# Daniels v. State

> Indiana Supreme Court · September 9, 1983 · 453 N.E.2d 160

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9721770

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael William DANIELS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** September 9, 1983
- **Citations:** 453 N.E.2d 160; 1983 Ind. LEXIS 940
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by DeBRULER
- **Judges:** Hunter, Givan, Pivarnik, Debruler, Prentice
- **Cited by:** 45 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Vacated on other grounds by Daniels v. Indiana, 491 U.S. 902 (1989).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9721770

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming trial court’s rejection of *1232 defendant’s plea agreement that took death penalty off the table, concluding the court is not just concerned with the defendant’s voluntariness, but it “must also protect the interests of other members of our society in living in a pe…
- affirming trial court’s rejection of defendant’s plea agreement that took death penalty off the table, concluding the court is not just concerned with the defendant’s voluntariness, but it “must also protect the interests of other members of our society in living in a peaceful…

## Opinion text

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
A prospective juror cannot be properly excluded because of his views regarding the *176 propriety of the penalty of death unless he is "irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and cireum-stances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings," Witherspoon v. Illinois, (1969) 391 U.S. 510, 522 , 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 , 20 LEd.2d 776. After taking the seeming unalterable position that he could not impose the death penalty under any circumstances, prospective juror Hardy, under questioning by the court backed off. Under prodding by the court's questions, he began a process of deeper personal reflection upon his own conscience. This led to the discovery that he would deem the penalty of death appropriate for assassination of the president. Further reflection resulted in his arriving at the belief that the death penalty would be proper for child molesting. After properly precipitating this process by her questioning, the trial judge suddenly terminated it and finished the questioning of Mr. Hardy with the following two questions: j
"Q. Then other than the president you can't think of any instances or any circumstances involving a murder that you would feel would warrant recommendation of the death sentence?
A. No.
Q. And your feelings would preclude you from recommending the death penalty if the Defendant was found guilty, is that right?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
COURT: We will show that the juror is excused for cause."
The Hardy voir dire questioning at the beginning shows a mind irrevocably committed to vote against the penalty of death come what might. That standing alone would have warranted dismissing him for cause. It did not stand alone, as subsequent inquiry by the court showed an open mind, a mind willing and capable of self-analysis. He engaged in the process of developing and forming new beliefs and convictions, as he sought to understand and truthfully answer the court's questions, He rejected absolutely his irrevocable commitment against the death penalty, and commenced the process of forming a new and more refined commitment. He began to define a class of cases in which he could find the imposition of the death penalty acceptable. The class included assassination of the president. That is a type of murder. The charge to be tried was a type of murder. The class also included child molesting. It would be fair to say that most people would regard child molesting as a lesser crime than murder. When, then, the trial court abruptly terminated her questioning with the two questions quoted above, it is no longer possible to conclude from the questioning as a whole that Mr. Hardy was "irrevocably committed" to vote against the death penalty. It was therefore constitutional error to exclude Mr. Hardy for cause because of his views on capital punishment, and as a consequence the penalty of death must be set aside.
I vote however to affirm the conviction.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9721770. Public record. Not legal advice.