# People v. Superior Court (Crook) > California Court of Appeal · July 11, 1978 · 83 Cal. App. 3d 335 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9720558 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GLENN COUNTY, Respondent; BRUCE LEE CROOK, Real Party in Interest - **Court:** California Court of Appeal - **Decided:** July 11, 1978 - **Citations:** 83 Cal. App. 3d 335; 147 Cal. Rptr. 856; 1978 Cal. App. LEXIS 1765 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Reynoso - **Judges:** Evans - **Cited by:** 17 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9720558 ## Opinion text *342 REYNOSO, J. I dissent. We deal with an issue of substantial evidence. The majority find that there is no such evidence in the record to support the trial court’s ruling suppressing the defendant’s incriminating statements (Pen. Code, § 1538.5). My review of the record convinces me otherwise. I necessarily disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, only limited immunity appears. In resolving the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, we are bound by established rules of appellate review which dictate that all factual matters will be reviewed most favorably to the prevailing party. {Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 568 , 496 P.2d 480 ]; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) § 245, p. 4236.) We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 225 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 352 , 524 P.2d 824 ].) If the circumstances reasonably justify the trial court’s finding, an appellate court cannot reverse merely because the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding. (People v. Robillard (1960) 55 Cal.2d 88, 93 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 167 , 358 P.2d 295 , 83 A.L.R.2d 1086 ].) “In brief, the appellate court ordinarily looks only at the evidence supporting the successful party, and disregards the contrary showing. ” (Italics in original; Witkin, supra, § 249 at p. 4241.) It is with these basic principles in mind that I turn to the record. In suppressing the evidence, the trial judge concluded: “Furthermore, the limitations imposed on the offer of immunity, being limited to the greater or lessor [sic] recollections of the various witnesses, are not so clearly set forth as to preclude the Court from considering that the motivating cause for the Defendant’s incriminating statements was in fact the original offer of immunity.” From the evidence presented, the judge, as the trier of fact, found that the prosecution did not sufficiently establish the terms of the immunity. It is the trial court judge, the trier of fact, who listened to the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and evaluated their testimony. He is not compelled, of course, to believe any witness. The testimony of three key witnesses at the hearing on the motion to suppress illustrates the vagueness and uncertainty of the circumstances surrounding the grant of immunity. On cross-examination the district attorney, who was present during the interrogation of the defendant and who apparently extended the offer of immunity, was asked: “Q. Okay. Can you recall what the statement regarding the immunity was? A. No.” Thus, while the witness subsequently explained the immunity the exact extent was not clear. *343 And the testimony of Special F.B.I. Agent Ott, also present during the questioning, is equally deficient as to the crucial terms of the immunity offer: “Q. So you do recall that Mr. Maloney did in fact tell him that he was unimmunized again from anything about the Vereschagin property burglary? “A. I don’t remember those exact words, no, sir.” The witness then explained his recollection of the immunity discussion based on a “very, very hazy recollection.” Finally, the testimony of Officer Co troné, who apparently taped the defendant’s discussion of the two burglaries in a subsequent session, fails to demonstrate affirmatively the partial grant of immunity. The testimony of the witness on cross-examination follows: “Q. Well, I’m asking you the reason you didn’t or if you did mention anything about immunity prior to taking the taped statement of Vereschagin. “A. I didn’t mention anything. “D. Did anybody? “A. I don’t know. I don’t recoil [j/c]. “Q. Well, do you recall exactly what he was offered immunity for? “A. No, I don’t. I was there only to assist in the search and I ended up involved in taking the statements. “The Court: Q. Officer Co troné, you were not present when the district attorney offered the defendant immunity, were you? “The Witness: A. No, . . .” [The witness explained that another officer told him of the offered immunity.] *344 The vague quality of the testimony of each prosecution witness belies a conclusion that the judge could not have reached the determination that the defendant’s incriminating statements were induced by the original offer of immunity. The testimony of those present during the interrogation of the defendant is the only evidence from which the trial judge could reconstruct the alleged limited grant of immunity. The record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that an original grant of immunity probably provoked the defendant’s subsequent incriminating statements. We cannot reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. Furthermore, the failure of the People to comply with the statutory scheme of Penal Code section 1324 places a heavy burden on the People to establish the precise terms of the grant of immunity. “The cold record cannot give the look or manner of the witnesses; their hesitations, their doubts, their variations of language, their precipitancy, their calmness or consideration. A witness may convince all who hear him testify that he is disingenuous and untruthful, and yet his testimony, when read, may convey a most favorable impression.” (Maslow v. Maslow (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 237, 243 [ 255 P.2d 65 ].) Penal Code section 1324 is the statutory scheme for grants of immunity. If the district attorney desired a limited grant of immunity, he need only have followed the statutory provision. Since the People failed to utilize the formal processes for granting immunity, any immunity promised must be construed broadly as providing immunity against prosecution for any of the activities the defendant revealed to the authorities. “As with plea bargains, terms of a promise of immunity should appear clearly on the record and be supported by court order. Full disclosure of the terms of the bargain not only protects against double-dealing, coercion, and misunderstanding . . . , but it enables an impartial judicial officer to review the propriety of the immunity bargain itself.” (People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 908, 914 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 501 ].) The statute establishes a procedure under which the bargain between prosecutors and witnesses can be made a matter of record so that dishonesty, equivocation, and misunderstanding may be minimized. The People can prevent this only by meeting their heavy burden of establishing the extent of the immunity offered. The People have not done so. The majority emphasize that at times limited grants of immunity by prosecuting authorities, although not formalized pursuant to Penal Code section 1324, may be honored by the court. (People v. Brunner, supra, at *345 p. 915 .) 1 In Brunner , a witness had been promised immunity against prosecution in exchange for an agreement to testify against two defendants. The witness complied with the agreement. The district attorney, alleging that Brunner testified untruthfully, sought to prosecute him. The court held that “It would be anomalous to permit the People, represented by the district attorney, to argue that an earlier agreement entered into by the district attorney was void for lack of compliance with a statute of whose existence the district attorney must have been aware.” {Ibid.) That is, to permit prosecution of the offenses for which immunity was promised would result in a gross injustice. The court affirmed the dismissal of an indictment against Brunner. Manifestly, the Brunner ruling is inapplicable to the conclusion reached by the majority. The record contains substantial evidence in support of the ruling by the trial court. I would deny the writ. No peremptory writ of mandate should issue instructing the superior court to vacate its suppression order. Unlike the majority, I do not read People v. Label (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 766 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 522 ], as standing for the proposition that the district attorney has inherent power to grant a general or limited immunity without complying with Penal Code section 1324. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9720558. Public record. Not legal advice.