# Colpetzer v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · March 30, 2005 · 582 Pa. 295

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9727179

## Case

- **Full name:** William COLPETZER v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (STANDARD STEEL), Appeal of Standard Steel; David Zerby v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Reading Anthracite Company), Appeal of Reading Anthracite Company
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 30, 2005
- **Citations:** 582 Pa. 295; 870 A.2d 875; 2005 Pa. LEXIS 620
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Eakin
- **Judges:** Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor, Eakin, Lamb, Former
- **Cited by:** 15 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9727179

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the Act does not intend to overcompensate injured employees

## Opinion text

Justice EAKIN
dissenting.
The majority relies on the analysis in Hannaberry HVAC v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd. (Snyder, Jr.), 575 Pa.66, 834 A.2d 524 (2003), concluding that the average weekly wage established for a claimant’s previous injury is to be used in calculating his average weekly wage for his second injury, instead of using the actual Workers’ Compensation benefits received. I dissented in Hannaberry, and for the same reasons, must dissent in this ease.
“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Yet the majority does precisely that— § 309(d) says nothing about using a different method of computation when the relevant four consecutive 13-week periods include periods where benefits were received instead of salary, but the majority extrapolates this exception, citing the “overall humanitarian purpose of the Act,” Majority Opinion, at 311-12, 870 A.2d at 885, and the legislative intent of ensuring a “ ‘fair ascertainment’ of the employee’s wages.... ” Id. (quoting Hannaberry, at 533).
The Legislature’s desire presumptively includes an effort to ensure fairness, but if the Legislature provides a formula that is not “fair” in every circumstance, it is not the function of this Court to ignore the formula and create a new one.
The statute already provides, in clear, unambiguous terms, a method for computing the average wage; it is not ambiguous simply because the Legislature failed to make an exception for this particular employment scenario. Under the clear language of the statute, the claimants were employed within the meaning of § 309(d) for at least four consecutive, 13-week quarters the year before each was injured again. Most of that time, they were receiving Workers’ Compensation benefits for their previous injuries, and these benefits are to be used in calculating benefits for their second injuries. While this may *317 not appear to be a “fair” result, in that claimants’ new benefits are artificially deflated because their previous benefits were less than their salaries, “[arguments of unjust or uncomtemplated results of a legislative scheme do not amount to ambiguity, and courts should not manufacture ambiguity to avoid a disagreeable result.” Hannaberry, at 535 (Eakin, J., dissenting). It is the province of the Legislature, not this Court, to make adjustments to a statute which, although not ambiguous, has created an unintended result. Judicial modification of unambiguous legislation in the name of “fairness” is a dangerous practice. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9727179. Public record. Not legal advice.