# Henrich v. Libertyville High School

> Illinois Supreme Court · June 1, 1999 · 186 Ill. 2d 381

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9720464

## Case

- **Full name:** JOSHUA A. HENRICH, by His Mother and Next Friend, Judith Henrich, Appellant, v. LIBERTYVILLE HIGH SCHOOL Et Al., Appellees
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 1, 1999
- **Citations:** 186 Ill. 2d 381; 238 Ill. Dec. 576; 712 N.E.2d 298
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Heiple
- **Judges:** Freeman, Heiple, Harrison, Nickels, McMorrow, Rathje
- **Cited by:** 239 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9720464

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that defendants were immune from liability for “ordinary negligence” but not for “willful and wanton misconduct”
- noting that courts “cannot restrict or enlarge the meaning of an unambiguous statute” or “rewrite statutes to make them consistent with the court’s idea of orderliness and public policy”
- holding the defendant school district had a “vested right” to the immunity provided by the statute before the amendment
- finding a school district’s right to the total immunity as a defense vested when the cause of action accrued

## Opinion text

JUSTICE HEIPLE, specially concurring:
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that section 24 — 24 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/24 — 24 (West 1994)) and section 3 — 108(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3 — 108(a) (West 1994)) do not conflict. However, the majority’s rationale is wrong.
The two provisions at issue in this case both grant immunity to a defendant where a plaintiff alleges ordinary negligence. However, whereas section 24 — 24 of the Code grants immunity for ordinary negligence only, section 3 — 108(a) of the Act grants immunity for both ordinary negligence and willful and wanton conduct. Thus, where ordinary negligence is alleged, either the Code or the Act may be raised as an affirmative defense, and the two provisions do not conflict. Rather, they simply complement each other.
Where a plaintiff alleges willful and wanton conduct, however, section 3 — 108(a) of the Act is alone available as an affirmative defense. That is because section 24 — 24 of the Code does not immunize willful and wanton conduct. On the other hand, neither does it create liability for willful and wanton conduct. It simply has no application in that situation. That is to say, section 3 — 108(a) of the Act does not conflict with section 24 — 24 of the Code; the Act merely grants a greater immunity than the Code. Consequently, the Act controls the disposition in the case at hand. Thus, I concur with the judgment of the court but not its opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9720464. Public record. Not legal advice.