# Kasel v. Remington Arms Co.

> California Court of Appeal · April 4, 1972 · 24 Cal. App. 3d 711

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9724283

## Case

- **Full name:** EDWARD W. KASEL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Respondent
- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** April 4, 1972
- **Citations:** 24 Cal. App. 3d 711; 101 Cal. Rptr. 314; 1972 Cal. App. LEXIS 1164
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Aiso
- **Judges:** Reppy, Aiso
- **Cited by:** 92 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9724283

## Opinion text

AISO, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in judgment of reversal but respectfully dissent as to the basis for reversal. The threshold and pivotal issue in this case is what law is to be applied under the California law of conflict of laws. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that factors pertinent to the choice of law question should be kept separate and apart from the factors relevant to the question of liability under the California law pertaining to products liability.
In this case (involving no personal relations, e.g., marital status or probate), the basic operative facts on the choice of law issue are: (1) place of manufacture, (2) place of sale, (3) place of injury, and (4) place of the injured person’s residence. The locale of the first three factors is Mexico-; the only contact with California is plaintiff’s residence.
Under the so-called “center of gravity” or “The Most Significant Relationship Approach” (adopted by the Restatement Second of Conflicts of Law as noted by the majority), the applicable law is clearly that of Mexico. To weight the happenstance factor o-f residence over the other three results in a throwback to “personal law” and the perpetuation of the vestiges of the doctrine of extraterritoriality. (See: Comment (1965) 78 Harv.L.Rev. 1452, 1465.) This is not appropriate as clearly pointed out by the author of the California Law Review article discussed by the majority. Nor should we completely overlook the possibility that the law of an injured person’s residence may or may not be favorable to his recovery. The so-called “governmental interest theory” has similar inherent weaknesses. Both theories generate uncertainties as to foreseeability o-f liability by potential defendants.
Reich v. Purcell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 551 [63 Cal.Rptr.31, 432 P2d 727 ] has not, in my opinion, definitely committed California to a “governmental interest theory.” Neither the persons killed nor the plaintiffs in Reich were *741 residents of California at the time of the accident. It was not a case involving products liability.
On the other hand, the majority do not espouse the adoption of a rule that the law most favorable to the plaintiff, whether he be a resident or a nonresident, a citizen or an alien, be applied.
The result reached by the majority can only be sustained upon the “governmental interest theory,” which in areas such as welfare relief has been subject to erosion.
I would conclude that the trial court erred in selecting California law as the applicable law under the facts of this case and that the case should be retried applying the law of Mexico.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 31, 1972.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9724283. Public record. Not legal advice.