# In Re the Revocation of the License of Polk

> Supreme Court of New Jersey · July 30, 1982 · 90 N.J. 550

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9718853

## Case

- **Full name:** In the Matter of the Revocation of the License of Irwin Jacob Polk, M.D., License No. 141816 to Practice Medicine and Surgery in the State of New Jersey
- **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 30, 1982
- **Citations:** 90 N.J. 550; 449 A.2d 7; 1982 N.J. LEXIS 2169
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Pashman
- **Judges:** Handler, Pashman
- **Cited by:** 242 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9718853

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that a criminal defendant may present evidence "if the proof offered has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State's case"
- finding that applica tion of the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof to medical disciplinary proceedings does not violate due process or equal protection
- finding that applica *103 tion of the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof to medical disciplinary proceedings does not violate due process or equal protection
- finding that application of the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof to medical disciplinary proceedings does not violate due process or equal protection

## Opinion text

PASHMAN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion except insofar as it remands the case to the State Board of Medical Examiners to reconsider the sanction of license revocation. I would simply reinstate the State Board order of revocation.
The majority opinion recognizes that the test for judicial review of administrative sanctions is whether, under the circumstances of the case, the punishment is so disproportionate to the offense as to shock one’s sense of fairness. Ante at 578. The majority also recognizes that license revocation has frequently been upheld by courts when physicians have been found to have sexually abused their patients. Ante at 578-579.
The State Board of Medical Examiners unanimously recommended the penalty of license revocation. We should defer to this administrative decision. I understand the majority’s concern for procedural fairness. I agree that it was wrong for the Board to have determined to revoke Polk’s license before hear *581 ing from his attorney. However, the mitigating circumstances would have to be substantial indeed to warrant anything less than license revocation in a case such as this. Polk’s attorney did get a chance to urge those circumstances and the Board quickly decided that the new information did not warrant reconsideration of the penalty.
I see absolutely no reason to reverse the Board’s determination or to order it to reconsider its decision. The Board heard the relevant evidence and concluded that Dr. Polk had “grossly exploited” his young patients, “denied the reality of their concerns,” and “surreptitiously manipulated them] to satisfy his own lascivious interests.” Revocation of his license is certainly not shocking under these circumstances. Sexual abuse of one’s patients is itself a shocking breach of professional ethics. Because license revocation is not unreasonable, I dissent.
Justice CLIFFORD joins in this dissent.
For modification and remandment—Justices SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK and O’HERN-4.
Dissenting in part, concurring in part—Justices PASHMAN and CLIFFORD—2.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9718853. Public record. Not legal advice.