# Dickerson v. State

> Indiana Supreme Court · January 5, 1972 · 257 Ind. 562

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9716739

## Case

- **Full name:** Clifton Willie Dickerson v. State of Indiana
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** January 5, 1972
- **Citations:** 257 Ind. 562; 276 N.E.2d 845; 1972 Ind. LEXIS 627
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by DeBruler
- **Judges:** Hunter, Givan, Debruler
- **Cited by:** 52 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9716739

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding it misleading to instruct defendant to sign rights form “if he understood it.”
- finding inadequate a warning identical to the one in this case
- discussing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)

## Opinion text

Concurring in Result
DeBruler, J.
I concur in the result reached by Justice Hunter in this case, and agree that the waiver was inadequate. However, I do not agree that the warnings in this case were adequate as I have previously indicated in Jones v. State (1969) 253 Ind. 235 , 252 N. E. 2d 572 . When the accused is told that “we have no way of giving you a lawyer but one will be appointed for you, if and when you go to court and the court finds that you are a pauper,” he is effectively told that he can talk now or remain in custody — in an alien, friendless, harsh world — for an indeterminate length of time. To the average accused, still hoping at this stage to be home on time for dinner or to make it to work on time, the implication that his choice is to answer questions right away or remain in custody until that nebulous time “if and when” he goes to court is a coerced choice of the most obvious kind.
Furthermore, the printed warnings clearly imply that a lawyer will be helpful during questioning but would be unable to prevent the questioning. The accused is told that “you have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any *575 questions, and to have him with you during questioning,” and later “you also have the right to stop answering questions until you talk to a lawyer.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the accused is left with the impression that he can answer questions right away and possibly be released, or wait an indeterminate length of time in custody until a lawyer can be appointed to be with him while he is questioned. It is true that he is told that “you have the right to remain silent,” but this simple statement does not and cannot convey the important protection of the Fifth Amendment to the accused, namely, that he has an absolute right not to answer questions at any time. This single sentence is especially inadequate where the remainder of the warning implies that a lawyer could only help him answer the question and not prevent any questioning.
Note. — Reported in 276 N. E. 2d 845 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9716739. Public record. Not legal advice.