# People v. House > Illinois Supreme Court · December 20, 1990 · 141 Ill. 2d 323 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9717662 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DERRICK HOUSE, Appellant - **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court - **Decided:** December 20, 1990 - **Citations:** 141 Ill. 2d 323; 152 Ill. Dec. 572; 566 N.E.2d 259; 59 U.S.L.W. 2423; 1990 Ill. LEXIS 153 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Miller - **Judges:** Calvo, Miller - **Cited by:** 166 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9717662 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that based on the closeness of the evidence, counsel’s failure to conduct an investigation that would have established that the victim described someone other than the defendant at the scene, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which likely affected the outc… - reasoning that it is difficult to draw a bright line, but defendants properly processed and charged can be held in interview rooms for lengthy periods of time, although given a different set of circumstances the result might be different - stating there is no per se rule “that a declarant cannot make a spontaneous declaration to a person after having spoken previously to another” and such an occurrence “is merely a factor to consider in determining admissibility” - finding there is no per se rule that a declarant cannot make an excited utterance to one person after having previously spoken to another - observing that “the presence or absence of self-interest” is a factor to consider in determining whether an excited utterance is admissible ## Opinion text JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: I do not agree with the court’s conclusion that certain statements made by a victim in this case were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, I dissent. One of the victims, Kim Brooks, spoke with a police officer at the crime scene around 6:15 p.m., shortly after the discovery of the fire. In her conversation with the officer, Brooks recounted the details of the offenses, but she said that she did not know the identities of the offenders, and she did not describe them to the officer. On two occasions later that evening, Brooks spoke at the hospital with another police officer. The first conversation occurred around 8:30, and the second around midnight. On those occasions, Brooks provided descriptions of the two offenders. At trial, defense counsel contended that neither description given by Brooks matched the defendant, and counsel sought to introduce, as substantive evidence, the second officer’s testimony concerning Brooks’s statements. The judge refused to admit the evidence, concluding that the statements did not meet the requirements of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Admission of a hearsay statement as an excited utterance requires that three criteria be met: “(1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.” (People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175, 181 .). The present dispute centers on the length of time that elapsed between the occurrence and the declarant's statements. Discussing the second criterion for admission, this court has observed that “[t]he time factor is an elusive element and will vary with the facts of the case.” (People v. Shum (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 317, 343 .) “The proper question is whether the statement was made while the excitement of the event predominated.” M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §803.3, at 627 (5th ed. 1990). The circumstances of the present case demonstrate that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to admit the proffered testimony as substantive evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The two later statements that the defendant sought to introduce were made some 21k and 6 hours after the event, and after the declarant’s initial statement at the scene. During that time the declarant underwent medical treatment, and she was exposed to a variety of persons, including her brother. Unlike cases in which this court, has found that delays between the event and the statement did not prevent application of the spontaneous utterance exception (see, e.g., People v. Nevitt (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 423 ; People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 221 ), the present appeal involves a declarant who had already given one statement at the crime scene and who, following her rescue, provided additional information in response to subsequent questioning. Under the circumstances shown here, admission of the later statements would not be consistent with the hearsay exception asserted by the defendant. See People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 342 . In support of its decision in the present appeal, the 'majority poses a case in which a declarant, in response to a startling event, makes a remark to one person and immediately afterwards makes a remark to another person. The majority believes that both statements should be admissible, and cites that hypothetical to show that a declarant’s successive statements should not necessarily fail to qualify as excited utterances. 141 Ill. 2d at 386. Whatever may be said of the example posited by the majority, the circumstances of the present case are different. Here, the declarant initially made a statement to an officer at the scene. Not until several hours later, when the declarant was again questioned about the event, did she provide the information that the defendant attempted to introduce into evidence at trial. As noted, during that period the declarant received medical treatment, and she was exposed to a number of different persons between the times of her initial and subsequent statements. These circumstances indicate that the declarant’s two later statements were not made “while the excitement of the event predominated.” I would conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding from evidence the hearsay testimony that the defense sought to introduce. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9717662. Public record. Not legal advice.