# Colpetzer v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · March 30, 2005 · 582 Pa. 295

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9727178

## Case

- **Full name:** William COLPETZER v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (STANDARD STEEL), Appeal of Standard Steel; David Zerby v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Reading Anthracite Company), Appeal of Reading Anthracite Company
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 30, 2005
- **Citations:** 582 Pa. 295; 870 A.2d 875; 2005 Pa. LEXIS 620
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Cappy
- **Judges:** Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor, Eakin, Lamb, Former
- **Cited by:** 15 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9727178

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the Act does not intend to overcompensate injured employees

## Opinion text

Chief Justice CAPPY
concurring.
I join the majority opinion, but write separately to set forth the construction that I believe the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 el seq., requires of Section 309(d) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 582(d).
I conclude that the language of Section 309(d), specifically the phrase, “total wages,” is not clear as to whether the General Assembly intended that claimants’ previously established average weekly wage (“AWW’) or the benefits they received for their first injuries be used in calculating the benefits they should be awarded for their second injuries. I, therefore, agree with the analysis under the Statutory Construction Act in which the majority engages, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c); with the majority’s determination of legislative intent in this regard; and with the holding that relevant periods of compensated work disability in these cases should be computed by using the AWW that was established for claimants’ first injury. 1 I, however, do not agree with and disassociate myself from any conclusion on the majority’s part *316 that Section 309(d) is silent on the calculation of benefits question claimants presented.
. I joined Mr. Justice Eakin's dissenting opinion in Hannaberry HVAC v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Snyder, Jr.), 575 Pa.66, 834 A.2d 524 (2003), having also concluded that there was no gap in Section 309(d) as to the calculation of benefits issue raised; that Section 309(d) spoke to the issue explicitly; and that Section 309(d) was to apply. For me, the instant case differs from Hannaberry. Here, Section 309(d) is not clear as to the calculation of benefits issue presented.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9727178. Public record. Not legal advice.