# Wilson v. Hinsdale Elementary School District 181

> Appellate Court of Illinois · May 27, 2004 · 284 Ill. Dec. 847

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9722680

## Case

- **Full name:** BLAKE WILSON, a Minor, by His Mother and Next Friend, Cher Geiger, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HINSDALE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT 181 Et Al., Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** May 27, 2004
- **Citations:** 284 Ill. Dec. 847; 349 Ill. App. 3d 243; 810 N.E.2d 637
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by McLAREN
- **Judges:** Byrne, Kapala, McLAREN
- **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9722680

## Opinion text

JUSTICE McLAREN, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The standard of review is whether the trial court’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence and whether the trial court’s exercise of discretion based upon those facts is an abuse of discretion. “An abuse of discretion occurs only when no reasonable person would take the position adopted by the trial court.” McKenzie Dredging Co. v. Deneen River Co., 249 Ill. App. 3d 694, 700 (1993). The test is not whether the appellate court agrees with the trial court’s decision, but whether the lower court “ ‘acted arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or, in view of all the circumstances, exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.’ ” Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 213 Ill. App. 3d 591, 595 (1991), quoting In re Marriage of Aud, 142 Ill. App. 3d 320, 326 (1986); see also American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Schwartz, 343 Ill. App. 3d 553, 559 (2003); In re J.S., 267 Ill. App. 3d 145, 148 (1994); Kaden v. Pucinski, 263 Ill. App. 3d 611, 615 (1994).
Considering the trial court’s grant of a temporary restraining order in the perspective set forth above, I am constrained to determine that other reasonable minds could or would also grant the temporary restraining order.
I tend to believe that the majority, rather than applying the appropriate standard outlined above, has considered the appeal as if it were an appeal from a final hearing on the merits, and has not given the trial court’s judgment the deference to which it is entitled in matters relating to temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions.
It is quite possible that the final resolution of the cause will result in expulsion. However, that is not the issue at this stage of the proceedings, unless that determination is based upon a belief that no reasonable individual would disagree, based upon the record as it exists today, that there is no probability of success on the merits. The student is not seeking total immunity from punishment, as indicated by his suggestion that he be suspended for 15 days. He is seeking a lesser punishment. In that regard, in my opinion, there is a probability of success on the merits.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9722680. Public record. Not legal advice.