# Stinner v. Stinner

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · February 8, 1989 · 520 Pa. 374

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9717281

## Case

- **Full name:** Eleanore STINNER, Appellant, v. Donald E. STINNER and Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Appellees
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 8, 1989
- **Citations:** 520 Pa. 374; 554 A.2d 45; 10 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1972; 79 A.L.R. 4th 1071; 1989 Pa. LEXIS 30
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Zappala
- **Judges:** Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos, Stout
- **Cited by:** 22 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9717281

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the judgment for past-due alimony that the wife was attempting to enforce by garnishing the husband's pension was "made pursuant to the decisional domestic relations law of Pennsylvania"
- holding that ERISA's anti-alienation provision did not invalidate an order garnishing the former husband's ERISA benefits to satisfy an alimony arrearage
- holding that a QDRO may be entered to enforce a judgment for breach of an alimony agreement

## Opinion text

*384 ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
In order to be considered as a qualified domestic relation order under Section 1056(3)(B)(i) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982), as amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (d) (1982 and Supp. Ill (1985)), a primary requisite is that the order give a spouse a specific interest in the subject pension proceeds. Because the majority fails to recognize this requirement, I must dissent.
Section 1056(3)(B)(i) states as follows:
(i) The term “qualified domestic relations order” means a domestic relations order—
(I) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee’s right to or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan, ... (Emphasis added)
Thus, before a spouse is entitled to receive any share of pension proceeds, that amount must be spelled out in the support order. For example, a court may order a spouse to pay $100 a month in alimony and 50% of that spouse’s pension. The specific designation regarding the pension enables the order to be recognized as a “qualified domestic relations order” as that term is defined under the Act.
In the appeal sub judice, the Appellant is attempting to enforce a support agreement which provided for the payment of $250 per week for life. The Appellant appears to have leaped over the first hurdle by having her support agreement incorporated into a court order. See Majority Slip Opinion at 2, fn. 1. This does not alleviate the Appellant’s second hurdle, however, which is to obtain a specific order assigning an interest in the pension plan. While the Appellant does have, at least arguably, a domestic relation order, the order of February 5, 1980, is not a “qualified domestic relations order.” Therefore, there is no authority under the Act to attach the Appellee’s pension.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9717281. Public record. Not legal advice.