# State v. Andersen

> Supreme Court of Minnesota · June 30, 2010 · 784 N.W.2d 320

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9721095

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kenneth Eugene ANDERSEN, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Minnesota
- **Decided:** June 30, 2010
- **Citations:** 784 N.W.2d 320; 2010 Minn. LEXIS 339; 2010 WL 2606031
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Page
- **Judges:** Paul, Meyer, Anderson, Barry
- **Cited by:** 181 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9721095

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that in determining the circumstances proved, “we defer, consistent with our standard of review, to the jury, acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the state” (quotation o…
- holding that a warrant application established probable cause supporting the warrant’s issuance, as alleged omissions were not material to the probable-cause determination; in other words, including the “omissions would have no impact on the probable cause determination”
- stating that a Franks challenge requires the defendant to show that a search-warrant application “includes intentional or reckless misrepresentations of fact material to the findings of probable cause”
- concluding that the search warrant application’s reference to “possible evidence of foot traffic” was appropriately qualified by the word “possible”
- stating that a reviewing court “will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture” (quotation omitted)

## Opinion text

PAGE, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result, but I write separately to note my disagreement with the court’s statement of and application of our standard of review for convictions based on circumstantial evidence.
To the extent that the court’s statement of and application of our standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence in circumstantial evidence cases is inconsistent with Justice Meyer’s articulation of the rule in State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709, 720-26 (Minn.2010) (Meyer, J., concurring), I would follow the standard articulated by Justice Meyer. Juries may be in the best position to determine credibility and weigh the evidence, and we defer to their determination of the circumstances proved, but a jury’s choice between reasonable inferences to be drawn from the circumstances proved is not entitled to deference.
In its decision here, the court ignores the fact that neither the timeline nor the physical evidence exclusively supports an inference of guilt. That is to say, the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the timeline and physical evidence support a rational hypothesis other than guilt. Under our standard of review, “[cjircumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn.2002); see also State v. McArthur, 730 N.W.2d 44, 49 (Minn.2007) (holding that when a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, “that evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis except that of guilt”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In that the reasonable inferences from the timeline and physical evidence support a rational hypotheses other than guilt, the question becomes whether the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable. See Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 206 (stating that “possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although, on the record before us the answer to that question is a close one, I believe that the totality of the remaining evidence is sufficient to establish Anderson’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9721095. Public record. Not legal advice.