# Gilligan v. Korzen

> Illinois Supreme Court · January 31, 1974 · 56 Ill. 2d 387

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9726528

## Case

- **Full name:** JOHN E. GILLIGAN Et Al., Appellees, v. BERNARD KORZEN, County Treasurer, Et Al., Appellants
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** January 31, 1974
- **Citations:** 56 Ill. 2d 387; 308 N.E.2d 613; 1974 Ill. LEXIS 451
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Schaefer
- **Judges:** Goldenhersh, Schaefer
- **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9726528

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating the General Assembly enacted prior versions of the municipal and county ROT Acts to account for government services provided

## Opinion text

MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER, dissenting:
What is involved in this case was referred to in the constitutional convention as “differential taxation” — the levy or imposition of a tax upon less than all similarly situated property or persons within the boundaries of the governmental unit levying the tax. (7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1579.) That kind of taxation is governed, with respect to home-rule units, by paragraph Z of section 6 of article VII, which provides: “The General Assembly may not deny or limit the power of home rule units *** to levy or impose additional taxes upon areas within their boundaries in the manner provided by law for the provision of special services to those areas and for the payment of debt incurred in order to provide those special services.” Identical language in section 7 of article VII governs the imposition of differential taxation by non-home-rule units.
The “sole question” under the Constitution is not, as the opinion states, whether the differential tax is based upon a reasonable classification. The first question is whether the differential tax has been levied or imposed “in the manner provided by law for the provision of special services”, as required by section 6(Z). I could concur in an opinion which answered that question in the affirmative, pointing out that the classification of persons and area contained in the differential tax ordinance now before us complies with section 6(Z), since it was not created ad hoc by the taxing unit, but rather had been brought into existence by the action of others and had long been recognized by the General Assembly. But I am not able to concur in an opinion which totally disregards section 6(Z) of article VII of the Constitution.
With respect to the subsidiary question, so long as the proceeds of the tax are effectively segregated and used for the designated special service, a matter that is not disputed in this case, I would not regard the method by which that result is accomplished, legislative or administrative, as particularly significant.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9726528. Public record. Not legal advice.