at its inception can become constitutionally infirm if it lasts longer or becomes more intrusive than necessary to complete the investigation for which that stop was made. . . . Like the determination of initial justification, this inquiry is fact-bound.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mitchell, supra, 204 Conn. 197 . Whether the detention of a suspect exceeds the scope of a permissive investigative stop, however, is a question of law. See, e.g., State v. Nash, 278 Conn. 620, 641 , 899 A.2d 1 (2006).
“One function of a constitutionally permissible Terry stop is to maintain the status quo for a brief period of time to enable the police to investigate a suspected crime. A police officer who has proper grounds for stopping a suspect has constitutional permission to immobilize the suspect briefly in order to check a description or an identification, [as] long as his conduct is strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances [that] rendered its initiation permissible. . . . Determination of the means that are reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo necessarily depends on a fact-bound examination of the particular circumstances of the particular governmental intrusion on the personal security of a suspect.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 689 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985). “A police officer who has articulable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and to detain someone who may be implicated in that crime must be permitted to make reason *648 able use of the resources at his disposal at the site of the investigatory stop.” Id., 690 .
The defendant claims that two or three armed officers surrounded him, ordered him out of his vehicle and used undue force in detaining him. The defendant’s characterization of what occurred, however, is not fully consistent with the trial court’s findings concerning the officers’ conduct. As we previously have indicated, although the court made only limited factual findings with respect to the encounter between the police and the defendant, it determined that the confrontation had none of the indicia of an arrest because the officers “didn’t have any guns out, [and] they didn’t run up to [the defendant].” The court further found that, although the officers “did stop [the defendant’s] car” by pulling in front of it, that action was the only way for them to get the defendant’s attention so that they could talk to him. At no time did the police ever handcuff the defendant or otherwise inform him that he was not free to leave. Moreover, Kennelly testified that he had asked the defendant if he would be willing to accompany him to the station for questioning. Although one witness, namely, Vega, testified that the officers actually had drawn their guns, the court did not credit his testimony and was not required to do so. None of the other witnesses, including Wilson, the defendant’s girlfriend, described any conduct on the part of the officers that could be construed as unduly coercive, threatening or oppressive. Although it is true that Kennelly and Ariola approached the defendant’s vehicle from both sides, this was not unreasonable in view of the fact that the defendant was accompanied by Wilson, who was sitting in the front passenger seat. Because the suppression hearing testimony fully supports the trial court’s factual findings and its conclusion concerning the propriety of the Terry stop, we see no reason to disturb those findings and conclusions.
*649 The defendant nevertheless claims that the officers, by virtue of their actions, exceeded the scope of a permissible investigative stop, as a matter of law, when they approached and communicated with him. “When engaging in a fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry, we ask, would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a [person] reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? . . . [T]o satisfy the reasonableness standard, officers conducting stops on less than probable cause must employ the least intrusive means reasonably available to effect their legitimate investigative purposes. ... At the same time, however, the law recognizes the important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any particular situation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nash, supra, 278 Conn. 641 -42.
Connecticut courts have found the patdown of a suspect, the search of a suspect’s vehicle and the approach of officers with their guns drawn to be within the permissible bounds of a Terry stop depending on the circumstances. Thus, in State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489 , 692 A.2d 1233 (1997), for example, this court held that an investigatory detention was lawful when a uniformed officer, following a traffic stop of a vehicle during which its two occupants engaged in furtive conduct, approached the vehicle with his gun drawn, ordered the occupants out and, thereafter, conducted a patdown search of the occupants and a limited search of their vehicle for weapons. Id., 493-94, 501-504 ; see also State v. Casey, 45 Conn. App. 32, 41-44 , 692 A.2d 1312 (actions of police officers did not exceed permissible limits of investigative detention under Terry, even though police officers removed defendant and other suspects from vehicle at gunpoint, searched vehicle, defendant and other suspects twice, handcuffed defendant and other *650 suspects and placed them in back of police cruisers for one hour before making identifications necessary for probable cause to arrest, when police had information that defendant and other occupants of vehicle may have been involved in shooting and officers’ actions accounted for safety of public and themselves), cert. denied, 241 Conn. 924 , 697 A.2d 360 (1997); State v. Holloman, 20 Conn. App. 521, 526 , 568 A.2d 1052 (permissible in course of Terry stop for officers to order occupants out of car at gunpoint when report indicated occupants were involved in local armed robbery in which handgun was stolen), cert. denied, 214 Conn. 805 , 573 A.2d 317 (1990); State v. Wylie, 10 Conn. App. 683, 687-88 , 525 A.2d 528 (mere fact that officer ordered defendant to stop with officer’s gun drawn does not automatically convert Terry stop into arrest), cert. denied, 204 Conn. 807 , 528 A.2d 1154 (1987).
Guided by the general principles articulated in the foregoing cases and the policy considerations underlying Terry, we reject the defendant’s claim that the officers engaged in conduct that was more intrusive or more coercive than necessary to effectuate a legitimate Terry stop. In view of the fact that the officers were investigating a murder that had occurred in the area only a few hours earlier and the fact that the defendant was the last person seen with the victim, the officers’ conduct in detaining him briefly was not unreasonable. The only police conduct that fairly may be characterized as coercive was the action undertaken by the officers in blocking the defendant’s vehicle to ensure that he would not leave the area before they could speak to him. In light of the defendant’s attempt to leave almost immediately after he pulled up to his house, we agree with the trial court that blocking the defendant’s vehicle likely was the most efficacious way to maintain the status quo so that the police could gain the defendant’s attention. Other courts agree that such action ordinarily *651 is permissible to maintain the status quo when the subject of the investigatory stop is in a vehicle and, therefore, has the capacity to flee from the scene unless physically blocked from doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Tuley, 161 F.3d 513, 515 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[blocking a vehicle so its occupant is unable to leave during the course of an investigatory stop is reasonable to maintain the status quo while completing the purpose of the stop”); Commonwealth v. Hall, 50 Mass. App. 208, 210, 736 N.E.2d 425 (“[blocking generally will be reasonable [for purposes of a Terry stop] when the suspect is in a vehicle because of the chance that the suspect may flee upon the approach of police with resulting danger to the public as well as to the officers involved” [internal quotation marks omitted]), review denied, 432 Mass. 1111 , 739 N.E.2d 701 (2000).
Furthermore, as we previously indicated, the officers, who were driving an unmarked car and were not in uniform, approached the defendant’s vehicle without drawing their guns and merely requested that the defendant accompany them to the police station for questioning about the murder. Thus, other than Vega, whose testimony the trial court expressly discredited, no witness described the officers as having engaged in any conduct that reasonably may be deemed to be unduly intimidating or coercive under the circumstances with which the police officers were confronted when they stopped the defendant.
The defendant cites several cases for the proposition that the officers used a level of force and coercion that exceeded the limits of a lawful Terry stop. The officers in those cases, however, used far more coercive techniques than those that were employed by the officers in the present case. See Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843, 851-52 (4th Cir. 2001) (defendant’s liberty was curtailed to degree associated with formal arrest because he would not have felt free to leave after being thrown *652 against wall, kicked, handcuffed and locked in patrol car); United States v. Robinson, 30 F.3d 774, 785 (7th Cir. 1994) (stop escalated into arrest when defendant was placed in handcuffs and read his Miranda rights); Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 645-46 (2d Cir. 1994) (court concluded that police had gone beyond investigatory stop of suspects and had arrested them on basis of facts that suspects had been “boxed-in by six police vehicles and outnumbered two-to-one by officers with guns drawn or at the ready,” ordered from vehicle, harshly treated, kept in handcuffs for duration of detention, placed in separate police cruisers and questioned with or without Miranda warnings, and extensively searched), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1076 , 115 S. Ct. 721 , 130 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1995); United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir. 1992) (blocking of defendant’s egress by two agents in separate cars and approach by agent with drawn gun constituted arrest that required probable cause because suspect was not free to leave); United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (11th Cir. 1992) (detention went beyond bounds of Terry stop when officer asked suspect to stop and identify herself, placed her in handcuffs, took her to police station, handcuffed her to chair and searched her purse); United States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337, 340 (9th Cir. 1990) (investigatory stop transformed into arrest when officers took hold of and isolated unarmed, compliant juvenile by shining high beams of police car in his face, patting him down, gripping his arm, telling him not to run anymore and directing him to back of one of two patrol cars); State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57, 70-73 , 570 A.2d 193 (1990) (detention in course of Terry stop exceeded permissible limits when officers placed defendant in handcuffs and transported him to police headquarters to be held for investigative purposes for indefinite period of time). In fact, none of the elements associated with the impermissible Terry stops in the *653 foregoing cases is present in this case: the officers who confronted the defendant did not draw their guns, did not place the defendant in handcuffs, did not seize any items in his possession or control, did not tell him or indicate to him that he could not leave, did not lock him in a patrol car and did not use any other type of physical force against him that might have been considered excessive under the circumstances. The defendant therefore cannot prevail on his claim that the conduct of the officers exceeded the permissible bounds of a Terry stop as a matter of law.
The defendant also claims that he did not agree voluntarily to go to the police station to be questioned about the murder. He contends that his purported consent to speak to the police was the fruit of his illegal seizure and that, even if it was not, his agreement merely reflected his submission to lawful authority. We reject the defendant’s contentions.
We first address the defendant’s claim that his consent was invalid because it was the fruit of an illegal seizure. “Courts have frequently held that a purportedly voluntary consent given after an illegal arrest or search is nonetheless a tainted fruit when that consent was given very soon after the illegal police action. See, e.g., United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1459 (10th Cir. 1985) (consent given promptly after illegal arrest invalid); United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 84 (4th Cir. 1982) (consent occurring ‘within the same brief continuous encounter’ as illegal seizure invalid); State v. Raheem, 464 So. 2d 293, 297-98 (La. 1985) (consent given within forty minutes of arrest invalid). These decisions imply that a consent given in very close temporal proximity to the official illegality is often a mere submission or resignation to police authority and not necessarily an act of free will.” State v. Cates, 202 Conn. 615, 621-22 , 522 A.2d 788 (1987). In light of our determination that the defendant’s detention was lawful under *654 Terry, however, the defendant cannot establish that his answers to questions posed to him by the police at the station constituted the fruit of an illegal seizure.
The defendant next asserts that, even if he was the subject of a lawful investigatory stop, he did not consent voluntarily to go to the police station for questioning bécause, under the totality of the circumstances, his agreement to do so was the product of police coercion. The defendant also contends that the evidence demonstrates that he merely was submitting to lawful authority. We reject these claims.
It is well established that “[t]he question [of] whether consent ... has . . . been freely and voluntarily given, or was the product of coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. . . . and, ultimately, requires a determination regarding the putative consenter’s state of mind.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 44 , 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 , 124 S. Ct. 1614 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004). “The state must affirmatively establish that the consent was voluntary; mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is not enough to meet the state’s burden. ... As a question of fact, it is normally to be decided by the trial court [on] the evidence before that corut together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.
. . . We may reverse [the trial court’s factual] findings on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Azukas, 278 Conn. 267, 275 , 897 A.2d 554 (2006). “We are particularly mindful that all of these factual findings revolve principally around the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before the trial court, the evaluation of which is left to the trial court’s sound discretion because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it.” Id., 277 .
*655 This court recently considered the issue of voluntary consent in State v. Azukas, supra, 278 Conn. 267 . In Azukas , several officers were granted entry into a home in which the defendant, Anthony Azukas, a suspect in a murder, was staying with his girlfriend and their infant child. 25 Id., 271 . The police located Azukas in an upstairs bedroom and told him that they would like to speak to him about a murder that they were investigating. Id., 273-74 . Azukas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station, where he confessed to the murder. Id., 271-72 . On appeal, Azukas claimed that the trial court improperly had denied his motion to suppress his inculpatory statements because, inter alia, his consent to accompany the police to the station had not been voluntary. See id., 272, 284-85 . In rejecting the claim, we observed that the trial court specifically had credited testimony, adduced by the state, that Azukas willingly had agreed to go to with the officers to the station and that he had not been placed under arrest, handcuffed or otherwise restrained in any way. Id., 284 . Furthermore, the evidence adduced by the state indicated that the officers had not engaged in any coercive conduct toward Azukas and that they also did not argue with him or harass him in any way. Id., 284 — 85. We concluded that the suppression hearing testimony supported the trial court’s conclusion that Azukas had consented to accompany the officers voluntarily. Id.
Similarly, in State v. Colon, supra, 272 Conn. 107 , we observed that the defendant, Ivo Colon, voluntarily had accompanied the police to the station, where he confessed to the fatal beating of a two year old child. 26 Id., *656 133,140-41 . We explained that the trial court had found that, after the police confronted Colon in the hallway of his mother’s apartment; see id., 131,137 ; they briefly detained him under Terry and asked him if he would go to the station with them to discuss the child’s injuries. Id., 151-52 n.15. When Colon nodded affirmatively, he was transported to the station by the police. Id. We further noted that the trial court had found that “[t]here were no guns drawn, or any evidence of threats, or physical force. The evidence that the court finds credible is that [Colon] was not handcuffed. He was placed in an unmarked police cruiser, without a cage, and taken to police headquarters. [Colon’s] demeanor was calm and [he was] under control. Although the police did not tell [Colon that] he could refuse to go to the police station, he did not object or request to go to the . . . station at another time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We thus characterized the evidence as indicating that Colon had consented voluntarily to go to the police station for questioning. See id.
Other courts also have concluded that a defendant’s consent to accompany the police to the station was voluntary when the defendant appeared willing to do so and there was no evidence of coercion. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-58 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 , 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980) (respondent voluntarily agreed to accompany federal agents to airport office after being approached on concourse and asked by agents if she would do so and there was no threat or show of force); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (defendant voluntarily consented to accompany officers to police station because, even though he was not told that he was free to leave or free to refuse further questioning, he expressly agreed to go to station when asked several times, never indicated any unwillingness to do so, and officers did not handcuff, physically restrain, threaten to arrest, coerce or *657 otherwise intimidate defendant); State v. Navarro, 201 Ariz. 292, 296-97 , 34 P.3d 971 (2001) (defendant voluntarily consented to accompany officer to police station for questioning after defendant arrived voluntarily at scene of investigation, plainclothes officers did not surround him on public street, handcuffs were removed almost immediately after being placed on him, and defendant verbally agreed to accompany officers to station upon being asked to do so); State v. Bragan, 920 S.W.2d 227, 243 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany police officers to station, there having been no threats, no show of force and no physical compulsion to accompany officers, even though speaking officer’s tone of voice indicated that trip to station was mandatory). But cf. United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1985) (defendant did not voluntarily consent to accompany police officer to station when officer withheld defendant’s driver’s license, car registration and title and defendant therefore had no reasonable choice other than to accompany officer no matter how polite officer was in phrasing request).
Turning to the present case, we conclude that the trial court properly found that the defendant voluntarily had agreed to go to the police station for questioning. There is no evidence that the officers forced or otherwise pressured the defendant to accompany them to the station. In fact, the testimony indicated that the defendant was cooperative with the police, who were not in uniform and did not display their weapons, and that he got out of his vehicle without being asked to do so. The defendant never was restrained, his demeanor was described as calm, and he did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the evidence that the state adduced demonstrated that the police had asked the defendant if he would be willing to accompany them *658 to the station; at no time was the defendant told that he was obligated to go to the station or that he otherwise was required to speak to the police. Although it may be true that most people would view such an approach by the police with concern or apprehension, we never have held that a Terry stop is so inherently coercive as to compel the conclusion that the suspect’s agreement to speak to the police could not have been voluntary. On the contrary, the test is fact specific, so that, ultimately, the determination of whether the consent was voluntary rests on a careful consideration of the totality of the relevant circumstances. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany the police to the station upon being requested to do so.
The defendant nevertheless has identified twenty-five “circumstances,” or reasons, 27 that purportedly demon- *659 state why his consent was not voluntary. Several of these reasons relate to the fact that the officers did not inform the defendant that he was not required to comply with their request that he accompany them to the police station or that they did not specifically ask him whether his consent was voluntary. Indeed, Kennelly acknowledged that he did not inform the defendant that he did not have to go to the station. It was altogether reasonable, however, for the trial court to have concluded that this fact, standing alone, was insufficient to render the defendant’s consent involuntary. Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, “we cannot accept the position . . . that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a ‘voluntary’ consent. Rather, it is only by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact it was voluntary or coerced. It is this careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each case that is evidenced in our prior decisions . . . .” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); see also United States v. Thompson, 524 F.3d 1126, 1134 (10th Cir. 2008) (“knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not a necessary prerequi *660 site” to establishing that consent was voluntary [internal quotation marks omitted]); United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 651 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Symes v. United States, 633 A.2d 51, 53-54 (D.C. 1993) (same). Under the circumstances of the present case, the mere fact that the pohce did not inform the defendant of his right to refuse to accompany them to the station does not invalidate the court’s finding that his agreement to do so was the product of his voluntary consent and not pohce coercion.
The defendant also claims that his consent was involuntary because the officers (1) blocked him from leaving the scene, (2) were armed, (3) approached on both sides of his vehicle, (4) did not allow him to move his vehicle from the middle to the side of the road, (5) sought his consent immediately after he was seized, (6) were blunt in their manner, and (7) had him ride to the pohce station in the backseat of their vehicle instead of having him drive his own vehicle. We disagree with the defendant’s contention that these facts required a finding that his consent had not been obtained voluntarily. Although these facts are relevant to the determination of whether the defendant’s consent was voluntary, they are not necessarily dispositive of that issue, and the trial court was not bound to treat them as such. Indeed, in light of the other facts that demonstrate the defendant’s willingness to accompany the police, the trial court reasonably concluded that the defendant had agreed to do so voluntarily. 28 We therefore reject the *661 defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his inculpatory statements and the fruits thereof.
II
BORN ALIVE RULE
The defendant next claims that, in denying his motion to dismiss the murder count and the two capital felony counts predicated on Antonia’s death, the trial court, Damiani, J., improperly invoked the bom alive mle in connection with its determination that Antonia was a “person” within the meaning of this state’s murder and capital felony statutes. The defendant contends that there is no precedent in this state pursuant to which a defendant may be held hable for a homicide that is founded on an injury inflicted on a fetus and, even if such authority existed, the mle is obsolete and should not be followed. The defendant further claims that the bom alive mle is inconsistent with, and thus abrogated by, our Penal Code, because, under the Penal Code, “criminal liability [is premised] on attendant circumstances that must exist at the time the [crime was committed].” The defendant maintains that, in light of this principle, he could not have murdered Antonia within the meaning of the Penal Code because of the lack of a temporal nexus between his criminal conduct and her status as a person. In a related vein, the defendant, relying on his contention concerning the inapplicability of the bom alive mle, further maintains that his intent to kill Rodgers could not be transferred to Antonia under the transferred intent provisions of § 53a-54a (a) because he engaged in the conduct resulting in Antonia’s death when Antonia was not a person. Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court’s “novel” application of the “twin legal fictions” of the bom alive mle and the doctrine of transferred intent, as a basis for concluding that the state could prosecute him for mur *662 der and capital felony, violated his constitutional right to fair warning under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and constituted a violation of the ex post facto clause of article one, § 10, of the United States constitution. 29
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of these claims. On February 11, 1999, the trial court, Damiani, J., conducted aprobable cause hearing on the two counts of murder and the two counts of capital felony with which the defendant had been charged. Because three of the counts require proof by the state that Antonia was bom alive, namely, the counts alleging the murder of Antonia, the murder of a person under the age of sixteen (Antonia) and the murder of two or more persons (Rodgers and Antonia) in a single transaction, the state adduced testimony from Richard S. Palmer, the emergency department physician who delivered Antonia via cesarean section. 30 Due to the circumstances, Palmer had only an extremely limited opportunity to observe Antonia, but he did observe that Antonia was not breathing and was not making any sounds at the time of delivery. He also made no attempt to resuscitate Antonia; instead, imme *663 diately after delivering Antonia, Palmer transferred her to a physician’s assistant, who then rushed her to the pediatric intensive care unit. Approximately one-half hour after the delivery, Palmer went to that unit and treated a laceration that Antonia had suffered during the cesarean section. At that time, Antonia’s vital signs, that is, her heart rate and respiration, had been stabilized, and she had been placed on a ventilator. Palmer thereafter completed the appropriate paperwork for the issuance of Antonia’s birth certificate, which signified that she had been bom alive. Over the next several weeks, Palmer often checked on Antonia, who continued to exhibit stable vital signs until, six weeks later, when she was removed from the ventilator and subsequently pronounced dead.
On the same day as the probable cause hearing, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the capital felony charges and the charge relating to Antonia’s murder, and made a request for a finding of no probable cause. In the motion to dismiss, the defendant asserted that these charges were legally deficient because, inter alia, (1) Antonia was a fetus when the defendant inflicted the injuries that resulted in her death, and, as a matter of law, a fetus is not a person under this state’s murder and capital felony statutes, (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite “concurrence between the [necessary] mens rea and the actus reus of the charged offenses,” and (3) prosecuting the defendant under the bom alive rule violates his right to notice under the relevant due process and ex post facto provisions of the federal constitution.
On May 19,1999, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and request for a finding of no probable cause. State v. Courchesne, 46 Conn. Sup. 63 , 757 A.2d 699 (1999). In its memorandum of decision, the trial court characterized the fundamental question presented as “whether the defendant can be tried for mur *664 der and capital felony for the killing of an infant who succumbs forty-two days following a [cesarean] birth necessitated by the fatal stabbing of her pregnant mother . . . .” Id., 64 . The court observed that, to establish that the defendant had committed the crimes of murder and capital felony arising out of the death of Antonia, the state was required to prove that Antonia was a “person” within the meaning of the murder and capital felony statutes. See id., 65 . Because General Statutes § 53a-3 (1) defines “person” simply as a “human being,” a term that itself is not defined in our statutes, the trial court turned to the Model Penal Code and the New York Penal Law for guidance. Id., 66-67. The court observed that, under the New York Penal Law, “a ‘person’ is defined as ‘a human being who has been bom and is alive.’ ” Id., 67, quoting New York Penal Law § 125.05 (1) (McKinney 1998). The trial court also observed that “[t]he Model Penal Code defines a ‘human being’ as ‘a person who has been bom and is alive.’ ” State v. Courchesne, supra, 67 ; see Model Penal Code § 210.0 (1) (1980). On the basis of these definitions and this court’s past reliance on the New York Penal Law and Model Penal Code in construing this state’s Penal Code, the trial court concluded that “the definition of a ‘person’ in Connecticut criminal law includes those who are bom and are alive.” State v. Courchesne, supra, 67 . The court further concluded that this definition did not exclude Antonia because the physician who delivered her, Palmer, had testified at the probable cause hearing that Antonia “was bom and remained alive for forty-two days before she succumbed to her injuries.” Id.
In reaching its determination, the trial court also relied on the common-law bom alive rule. See id., 67-69 . The court explained that, under that rule, “the death of a fetus could stand as a basis for murder as long as the fetus was bom alive and subsequently died of injuries *665 inflicted in útero.” Id., 68 . The corut further observed that the bom alive rule previously had been recognized in this state in State v. Anonymous (1986-1), 40 Conn. Sup. 498 , 516 A.2d 156 (1986) (Anonymous). See State v. Courchesne, supra, 46 Conn. Sup. 67 . In Anonymous, the court relied on the bom alive rale in denying the state’s application for a warrant to arrest the defendant, who had been accused of murder in connection with the death of “an unborn but viable fetus . . . .” State v. Anonymous (1986-1), supra, 498-500, 502-503, 505. The trial court in the present case therefore rejected the defendant’s contention that application of the bom alive rale violated his due process right to fair notice because Antonia was a fetus when the defendant inflicted her fatal injuries, and, therefore, he had no reason to know that her subsequent death could give rise to a cognizable offense, namely, murder or capital felony. See State v. Courchesne, supra, 71-72 . The court explained that the bom alive rale has deep roots in the common law and that the legislature’s codification of the criminal law had not altered the rale in any way. Id., 71 . For these same reasons, the court rejected the defendant’s claim that application of the rale constituted an unconstitutional ex post facto law, concluding that “the rule [that] applies to establish the defendant’s liability was not created after he acted. ... To apply the bom alive rale to this defendant, therefore, would not make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission [in violation of the ex post facto clause] .... Collins v. Youngblood, [ 497 U.S. 37, 42 , 110 S. Ct. 2715 , 111 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1990)].” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, supra, 72 . Finally, with respect to the defendant’s claim that the state had failed to demonstrate the necessary “concurrence between the mens rea and the actus reus of the charged offenses”; id., 73 ; the trial court observed that “[t]he intent required by *666 § 53a-54a (a) [this state’s murder statute] may be supplied under the doctrine of transferred intent. The clear meaning of the statute leads to the result that, when a person engages in conduct with the intent to kill someone, there can be a separate count of murder for every person actually killed by the conduct. State v. Hinton, [ 227 Conn. 301, 309 , 630 A.2d 593 (1993)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, supra, 74 . The court concluded that there was nothing in our statutory scheme to prevent the state from relying on the principle of transferred intent for the purpose of establishing that the defendant had the mental state necessary to support a conviction of the murder of Antonia even though the injuries that caused her death were inflicted while she was in útero. Id., 74-75 .
Thereafter, the defendant waived his right to a jury trial for purposes of the guilt phase of the case, and his case was tried before the panel. On September 17, 2001, following that trial, the panel issued a written decision finding the defendant guilty of all charges. With respect to the counts of the information relating to Antonia’s murder, the panel found that the definition of “person” under Connecticut law “includes those who are bom and are alive,” and, therefore, for purposes of § 53a-3 (1), a human being is “a person who has been ‘bom alive.’ ” After observing that “[t]he law of the case is consistent with this . . . [conclusion],” the panel further stated that “the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Antonia . . . was bom alive” and, consequently, that she is “a person” within the meaning of this state’s murder and capital felony statutes. The panel further explained that the state had proven that the defendant, with the intent to cause the death of Rodgers, had caused the death of Antonia in violation of the provision of § 53a-54a (a) pursuant to which a person is guilty of murder “when, with intent to cause *667 the death of another person, he causes the death . . . of a third person . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The defendant subsequently filed a motion for articulation of several legal conclusions and factual findings made by the panel in its written decision. The panel granted the motion only as to one legal conclusion, 31 namely, “[t]he legal basis for [the] adoption of the bom alive mle and what [the panel] meant when it referred to ‘the case law’ and ‘the law of the case.’ . . . The defendant requests that [the panel] articulate both the meaning and significance of ‘the case law’ and ‘the law of the case,’ and to what extent, if at all, [the panel] adopted [the] . . . analysis and ruling [of the court, Damiani, J.] on the [bom alive] issue.” In its articulation, the panel stated that the term “ ‘[l]aw of the case’ refers to prior decisions made during the course of this case” and that, under that doctrine, “when a matter has previously been ruled [on] interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding in the case may treat that decision as the law of the case.” The panel then observed that the court, Damiani, J., had resolved the issue of the bom alive mle as it applies to murder and *668 capital felony “in a well thought out [and] comprehensive opinion,” and that the panel had adopted the court’s reasoning and analysis in concluding that the defendant was guilty of those offenses insofar as they pertained to the murder of Antonia.
Before turning to the merits of the defendant’s claims, we first set forth the applicable standard of review. 32 “A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the [state] cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cyr, 291 Conn. 49, 56 , 967 A.2d 32 (2009). “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [0]ur review of the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [decision to deny] . . . the motion to dismiss will be de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Haight, 279 Conn. 546, 550 , 903 A.2d 217 (2006).
The defendant’s claim also raises an issue of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary. E.g., Stiffler v. Continental Ins. Co., 288 Conn. 38, 42 , 950 A.2d 1270 (2008). “When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine the meaning, General Statutes § l-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of *669 such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 43. “[W]hen the statute being construed is a criminal statute, it must be construed strictly against the state in favor of the accused.” State v. Cardwell, 246 Conn. 721, 739 , 718 A.2d 954 (1998). Furthermore, “[w]e are mindful . . . that, [i]n determining whether ... a statute abrogates or modifies a common law rule the construction must be strict, and the operation of a statute in derogation of the common law is to be limited to matters clearly brought within its scope. . . . Thus, [n]o statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import [and a statute] is not to be construed as making any innovation [on] the common law which it does not fairly express. . . . We recognize only those alterations of the common law that are clearly expressed in the language of the statute because the traditional principles of justice [on] which the common law is founded should be perpetuated.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 267 Conn. 524, 532 , 839 A.2d 1250 (2004); see also State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 94 , 584 A.2d 1157 (1991) (recognizing in context of criminal case that “[i]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of the common law should not be construed to alter the common law further than their words demand”). Thus, “[i]t is assumed that all legislation is interpreted in light of the common law at the time of its enactment.” (Inter *670 nal quotation marks omitted.) Hunte v. Blumenthal, 238 Conn. 146, 153 , 680 A.2d 1231 (1996). Accordingly, this court frequently has interpreted our criminal statutes and rules in light of common-law principles. See, e.g., State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 536-40 , 949 A.2d 1092 (2008) (kidnapping statute); State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 691-93 , 888 A.2d 985 (2006) (criminal statute of limitations), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030 , 127 S. Ct. 578 , 166 L. Ed. 2d 428 (2006); State v. Scott, 256 Conn. 517, 533-34 , 779 A.2d 702 (2001) (sexual assault statutes); State v. Miranda, 245 Conn. 209, 222-26 , 715 A.2d 680 (1998) (assault statute), overruled on other grounds by State v. Miranda, 274 Conn. 727, 734 , 878 A.2d 1118 (2005); State v. Guess, supra, 244 Conn. 771 -76 (murder statute); Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 705-708 , 647 A.2d 324 (1994) (criminal contempt statute); State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 196-200 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994) (territorial jurisdiction of court over capital felony offenses), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165 , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995); State v. Kulmac, 230 Conn. 43, 52-53 , 644 A.2d 887 (1994) (rape shield and risk of injury statutes); State v. Sanchez, 204 Conn. 472, 477-82 , 528 A.2d 373 (1987) (perjury statute). Thus, the issue is “whether the principle should be recognized as a matter of policy under the circumstances of [the particular] case.” State v. Miranda, supra, 245 Conn. 221 .
With these principles in mind, we commence our review of the defendant’s claim with an examination of the relevant statutory language. General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) provides in relevant part that “[a] person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person . . . .” “Person” is defined for the purpose of the homicide statutes as a “human being . . . .” General Statutes § 53a-3 (1). The term “human being,” however, is not defined statutorily. Moreover, as the trial court correctly observed, the legislative his *671 tory of the relevant statutoiy provisions, including §§ 53a-3 (1) and 53a-54a (a), offers no guidance with respect to the issue raised by the present case, namely, whether a person who murders a pregnant woman also may be found guilty of the murder of the baby if the baby is bom alive and later dies from injuries inflicted while the baby is in útero, in the course of the intentional killing of the mother. 33
When the language and legislative history of a criminal statute do not resolve the question of statutory interpretation presented by a particular case, this court “may turn to the parallel statutory provisions set forth in the Model Penal Code and the [revised] New York . . . Penal Law, effective September 1, 1967, for guidance”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Havican, 213 Conn. 593, 601 , 569 A.2d 1089 (1990); because “[t]he drafters of [our Penal Code] relied heavily [on] the Model Penal Code and various state criminal codes, especially the [P]enal [Law] of New York. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 1, 1969 Sess., p. 11.” State v. Hill, 201 Conn. 505, 516-17 , 523 A.2d 1252 (1986); see also State v. Henry, 253 Conn. 354, 363 , 752 A.2d 40 (2000) (“[w]e note that our Penal Code is modeled after the New York Penal [Law]”); State v. Desimone, 241 Conn. 439, 456 , 696 A.2d 1235 (1997) (legislature relied on “the interpretations of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code and the New York [P]enal [Law] . . . when it revised the state [P]enal [C]ode in 1969” [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Anonymous (1986-1), supra, 40 Conn. Sup. 500 (“[t]he murder section of [this state’s] [P]enal [C]ode was based partly on the [revised] New York *672 . . . Penal Law and partly on the Model Penal Code” [internal quotation marks omitted]). The New York Penal Law defines “person” as “a human being who has been bom and is alive.” New York Penal Law § 125.05 (1) (McKinney 2009). 34 The Model Penal Code defines “human being” as “a person who has been bom and is alive . . . .” Model Penal Code § 210.0 (1) (1980). Thus, even a viable fetus that succumbs to injuries inflicted in útero before being bom alive is not a person within the meaning of the New York Penal Law and the Model Penal Code. 35 Notably, moreover, New York *673 courts have concluded that an infant who is bom alive and then dies from injuries sustained in útero is a person under that state’s homicide statutes. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 158 App. Div. 2d 69, 71-76, 557 N.Y.S.2d 879 , appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 940 , 564 N.E.2d 679 , 563 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1990).
*674 We also look for interpretive guidance to common-law principles governing the same general subject matter. 36 “At common law it is clear that only a living human being could be the victim of a homicide. To become a human being within the meaning of homicide statutes at common law, a child had to be bom alive and have an existence independent of and separate from its mother. . . . The ‘bom alive’ rule dates back to at least the [seventeenth] century when the great common lawyer, Sir Edward Coke, wrote that the killing of an unborn quickened child ‘is a great misprision and no murder.’ . . . The ‘bom alive’ requirement was reiterated [in the eighteenth century] by [Sir William] Blackstone in [his common-law treatise entitled] Commentaries [on the Laws of England] .... As has been elsewhere thoroughly documented, Blackstone had tremendous impact on the development of the common law in the original American colonies and in the early states of *675 this . . . country. By 1850, the ‘bom alive’ rule had widespread general acceptance by all jurisdictions in the United States [that] had considered the issue.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 1985); see also C. Forsythe, “Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Bom Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms,” 21 Val. U. L. Rev. 563 , 595-96 (1987).
“In its simplest statement, the ‘bom alive rule’ prescribes that only one who has been bom alive can be the victim of homicide. Causing the death of a fetus, whether viable or not, was not considered homicide at common law. If, however, the fetus was bom and then died of injuries inflicted prior to birth, a prosecution for homicide could be maintained. Requirements for proof of live birth were . . . stringent: ‘the fetus must have been totally expelled from the mother and have shown clear signs of independent vitality.’ ” Commonwealth v. Booth, 564 Pa. 228, 240 , 766 A.2d 843 (2001). “At least two reasons, both deriving from the state of medical knowledge in centuries past, may be discerned for such requirements. First, owing to the high incidence of prenatal mortality and stillbirths, it was exceedingly difficult to determine that a fetal death or stillbirth had resulted from a defendant’s act and not from natural causes. Second, because the fetus was considered to be dependent [on], and therefore essentially a part of, its mother, a prosecution for homicide could not be maintained unless it could be shown that the fetus had become a person separate from its mother.” Id., 241 . As one court in Australia recently explained: “The law presumed that all children were bom dead and the fact of live birth had to be established by evidence. . . . Usually such proof was not difficult, but problems arose when a child died soon after birth and there was no, or little, direct evidence of what had happened at or immediately after birth.” (Citations *676 omitted.) Regina v. Iby, 63 N.S.W.L.R. 278, 283-84, 154 A. Crim. R. 55 (New South Wales Crim. App. 2005).
The commentaries of one of Connecticut’s most prominent legal scholars, former Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift, a member of this court from 1808 until 1819, reveal that the bom alive rule was a component of the state’s homicide laws from its earliest days. See 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (1796) p. 299. In his scholarly and authoritative treatise on Connecticut law, Swift states: “The [s]tatute respecting murder enacts, that if any person shall commit any wilful murder, upon malice, hatred or cruelty, not in a man’s just and necessary [defense], nor by casualty against his will, or shall slay or kill another through guile, or by poisoning, or other such atrocious practices, he shall be put to death. The common law definition of murder is when a person of sound memory and discretion, unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in being, and in the public peace, with malice aforethought, either express or implied. It is evident that the statute is made in affirmance of the common law. . . .
“The person killed, to constitute murder, must be actually in existence. To kill a child in its mother’s womb, is not murder, but a great misdemeanor, but if the child be bom alive, and then die by reason of the injury it suffered in the womb, it will be murder in him who caused it.” Id., pp. 298-99. A similar assertion concerning the vitality of the bom alive rule also is contained in a second commentary, namely, A Digest of the Laws of the State of Connecticut, that also was originally authored by Swift. Swift stated therein: “Felonious [h]omicide is of two kinds, [m]urder and [m]an-slaughter. Murder is defined to be where a person of sound memory, and discretion, unlawfully kills any reasonable creature, in being, and in the peace, with malice aforethought express or implied. . . .
*677 “To constitute murder the party killed must be a reasonable being, alive and in the peace. Therefore to take a potion in order to procure an abortion or to administer it, to a pregnant female with the same design, or to strike her so that the child is killed, is not murder at common law, because [the child] is not in existence, and the circumstance of its death cannot be ascertained with sufficient precision: but if the child be bom alive, and afterwards die[s] by reason of the violence it has received before its birth, it seems to be the better opinion that it will be murder in the party who inflicted it.” 37 2 Z. Swift, A Digest of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (1823) p. 267. Furthermore, although the issue is one of first impression for this court, trial courts in this state previously have applied the bom alive mle, or a rale akin to the bom alive rale, in concluding that a fetus that is bom alive despite having suffered injuries in útero as a result of the negligence of another person has a cause of action against the wrongdoer; Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Sup. 139, 147 , 380 A.2d 1353 (1977) (any fetus regardless of viability); Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 242, 248 , 111 A.2d 14 (1955) (viable fetus); and that a viable fetus that is injured in útero but dies before being bom is not a person within the meaning of the state’s homicide statutes. See State v. Anonymous (1986-1), supra, 40 Conn. Sup. 499 . In addition, in In re Valerie D., 25 Conn. App. 586 , 595 A.2d 922 (1991), rev’d on other grounds, 223 Conn. 492 , 613 A.2d 748 (1992), the Appellate Court quoted Anonymous with approval, noting, inter alia, that the court in Anonymous had declined to treat an unborn child as a person for purposes of our Penal Code because, under the code, a person includes only those who have bom alive. Id., 591 .
*678 In ascertaining the common law, we also look to the decisions of other jurisdictions. E.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 464 , 121 S. Ct. 1693 , 149 L. Ed. 2d 697 (2001) (“[cjommon law courts frequently look to the decisions of other jurisdictions in determining whether to alter or modify a common law rule in light of changed circumstances, increased knowledge, and general logic and experience”); State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93, 107 , 794 A.2d 506 (same), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 902 , 123 S. Ct. 224 , 154 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2002); see also Pacific Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 240 Conn. 26, 30 , 688 A.2d 319 (1997) (“[although this court has not previously addressed [the common-law issue presented], we find guidance in the decisions of other jurisdictions”). As one court has noted, “[c]ourts in other jurisdictions have also consistently concluded that the death of an infant who is bom alive from injuries inflicted in útero constitutes homicide. See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341, 1343-44 [9th Cir.] (kicking and stabbing of mother resulting in death of infant ten minutes after birth was killing of ‘human being’) [cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1238 , 108 S. Ct. 2908 , 101 L. Ed. 2d 939 (1988)]; Ranger v. [State], 249 Ga. 315 , [317, 290 S.E.2d 63 ] (1982) (death of child, twelve hours after birth, caused by shooting of mother sufficient to sustain conviction for felony murder of child); [People] v. Bolar, 109 Ill. App. 3d 384 , [389-92, 440 N.E.2d 639 ] (1982) (newborn surviving only long enough to exhibit a few heartbeats ‘individual’ within meaning of manslaughter and reckless homicide statutes); Jones v. [Commonwealth], 830 S.W.2d 877,880 [Ky. 1992] (infant who died from prenatal injuries fourteen hours after birth was ‘person’ within [meaning of] criminal homicide statutes); Williams v. [State], 316 Md. 677 , [682-83, 561 A.2d 216 ] (1989) (death of child seventeen hours after birth from arrow wound [to] mother supported manslaughter conviction); [State] v. Anderson, 135 N.J. *679 Super. 423 , [429, 343 A.2d 505 (1975)] (twins who died within hours of birth ‘persons’ within meaning of homicide laws); People v. Hall, [supra, 158 App. Div. 2d 76-78] (infant who died thirty-six hours after birth due to prenatal shooting of mother [was] ‘person’ within meaning of homicide statutes); Cuellar [v. State], 957 S.W.2d 134 [140 (Tex. App. 1997, pet. refd)] (infant who died forty-three hours after birth from injuries suffered by mother in car crash ‘individual’ within meaning of manslaughter statute).
“Although some of those decisions were based [on] statutes expressly defining homicide to include the deaths of those who have been bom alive, the absence of such language does not dictate a contrary inteipretation. In [State] v. Cornelius, 152 Wis. 2d 272 , [ 448 N. W.2d 434 (App. 1989)], the defendant argued that, notwithstanding the inclusion of the bom alive mle in the statutory definition of ‘human being,’ he could not be prosecuted for homicide for the death of a child resulting from the infliction of prenatal injuries. [Id., 279.] In rejecting the claim, the court noted that Wisconsin (like Arizona [and Connecticut]) had abolished common law crimes in favor of a criminal code. See [id.] Nevertheless, the court observed that common law mies not in conflict with the code were retained . . . and thus concluded that it would have employed the bom alive mle in interpreting the homicide statute even absent a statutory reference to the mle. See id.” State v. Cotton, 197 Ariz. 584, 589 , 5 P.3d 918 (App. 2000); see also id., 586, 590-91 (infant who died twenty-four hours after birth from injuries sustained in útero when mother was shot in head was “person” within meaning of Arizona homicide statutes). This is trae in Connecticut, as well. See, e.g., Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360, 382 , 665 A.2d 1341 (1995) (statute shall not be constmed as altering common law unless statutory language clearly so requires); Dart & Bogue Co. *680 v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 573 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987) (statutory construction “begins with the presumption that statutory and common law should, [whenever] possible, be read in harmony”). As we previously have observed, moreover, “the common law of England . . . was brought here by the first settlers, and became the common law of Connecticut so far as it was not unadapted to the local circumstances of this country.” (Citations omitted.) Graham v. Walker, 78 Conn. 130, 133 , 61 A. 98 (1905). Thus, at times, “[this court’s] view of the relationship of the common law of England to the law of Connecticut has been conspicuous by its ambivalence”; Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn., 184 Conn. 21, 25 , 441 A.2d 49 (1981); and, consequently, “the common law of England prior to 1776 does not necessarily represent the common law of this state . . . .” (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Id. “As our jurisprudence developed [however], the courts applied the principles of the [English] common law to the decision of causes, so far as they seemed applicable to our social conditions . . . ,” 38 Brown's Appeal from Probate, 72 Conn. 148, 151 , 44 A. 22 (1899). The defendant has offered no reason, and we know of none, why the bom alive rule would not have been accepted as the law of this state at the time of its settlement, 39 just as *681 the rule was accepted by virtually every jurisdiction *682 that had considered it. 40 Put differently, there was no *684 ambivalence in Connecticut toward the bom alive rule. To the contrary, the writings of former Chief Justice Swift indicate that it was, in fact, regarded as a governing legal principle in this state. 41 We, therefore, must *686 presume that the legislature did not intend to abrogate the rule when it enacted the Penal Code in 1971. 42 Indeed, in the absence of legislation “expressly includ *687 ing a fetus within the definition of victims of homicide *688 or [the passage of] a separate feticide statute ... no court of last resort in this country [had] held [prior to the enactment of our Penal Code] that the killing of a fetus is murder unless the fetus is bom alive and then expires.” 43 (Citations omitted.) People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 111 , 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980). Accordingly, we recognize the rule in the absence of a persuasive reason to the contrary. 44
As the defendant correctly notes, recent advances in medical science have prompted a number of state courts to depart from the bom alive rule in favor of a rule of viability, under which “a viable fetus can be the victim of a homicide,” regardless of whether it is bom alive. (Emphasis added.) Commonwealths. Morris, 142 *689 S.W.3d 654, 660 (Ky. 2004); see also, e.g., Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 731 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (viable fetus is “human being” under statute defining homicide as intentional killing of “human being”); Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 807 , 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984) (viable fetus is “person” under vehicular homicide statute barring certain conduct that causes death of “another person”); State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444, 446-47 , 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984) (viable fetus is “person” within meaning of statute defining murder as killing of “any person”). These courts generally have concluded that “the rationale for the ‘bom alive’ mle no longer exists” because “[m]edica! science has now advanced to the stage that the viability, health, and cause of a [fetus’] death can be determined.” 45 Commonwealth v. Morris, supra, 659 ; see also Commonwealth v. Cass, supra, 806 (“[m]edical science now may provide competent proof as to whether the fetus was alive at the time of a defendant’s conduct and whether his conduct was the cause of death”). Furthermore, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, thirty-eight states have abrogated the bom alive mle legislatively by the enactment of laws that classify the killing of a viable fetus as a homicide. 46 See National Conference of State Legis *690 latures, Fetal Homicide Laws (March, 2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/fethom.htm (last visited May 27, 2010).
Notwithstanding the recent trend in other jurisdictions toward recognizing a viable fetus as a person for purposes of the homicide statutes of those jurisdictions, 47 several states have elected to treat the killing of *691 a fetus, including a viable fetus, as a form of aggravated *692 assault inflicted on the mother rather than as a homicide. 48 Connecticut is one of those states. In 2003, the legislature enacted Public Acts 2003, No. 03-21 (P.A. OS-21), entitled “An Act Concerning Assault of a Pregnant Woman,” which is codified as amended at General Statutes § 53a-59c. Public Act 03-21 provides in relevant part: “(a) A person is guilty of assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy when such person commits assault in the first degree . . . and (1) the victim of such assault is pregnant, and (2) such assault results in the termination of pregnancy that does not result in a live birth. . . .
“(c) Assault of a pregnant woman resulting in termination of pregnancy is a class A felony.”
Public Act 03-21, also known as “Jenny’s Law,” was enacted in response to the December 31, 2001 murder of Jenny McMechen, who was thirty-six weeks pregnant at the time she was shot to death by Michael Latour. See State v. Latour, 276 Conn. 399, 401 , 886 A.2d 404 (2005). Because the fetus she was carrying died in útero, the bom alive rule operated to bar the state from treating the death of the fetus as murder, and, presumably as a consequence, Latour was charged with only one count of murder, that is, the murder of McMechen. See id. Indeed, at the time McMechen was murdered, our Penal Code contained no provision pertaining to the *693 killing of a fetus that dies in útero. McMechen’s family petitioned state lawmakers to enact legislation recognizing an unborn fetus as a person for purposes of this state’s homicide statutes. See, e.g., Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 9, 2002 Sess., pp. 2797, 2806-2807. In response, Raised House Bill No. 5747 (2002), entitled “An Act Concerning the Definition of a Person in the Penal Code,” was referred to the judiciary committee on March 13, 2002. Section 1 of the bill provided that the term “ ‘person’, when used to describe the victim of [a homicide], includes a viable fetus.” A public hearing on the bill was held on March 18, 2002, at which numerous people testified both for and against the bill. See, e.g., Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 8,2002 Sess., pp. 2307-18, 2402-39. At the hearing, Representative Michael P. Lawlor, the judiciary committee cochairperson, explained that the state historically had used the word “person” in its criminal statutes and that had not changed since the “[s]tate was chartered” in the 1600s. Id., p. 2405. He indicated, moreover, that he opposed expanding the definition of “person” under the homicide statutes to include a fetus because, among other reasons, it would create another death penalty eligible offense. Id., p. 2429.
Clarke D. Forsythe, president of Americans United for Life and a leading opponent of the common-law bom alive rule, 49 spoke in favor of the bill. Id., pp. 2402-17. Forsythe argued that, “[o]ver the past several years a number of criminal assaults in Connecticut resulting in the death of unborn human beings have demonstrated that no remedy exists in the criminal law and that legislation is needed.
“The lack of remedy in the law is due to the outdated and obsolete common law bom alive mle which pre *694 vents a charge of homicide when a child is stillborn after an assault. At common law, the killing of an unborn human was not treated as a homicide unless the child was bom alive and died thereafter and bom alive does not mean term birth, it doesn’t mean [forty] weeks gestation. It simply means expulsion from the womb at any time of pregnancy.
“It is a rule of location, a rule of evidence . . . that has no gestation[ai] time limitation and thus, a charge of homicide can be brought if a criminal assault results in miscarriage at any time [during] gestation, as long as the child dies after expulsion from the womb. . . .
“[W]hile [the rule] may have made medical sense four centuries ago when it was created in 1601 in English courts, it has been rendered obsolete by modem medical science. With modem medical science, the application of the bom alive rule leads to absurd results. Here in Connecticut, a prenatal assault that results in a miscarriage and death after birth at one month gestation can be charged as a homicide even though the fetus is only a month old. While a prenatal assault, as in the case of . . . McMechen, at eight months or nine months that results in a stillbirth, can never result in a charge of homicide.” (Emphasis added.) Id., pp. 2403-2404; see also id., pp. 2417-19, remarks of Bill O’Brien, legislative vice president of Connecticut Right to Life Corporation. Thus, those testifying in favor of the bill acknowledged that its passage would serve to abrogate the bom alive rule, which, they also acknowledged, was embodied in the common law of this state. Members of the judiciary committee both for and against the bill questioned these witnesses at some length in an effort to understand the rationale underlying the bill, its ramifications, and the extent to which other states had enacted similar legislation. 50
*695 Many abortion rights organizations testified against the bill. For example, Elaine C. Werner, executive director of the Connecticut affiliate of the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, argued that, “[b]y focusing on creating a separate legal status for fetuses, rather than whether the bill would actually deter criminal conduct, I fear the promotion of a political agenda — an agenda that has nothing to do with violence against pregnant women. . . . Although presented as crime fighting, it is actually aimed at eroding a woman’s constitutional right under Roe v. Wade.” 51 Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 9, 2002 Sess., p. 2809. Lisa B. Winjum, director of public policy and communication for Connecticut Sexual Assault Crisis Services, Inc., stated that the “bill opens the door to numerous legal and public policy concerns in the areas of privacy and reproductive freedom.” Id., p. 2783. Winjum stated further: “We strongly oppose the bill because it will not do anything to prevent violence against women. Nor will it save a single life. Those who seek to undermine a woman’s right to privacy and reproductive freedom continually try to separate the legal rights of the fetus from the legal rights of the mother.” 52 Id. Jennifer C. Jaff, an attorney, argued *696 that the bill was “bad public policy” predicated on the false premise “that the interests of the woman and those of the fetus developing inside her body can be separated when, in fact, they are inextricably joined.” Id., p. 2785. In light of the strong opposition to the bill, it was not reported out of the judiciary committee.
On March 25, 2002, Substitute House Bill No. 5747, entitled “An Act Concerning Assault of a Pregnant Woman,” was reported favorably out of the judiciary committee. The bill was described by one senator as a “compromise” between the pro-life and pro-choice groups. See 46 S. Proc., Pt. 4, 2003 Sess., p. 1013, remarks of Senator Catherine W. Cook; see also id., p. 1010, remarks of Senator Donald E. Williams, Jr. (noting “broad support” for bill and describing “unique alliance” between pro-choice and pro-life groups in supporting proposed legislation). Although the House passed the substitute bill, the Senate never acted on it before the expiration of the 2002 legislative session.
The substitute bill was resurrected in the 2003 session as Senate Bill No. 355. A hearing on the bill was held on February 10, 2003. Susan Lloyd Yolen, chairperson of the Connecticut Coalition for Choice, testified that “the language contained in [the bill] is the positive result of compromise that took place last [s]ession. In the generally acrimonious battle over reproductive rights, which has often centered on the questions of what status and rights are accorded to the fetus, the wording of this bill stands as a rare example of accord. Sponsors of last year’s bill assured the pro-choice community that it was not their intent to establish language that would erode abortion rights . . . [but that] would help mitigate the injustice done when a woman, pregnant with a wanted child, is harmed or killed by an assailant, and her pregnancy is ended. The resulting language was the result of a good faith effort to reach agreement on *697 an approach that would suitably punish the perpetrator by making such an assault a class A felony.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 2, 2003 Sess., p. 521.
Although many of those who had testified the previous year in support of the 2002 bill also testified in support of the 2003 bill, some complained that the bill did not go far enough because it did not define the term “person” in our Penal Code to include a viable fetus and, thus, did not serve to abolish the bom alive mle. For example, O’Brien testified that the bill “continues Connecticut’s adherence to [the] medically obsolete . . . bom alive rule which was [recognized] in 1601.” Id., p. 424. O’Brien explained that “[a] child no longer needs to be bom alive for science to prove whether or not the child was alive at a certain time in the womb” and implored the legislature to “move Connecticut’s courts and the law out of the [1600s] and abandon the bom alive mle to join other more technologically sophisticated states in the [twenty-first] century in using modem medical science to determine if an unborn child’s injuries or death resulted from some natural cause or from an assault.” Id.; see also id., pp. 668-69, 671, remarks of Clarke Forsythe (arguing that “the [legislature should abolish the obsolete and outdated bom alive mle in Connecticut” and suggesting different language in 2003 bill that would serve to abolish mle while protecting reproductive freedoms of women). Thus, some continued to advocate for the abolition of the bom alive rale, and members of the judiciary committee continued to be actively involved in that discussion. 53
*698 Ultimately, the legislature opted to treat the assault of a pregnant woman that results in the termination of her pregnancy without a live birth as an aggravated assault on the pregnant woman, and not as a homicide of the fetus, irrespective of whether the fetus was viable when the pregnancy was terminated. See P.A. 03-21. By its express terms, P.A. 03-21 applies only to “the termination of [a] pregnancy that does not result in a live birth,” language that clearly reflects the legislature’s awareness that it was carving out an exception for an infant who is bom alive but who thereafter dies from injuries sustained in útero. The reason for this exception could hardly be clearer in light of the legislative debate that preceded the enactment of P.A. 03-21, namely, the legislature’s recognition that an infant who is bom alive but subsequently dies from injuries sustained in útero already is protected by virtue of the operation of the bom alive rule, pursuant to which the infant’s death is treated as a homicide. 54
*699 As the foregoing statutory language and legislative history reveal, it is abundantly clear that, in enacting P.A. 03-21, the legislature fully considered and rejected the possibility of abolishing the bom alive mle and adopting a viability mle instead. In fact, a report on P.A. 03-21 prepared by the legislature’s office of legislative research indicates that the legislature, in making its determination, was well aware of the trial court’s express reliance on the bom alive mle in the present case, as well as the application of the mle by the court in State v. Anonymous (1986-1), supra, 40 Conn. Sup. 498 . 55 See Office of Legislative Research, Research *700 Report No. 2003-R-0488, “Assault of a Pregnant Woman and Murder” (June 30, 2003) (discussing present case and Anonymous, and specifically referring to fact that bom alive rule was “applied” by trial court in present case), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/ jud/rpt/2003-R-0488.htm (last visited May 27, 2010). “Although the comments of the office of legislative research are not, in and of themselves, evidence of legislative intent, they properly may bear on the legislature’s knowledge of interpretive problems that could arise from a bill.” Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 , 124 n.15, 942 A.2d 396 (2008); cf. State v. Tabone, 279 Conn. 527, 542 , 902 A.2d 1058 (2006) (consulting analysis of bill by office of legislative research to ascertain legislative intent). The report provides in relevant part: “[Public Act] 03-21 creates a new crime of assault of a pregnant woman. The act makes it a class A felony (punishable by [ten] to [twenty-five] years in prison) for anyone to assault a pregnant woman and cause her pregnancy to terminate without a live birth. . . .
“This new crime does not affect the murder statutes. Under Connecticut case law, a person cannot be charged with murder of a baby unless the baby is bom alive and lives for some period of time.” (Emphasis added.) Office of Legislative Research, Research Report No. 2003-R-0488, supra.
In light of the centuries old bom alive rule — which, as we have explained, has been universally recognized by courts and commentators throughout the country as deeply rooted in the common law — and the passage of and legislative history surrounding P.A. 03-21, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that *701 an infant who is bom alive and who subsequently dies of injuries that he or she had sustained in útero is a “person” within the meaning of this state’s homicide statutes. 56 Although it is tme, of course, that this court previously has had no occasion to consider the bom alive rule, no less authoritative a commentator than former Chief Justice Swift expressly acknowledged the applicability and import of the rule more than 200 years ago.
We note, furthermore, that, under the position that the defendant advances, he would not be subject to any greater penalty because Rodgers was eight and one-half months pregnant with Antonia than he would have been if she had not been pregnant at the time of her death. This result is a necessary consequence of the defendant’s contention that the bom alive mle was not embodied in our statutory scheme when he attacked and killed Rodgers; the defendant would be subject to criminal liability for Rodgers’ murder and nothing more. We are unwilling to presume that the legislature intended such a result, especially in light of the clear legislative history of P.A. 03-21.
Justice Zarella, like the defendant, contends that we should decline to recognize the bom alive rale because it is obsolete. It is true that the rale gained widespread acceptance at a time when it was not possible to determine whether a fetus was alive in útero. In part for that reason, the law required the state to prove a live birth to guard against the possibility that the fetus was not alive when the defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct. Of course, advances in medical science have *702 now made it possible to determine whether a fetus was alive prior to that conduct, and, consequently, the bom alive rule is not necessary for the purpose of proving that fact. With the removal of that evidentiary impediment, a majority of states have seen fit to abandon the rule, but they have done so in favor of statutes that treat the killing of a fetus as a form of homicide. See, e.g., A. Lotierzo, comment, “The Unborn Child, A Forgotten Interest: Reexamining Roe in Light of Increased Recognition of Fetal Rights,” 79 Temp. L. Rev. 279 , 284-85 n.52 (2006). Indeed, in a few states, courts have achieved the same result in the exercise of their common-law authority. See Commonwealth v. Cass, supra, 392 Mass. 807 (viable fetus); State v. Horne, supra, 282 S.C. 446 -47 (viable fetus). Those jurisdictions, therefore, have repudiated the bom alive rule for the purpose of expanding the protection afforded under their homicide statutes to include not only those victims who previously had been covered under the rule but, in addition, a considerably broader group of victims, that is, the class of victims comprised of viable, and in some states, previable, 57 fetuses who have suffered fatal injuries and died in útero. In other words, those states that have rejected the bom alive rule, either legislatively or judicially, have done so in the interest of protecting all viable fetuses who suffer fatal injuries, including those that are not bom alive, in addition to those that are bom alive but subsequently die due to injuries sustained in útero. Thus, as the Arizona Court of Appeals aptly has explained, “[although some commentators argue *703 that the bom alive mle is an anachronism in light of advances in the areas of obstetrics and forensics . . . such criticism favors the applicability of homicide statutes to the deaths of unborn, but viable, children, not the inapplicability of such statutes to babies . . . who are not only viable, but are in fact bom alive. ” (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) State v. Cotton, supra, 197 Ariz. 588 n.5 . In light of the reason why various states have abolished the bom alive mle — that is, because it now is viewed by those states as unnecessarily underinclusive with respect to the category of victims that it protects — it would make no sense to reject the mle, as Justice Zarella contends that we should, without replacing it with a broader mle, namely, one that includes the killing of a fetus.
We are not at liberty to follow the lead of other states in adopting a broader construction of our murder statute to include the killing of a fetus, however, because, as we previously discussed, our legislature took a markedly different approach from the majority of states when, in 2003, it made it a crime under P.A. 03-21 to commit an assault against a pregnant woman that causes the termination of pregnancy that does not result in a live birth. For the reasons that follow, the enactment of P.A. 03-21 provides yet another convincing reason why recognition of the bom alive rale is the only appropriate approach to take with respect to the constmction of our murder statute, as that statute is applied to the factual scenario presented. 58
*704 It is crystal clear from the legislative history of P.A. 03-21 that the legislature took this approach because of the concern that treating a fetus as a person for purposes of our murder statute might have significant implications in the area of abortion rights. Indeed, the very same debate that preceded the enactment of P.A. 03-21 has occurred in many other states throughout the country, prompting one commentator to explain: “Analytically, this topic is a difficult one — on one hand, it is hardly controversial to take the position that a fetus is a human organism (though the legal personhood of a fetus is hotly debated) and that, consequently, the killing of a fetus should not go entirely unpunished. But, on the other hand, those advocates of constitutionally protected reproductive rights balk at classifying all unborn children as ‘human beings’ for the purposes of *705 homicide statutes. The challenge, then, becomes appropriately protecting pregnant mothers and their unborn children while still maintaining reproductive freedoms. . . .
“[Consequently, before opting to recognize unborn children as potential homicide victims] the legislature must weigh very carefully a countervailing concern: the potential erosion of constitutionally protected reproductive freedoms. Many pro-choice advocates understandably worry that fetal homicide laws encroach on reproductive freedoms and could ultimately result in the outlawing of abortion altogether. Couched in these terms, it is unsurprising that many oppose passage of a fetal homicide law, not because they do not wish to protect the life of a fetus, but because the issue implicates the politics of reproductive rights.” D. Curran, note, “Abandonment and Reconciliation: Addressing Political and Common Law Objections to Fetal Homicide Laws,” 58 Duke L.J. 1107 , 1109-10 (2009).
The legislative history and debate surrounding the enactment of P.A. 03-21 59 reveals that it was precisely this consideration that prompted the legislature to treat the killing of a fetus in útero as an aggravated assault on the mother, which the legislature accomplished by enacting P.A. 03-21, and to treat the killing of an infant who dies after being bom alive from injuries sustained in útero as a murder, which the legislature accomplished by leaving the bom alive mle in place. Indeed, as we noted previously, two speakers, both of whom represented pro-life groups, argued strenuously before *706 the judiciary committee that the bom alive rule was outmoded and obsolete and that it should be abolished in favor of the proposed legislation that they favored, 60 which would have treated a viable fetus as a person under our murder statute. 61 See Raised House Bill No. 5747 (2002). Those who spoke against the bom alive rule lost the argument, however, and the legislature *707 took no action to abolish or abrogate the rule. Several legislators, moreover, expressly acknowledged that they were voting for P.A. 03-21 as a compromise between the position advocated by the pro-life activists and the position advocated by those other persons— mainly pro-abortion rights activists — who initially had favored no statutory change at all. It is evident, therefore, that the legislature’s enactment of P.A. 03-21 “merely reflects a desire to afford greater protection to the unborn fetus than was available under common law, not less protection to a child who, despite the homicidal conduct of another, happens to survive past birth." (Emphasis added.) State v. Cotton, supra, 197 Ariz. 588 . Of course, as a consequence of the enactment of P.A. 03-21, this court lacks the authority to reject the bom alive rale in favor of an expansion of our murder statute to include the killing of a viable fetus that dies in útero because the legislature already has determined that such conduct shall be treated as an aggravated assault against the mother under P.A. 03-21 and not as a homicide. 62
Disregarding the unmistakable import of P.A. 03-21 and the legislative debate that preceded its enactment, 63 *708 Justice Zarella would have us reject the bom alive rule as outmoded even though, in contrast to those other states that have done so, we would be barred by P.A. 03-21 from replacing it with a broader and, it is claimed, more modem and enlightened rule that encompasses the killing of a fetus in útero. The approach that Justice Zarella urges, however, simply ignores the reason why the legislature opted to preserve the bom alive rule, that is, to facilitate the compromise crafted in response to the competing positions advocated by pro-life and pro-choice supporters. Thus, although we agree that the bom alive rule no longer is necessary to ensure that the fetus was alive and viable when the injuries that led to its demise were inflicted, our legislature has decided to retain the rule for an altogether different reason, namely, to accommodate the concerns of pro-choice supporters who opposed treating the killing of a fetus in útero as murder.
Moreover, in light of the policy decision of the legislature that led to the enactment of P.A. 03-21, judicial abrogation of the bom alive rule would lead to a result that is both unprecedented and absurd; in that event, a person who fatally injures a fetus that dies in útero would be subject to severe criminal penalties under P.A. 03-21, whereas that same person would be subject to no criminal sanction for inflicting those same injuries if the fetus is bom alive and subsequently dies from the injuries inflicted in útero. Of course, no state ever has approved — or ever would approve of — such a result, yet that is the result that Justice Zarella would have us achieve by rejecting the bom alive rule. Justice Zarella nevertheless accuses us of “invadfing] the legislative prerogative” and “violat[ing] the separation of powers” by declining to ascribe to the legislature such a bizarre and irrational intent. On the contrary, it is the *709 position that Justice Zarella advocates — a position that defies both common sense and the legislative history surrounding the enactment of P.A. 03-21 — that would thwart the obvious intent of the legislature, that is, to classify as a homicide conduct that causes an infant to die after being bom alive as a result of injuries that were inflicted in útero, on the one hand, and to classify as an aggravated assault on the mother conduct that causes a fetus to die in útero from the same injuries, on the other.
Not surprisingly, the interpretation that Justice Zarella advances violates several cardinal principles of statutory construction. For example, this court repeatedly has stated “that the legislature, in amending or enacting statutes, always [is] presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Judicial Inquiry No. 2005-02, 293 Conn. 247, 262 , 977 A.2d 166 (2009). Moreover, “[j]ust as the legislature is presumed to enact legislation that renders the body of the law coherent and consistent, rather than contradictory and inconsistent . . . courts must discharge their responsibility, in case by case adjudication, to [ensure] that the body of law— both common and statutory — remains coherent and consistent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Loughlin v. Loughlin, 280 Conn. 632, 644 , 910 A.2d 963 (2006). Thus, “we are required to read statutes together when they related to the same subject matter .... Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 748 , 865 A.2d 428 (2005). In other words, “[t]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or non-action will have [on] any one of them. And it is always presumed *710 to have intended that effect which its action or non-action produces.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 84 , 818 A.2d 758 (2003). Furthermore, it is axiomatic that “those who promulgate statutes ... do not intend to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dias v. Grady, 292 Conn. 350, 361 , 972 A.2d 715 (2009). Consequently, “[i]n construing a statute, common sense must be used and courts must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended”; (internal quotation marks omitted) ATC Partnership v. Coats North America Consolidated, Inc., 284 Conn. 537, 545 , 935 A.2d 115 (2007); and, further, “if there are two [asserted] interpretations of a statute, we will adopt the . . . reasonable construction over [the] one that is unreasonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aspetuck Valley Country Club, Inc. v. Weston, 292 Conn. 817, 829 , 975 A.2d 1241 (2009).
The statutory interpretation that Justice Zarella urges is wholly incompatible with each and every one of these fundamental principles because that interpretation requires us to presume either that the legislature enacted P.A. 03-21 with the intent to achieve an absurd result or that the legislature was oblivious to the bizarre consequences of its action. For obvious reasons, neither presumption is tenable. Indeed, it is particularly indefensible to indulge in a presumption that achieves such a bizarre and irrational result when, as in the present case, an alternative interpretation — one that has deep roots in the common law and is firmly predicated on the pertinent legislative history and genealogy — leads to a perfectly reasonable and logical result.
Justice Zarella nevertheless seeks to justify his refusal to recognize the decision of the legislature to treat the killing of a fetus in útero as an aggravated assault on the mother and the killing of an infant who *711 is bom alive but who subsequently dies from injuries suffered in útero as a murder on the ground that this distinction “makes no sense whatsoever.” This assertion is suspect if for no other reason than the fact that seventeen of our sister states still “retain some form of the bom alive mle.” State v. Lamy, 158 N.H. 511, 517 , 969 A.2d 451 (2009); see also id., 517 n.3 (listing states that currently retain some form of bom alive mle). Justice Zarella also fails to account for his inability to identify even one case that, prior to 1998, had abolished the bom alive mle to reach the result that Justice Zarella would reach in the present case, that is, to exonerate a defendant who inflicts injuries on an infant in útero who is bom alive but who thereafter dies from those injuries. More importantly, however, in view of the competing public policy considerations outlined previously, there is absolutely nothing irrational or nonsensical about a statutory scheme such as ours, which classifies the killing of a fetus in útero as an aggravated assault on the mother — a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to twenty-five years — and the killing of an infant who is bom alive but who subsequently dies from injuries suffered in útero as murder. More importantly, this court is bound to honor that legislative distinction irrespective of whether we personally agree that it represents wise or sound public policy. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 289 Conn. 550, 585 , 958 A.2d 1214 (2008) (classification of crime “is a public policy determination reserved to the legislative branch of government, except [when] constitutional principles apply”); State v. Darden, 171 Conn. 677, 679-80 , 372 A.2d 99 (1976) (“[t]he [state] constitution assigns to the legislature the power to enact laws defining crimes and fixing the degree and method of punishment”).
Indeed, to whatever extent one reasonably might disagree with the distinction that the le

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9728476. Public record. Not legal advice.