# R.W. v. Manzek

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · December 28, 2005 · 585 Pa. 335

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9719702

## Case

- **Full name:** R.W. and C.W., Individually and as the Parents and Natural Guardians of L.W., Appellants v. Scott MANZEK, Personally and in His Capacity as the Owner of 84 Services, 84 Services, Cookbook Publishers, Inc. and Giftco, Inc., Appellees
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 28, 2005
- **Citations:** 585 Pa. 335; 888 A.2d 740; 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3088
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Cappy
- **Judges:** Cappy, Nigro, Newman, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Castille
- **Cited by:** 157 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9719702

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining “[t]he existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide. . . . a duty consists of one party’s obligation to conform to a particular standard of care for the protection of another.”
- recognizing duty of private fundrais-ing entities to warn children and parents of the danger of using children as fundraisers in school fundraising activities and competition
- explaining, in a negligence context, that "[tjhe existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide”
- explaining, in a negligence context, that "[t]he existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide”
- declining to address “how the ‘foreseeable and fairly direct’ element of a state created danger cause of action compares to the foreseeability analysis necessary to establish a duty in a state negligence cause of action” (emphasis added)

## Opinion text

Chief Justice CAPPY,
Dissenting.
Because I cannot agree with the reasoning or the conclusions drawn by the majority, I must respectfully dissent.
In my opinion, I do not believe that Appellees needed to provide a warning that there exist in the world evil people who could possibly cause intentional harm to minor students. Of course, it is an unfortunate fact that heinous acts are committed against small children by people such as Timothy Fleming (“Fleming”). And yet, this does not make it incumbent upon defendants such as Appellees to provide a warning of this generalized risk. Appellees had no specific knowledge that Fleming posed such a risk to L.W. 1 In the absence of such particularized knowledge, I am chary of imposing on individuals and business enterprises a duty to warn that unknown third parties could potentially cause harm by engaging in criminal acts.
Furthermore, even if I were to agree that Appellees had such a duty, I do not see how Appellants will ultimately prevail in this matter. Although this issue has not been raised before this court, in my opinion, it is apparent that Appellants’ complaint has tacitly conceded that there is no causation in *357 this matter. In a failure to warn case, a defendant will not be held liable, even in the absence of making a warning, when the plaintiff already knew of the danger which the missing warning allegedly should have cautioned and engaged in the dangerous activity anyway. See Phillips v. A-Best, 542 Pa. 124 , 665 A.2d 1167 , 1171 (1995). In the instant matter, the complaint admits that Appellants had specifically warned L.W. against approaching strangers in her fundraising. See Complaint at ¶¶ 15 and 18. In essence, Appellants had already given the warning that they claim Appellees negligently failed to convey. Thus, it cannot be said that Appellees’ failure to provide a warning in any fashion caused L.W.’s tragic injuries.
For these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s order reversing the order of the Superior Court and must respectfully dissent.
. This is in contrast to Emerich v. Philadelphia Center for Human Development, Inc., 554 Pa. 209 , 720 A.2d 1032 (1998). In Emerich , a psychiatric patient informed his psychiatrist that he intended to kill his girlfriend. In light of there being such a specific threat posed by a particular individual, this court held that the psychiatrist had a duty to warn the girlfriend of the boyfriend-patient’s threat to murder her. In the matter sub judice, however, there is no allegation that Appellees had knowledge that Fleming posed such a threat.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9719702. Public record. Not legal advice.