# State v. Pearson

> Supreme Court of Iowa · March 23, 1994 · 514 N.W.2d 452

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9723872

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Kris Kanon PEARSON, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** March 23, 1994
- **Citations:** 514 N.W.2d 452; 1994 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 69; 1994 WL 98423
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Carter
- **Judges:** Ternus, Carter, Snell
- **Cited by:** 50 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9723872

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding “skin-to-skin contact is not required in order to establish a ‘sex act’ under section 712.17” and determining “prohibited contact occurs when (1) the specified body parts or substitutes touch and (2) any intervening material would not prevent the participants, viewed o…
- noting with regard to State v. Phipps, 442 N.W.2d 611, 612 (Iowa Ct.App.1989), that “the fact that no nonsexual purpose for the contact was discernible also demonstrated the sexual nature of the contact”
- finding “[w]hether certain conduct constitutes ‘sexual contact’ is a fact question”

## Opinion text

CARTER, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of defendant’s conviction because I conclude *457 that the trier of fact could reasonably have concluded that defendant performed a “sex act” on an eight-year-old child. I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s criteria for determining whether “sexual contact,” an essential element of a “sex act” under Iowa Code section 702.17, has occurred.
I believe that it is axiomatic that any time two persons are moving about in close proximity to one another innocent contact may occur between sexual parts. The majority recognizes this and attempts to distinguish prohibited sexual contact from innocent contact. The majority includes, as a criterion for determining sexual contact, “the purposefulness of the contact.” At the same time, it disavows any requirement that there be an intent to act based on sexual gratification of either the perpetrator or the victim. The circumstances that the majority would consider in determining whether sexual contact has occurred would also be relevant to show an intent to act based on sexual gratification. However, by not recognizing sexual gratification as an element of sexual contact, the majority prohibits a defendant from attempting to negate the charge by urging lack of such intent. I believe that this is unrealistic and unfair.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9723872. Public record. Not legal advice.