# Cellucci v. General Motors Corp.

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · April 30, 1996 · 450 Pa. Super. 438

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9716816

## Case

- **Full name:** Daniel CELLUCCI v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and Joseph v. DeFalco
- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 30, 1996
- **Citations:** 450 Pa. Super. 438; 676 A.2d 253
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Cirillo
- **Judges:** Rowley, Cavanaugh, McEwen, Cirillo, Sole, Beck, Tamilia, Johnson, Hoffman
- **Cited by:** 13 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9716816

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining federal preemption is matter of law ripe for summary judgment

## Opinion text

CIRILLO, Judge,
concurring.
I join in the majority’s opinion today overruling this court’s decisions in Gingold and Heiple, adopting the Third Circuit Court’s decision in Pokomy, and concluding that Cellucci’s action against GM is impliedly preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. I write separately, however, to offer additional insight into the ramifica *455 tions of appellee’s suggestion that there exists a product liability cause of action against General Motors based on the theory of defective design.
Cellucci, a passenger in a 1986 Chevrolet Cavalier equipped with three-point lap and shoulder harness safety belts, was injured when the car struck a tree. In his action against GM, Cellucci averred that the Cavalier was defectively designed because it lacked air bags. There is no dispute here that GM was in compliance with the federal safety standards; the phase-in requirement for air bags was not to begin until the 1987 model year. Cellucci argues, nonetheless, that the car was defectively designed because it did not come equipped with air bags.
The doctrine of preemption springs from the simple mandate that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land----” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Chief Justice Marshall first stated the doctrine in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 , 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824):
The nullity of any act, inconsistent with the Constitution, is produced by the declaration, that the Constitution is the supreme law. The appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the state legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but though enacted in the execution of acknowledged state powers, interfere with, or are contrary to, the laws of Congress, in pursuance of the Constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In every case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210-11 . A state action that “frustrate[s] the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” may provide a basis for implied preemption, despite the absence of express preemption. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 1483 , 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 , 61 S.Ct. 399, 404 , 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)).
*456 Here, as the majority correctly notes, allowing a common law claim “in the face of specific federal safely standards would create an actual conflict between the federal and state law such that the state law is impliedly preempted.” Majority Opinion at p. 450. In 1986, manufacturers could choose from three safety options; air bags were not required. A state mandate would eliminate the element of choice which is clearly set forth in the federal Safety Standard 208. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 § 4.1.2.1, § 4.1.2.2, and § 4.1.2.3. See also Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1124-25 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990) (a common law rule cannot prohibit the exercise of a federally granted option). Cf. Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d 327 (Ind.1995) (applying traditional implied conflict preemption analysis, court found common law action in negligence for failure to install an airbag was not preempted by the Federal National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966).
In addition to offending preemption principles, allowing a common law action against General Motors creates the anomalous circumstance of punishing a manufacturer for complying with the federal safety standards. See Taylor v. General Motors Corporation, 875 F.2d 816, 827 (11th Cir.1989) (quoting Chicago & N.W. Trans. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318 , 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1130-31 , 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981)). See also Pokorny, supra. Further, it lays the foundation for a patchwork of differing standards throughout the country, and frustrates the uniformity Congress sought in enacting the federal safety law. Compare Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 412 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 782 (1990)(finding Congress’ chosen method of increasing automobile safety was to establish uniform national safety standards) with Pokorny, supra (suggesting uniformity was not a primary goal of Congress in enacting the Safety Act).
Cellucci’s argument that the availability of the air bags placed upon GM the duty to incorporate them into the design of its car, regardless of the federal safety standards, discounts the consumer’s ability to “design” his or her car to meet a *457 certain safety level beyond that required under federal law. In today’s market, the consumer is, in the sense of safety options, a designer. The consumer who wishes protection beyond that required by federal law can obtain that protection for a cost. Other safety options, such as side air bags, roll bars, steel cages, even bullet proof windows, are available and can be incorporated if the consumer is willing to pay a higher price.
Mere availability, however, is insufficient to create a cause of action in products liability. This defies the purpose and theory of product liability law, and reaches instead toward a theory of absolute liability. See Davis v. Berwind Corporation, 433 Pa.Super. 342, 352-54 , 640 A.2d 1289, 1295 (1994), citing Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 551-55 , 391 A.2d 1020, 1023 (1978); Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 376 Pa.Super. 220, 225 , 545 A.2d 906, 909 (1988); Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22, 61 , 485 A.2d 408, 429 (1984). When the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration 1 determines that a safety feature is required, only then can we reasonably conclude that its exclusion supports a product liability action based on defective design.
Before ROWLEY, President Judge 1 , CAVANAUGH, McEWEN, CIRILLO, DEL SOLE, BECK, TAMILIA, JOHNSON and HOFFMAN, JJ.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9716816. Public record. Not legal advice.