# Duffy v. State Personnel Board > California Court of Appeal · July 9, 1991 · 232 Cal. App. 3d 1 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9724787 ## Case - **Full name:** FATHER DANIEL PATRICK DUFFY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD Et Al., Defendants and Respondents; CALIFORNIA CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, Real Party in Interest and Respondent - **Court:** California Court of Appeal - **Decided:** July 9, 1991 - **Citations:** 232 Cal. App. 3d 1; 283 Cal. Rptr. 622; 91 Daily Journal DAR 8278; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5373; 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 777 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Blease - **Judges:** Davis, Blease - **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9724787 ## Opinion text BLEASE, Acting P. J. —I concur in the judgment. I write separately because I think no difficult constitutional issues have been tendered. Father Duffy seeks reinstatement to the position of prison chaplain, from which he was dismissed for failure to meet standards of ordination and accreditation established by the Roman Catholic Church and adopted by the Department of Corrections. He challenges the right of the state to set such *23 standards, arguing that the establishment and equal protection clauses of the federal Constitution preclude such criteria when different criteria are applied to the selection of Protestant and Jewish chaplains. Father Duffy cannot challenge the authority of the state to provide for paid prison chaplains since he is seeking just such a position. The lengthy discussion in the majority opinion on that point is therefore misplaced. The authority of the state to pay prison chaplains, free of the restraints of the establishment clause, if any, derives solely from the free exercise rights of inmates whose religious practices have been impaired by incarceration. (See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp (1963) 374 U.S. 203, 296-298 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 844, 900-901 , 83 S.Ct. 1560 ], cone. op. of Brennan, J.) The constitutional measure of the criteria for the selection of chaplains to minister to such inmates is whether their free exercise rights are thereby reasonably fostered. The state may not discriminate among religions in the payment of chaplains as, for example, by choosing to pay chaplains only from established denominations. (See Young Life Campaign v. Patino (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 559 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 23 ].) It must act on the basis of neutral standards regarding the size of the inmate population to be served and the demonstrated need for paid chaplains to foster the free exercise rights of inmates. The equal protection clause comes to bear if the state departs from such standards. Father Duffy’s only challenge is that the inclusive standards employed in the selection of paid chaplains for Protestant and Jewish inmates must apply to the position of Catholic chaplain so as to encompass Ecumenical Catholics. Father Duffy has no personal constitutional right to the position of paid prison chaplain. His right, if any, is derivative of the rights of the inmates to whom he would minister. He cannot assert the rights of Roman Catholic inmates. And he does not assert the rights of Ecumenical Catholic inmates and seek the creation of a paid chaplaincy ministering to them by claiming that they constitute a distinct group of believers, numerous enough to be comparably situated to that of Roman Catholics. He is therefore ill positioned to challenge the state’s deference to the criteria of the Roman Catholic Church for the selection of a priest to minister to inmates of the Roman Catholic faith. The authority of the state, if any, to pay chaplains in aid of the free exercise rights of inmates does not justify an invasion of the very rights to be protected. The interference by the state with the criteria by which a religious denomination may choose those who are to minister to inmates of their faith would entangle the state in the practice of religion in precisely the manner *24 forbidden by the free exercise clause. (See, e.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976) 426 U.S. 696 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 151 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 ].) That Protestants or Jews may adopt more inclusive criteria for the selection of a paid chaplain than the Roman Catholic Church is an aspect of their religious freedoms. The state may not impose the choice of one upon the other. A petition for a rehearing was denied August 2, 1991, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 3, 1991. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9724787. Public record. Not legal advice.