# State v. Weleck

> Supreme Court of New Jersey · October 20, 1952 · 10 N.J. 355

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9727416

## Case

- **Full name:** State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles Weleck, Defendant-Respondent
- **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey
- **Decided:** October 20, 1952
- **Citations:** 10 N.J. 355; 91 A.2d 751; 1952 N.J. LEXIS 254
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Hehek
- **Judges:** Hehek, Vanderbilt, Wacheneeld
- **Cited by:** 133 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9727416

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that extortion and attempted extortion are not continuing offenses

## Opinion text

*377 Hehek, J.,
(concurring in reversal). The “misconduct in office” laid to the' accused in the first indictment could not “continue” as an offense after the passage of the ordinance in question, for the essence of the charge is that the accused, “in violation of his duty” as borough -attorney, did “demand, request and receive” from Lubben “a promise” of the payment of $15,000 in equal monthly installments of $500, commencing in July, 1949, “in return for an agreement or understanding” that the accused, “would use his influence and office” as borough attorney “corruptly to influence, exhort and advise the Mayor and Council of the Borough * * * to enact” the pending amendment of the local zoning ordinance. Such is the breach of official duty pleaded. The mere demand for the illicit quid pro quo did not serve to “continue” the offense so as to intermit the statute of limitations. Indictable misconduct in office involves the breach of a duty laid upon the incumbent by the law, either of commission or omission. It is conduct “by which the legal duties imposed by law have not been properly and faithfully discharged.” 67 C. J. S. 432. There is an obvious distinction of substance between a violation of a duty incident to an office and the later demand for payment of the corrupt consideration, after the breach or failure of duty bargained for.
The demand for the consideration constituted an attempt to commit the crime of extortion, and this is the offense charged in the second indictment, in certain, definite and legally sufficient terms. The grand jury itself made the distinction. I concur in the reasoning of the Chief Justice sustaining this indictment. Compliance with the demand would have constituted criminal extortion. If there be an intent to commit a given crime and a direct ineffectual act done- towards its consummation, the elements of an indictable attempt to commit the crime are present. 14 Am. Jur. 813 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9727416. Public record. Not legal advice.