# Beck v. State

> Indiana Supreme Court · April 22, 1971 · 256 Ind. 318

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9721268

## Case

- **Full name:** Doris Ann Beck, Et Al. v. State of Indiana
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 22, 1971
- **Citations:** 256 Ind. 318; 268 N.E.2d 746; 1971 Ind. LEXIS 633
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Prentice
- **Judges:** Givan, Arterburn, Debruler, Hunter, Prentice
- **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9721268

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that loss-of-access instruction was properly submitted to the jury where property owners' "main body of land was cut off from [hJlighway" by a limited access fence

## Opinion text

Concurring Opinion
Prentice, J.
I concur in the result but for reasons somewhat different than those expressed in the majority opinion.
Whether or not appellants are entitled to damages for loss of access depends upon whether or not such loss affects the highest and best use to which the land could be devoted. If reduced access has not affected such use, then clearly it has not affected the value of the residue. That the appellants’ land was unimproved at the time of the taking is immaterial, as its value is not determined by its current use.
The majority opinions upholds the validity of the instruction complained of, which I believe is bad by reason of the last phrase “* * * and only when no other reasonable means of access is available to the property”. The reasonableness of *325 the access depends upon the use to which the land is to be devoted. If land has 1000 feet of frontage upon a main highway and 50 feet of frontage on a secondary and less desirable road, but its highest and best use is agricultural, the loss of full access to the main highway may be immaterial. If, however, the highest and best use would be to subdivide the land into ten one-hundred foot lots for residential home sites fronting upon the main highway, then the loss of the highway access has damaged the owner, notwithstanding that reasonable access for agricultural use is still available. The reasonableness- of the access must be related to the highest and best use, and the instruction may have been misleading inasmuch as this element was not provided for. However, appellants did not raise this question in their written objections to the instruction thus the error is not available. Rule 1-7 (2), Rules of the Supreme Court I.L.E. Appeals § 95.
The verdict of the jury was clearly defective in that it found no damages to the residue of the appellants’ real estate caused by the taking, notwithstanding that a small portion of appellants’ land on the south side of the highway was left landlocked. The majority has held that the fact that the jury did not spell this out as a damage to the residue does not mean that they did not take it into consideration in fixing the amount of total damage. But neither does it mean that they did take it into consideration. There were two issues to be determined by the jury: (1) The fair market value of the real estate appropriated, and (2) the damage to the residue of the real estate caused by the taking. However, the landlocked residue is so minute and so situated that it is altogether proper that the rule de minimis be applied. The fallacy of the majority statement lies in its possible application in situations where the de minimis rule is not applicable
Note. — Reported in 268 N. E. 2d 746 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9721268. Public record. Not legal advice.