# Town of Lebanon v. Woods

> Supreme Court of Connecticut · November 24, 1965 · 153 Conn. 182

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9715883

## Case

- **Full name:** Town of Lebanon v. John H. Woods
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Connecticut
- **Decided:** November 24, 1965
- **Citations:** 153 Conn. 182; 215 A.2d 112; 1965 Conn. LEXIS 421
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Murphy
- **Judges:** King, Murphy, Alcorn, Shannon, House
- **Cited by:** 68 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9715883

## Opinion text

*198 Murphy, J.
(dissenting). In my judgment, the opinion in this ease will set back zoning in Connecticut for many years. Our cases have been cited as authority in other jurisdictions and by text writers because we have adhered to good zoning practices with due regard to the public and private interests involved. This case may very well change that picture. The particular harm lies in the fact that regulations which set no standards, which do not “zone” and which have not been made in accordance with a “comprehensive plan” are sanctioned. That they are termed “interim” zoning regulations is of no particular importance. And I find no fault in the holding that the subdivision regulations are valid. My disagreement relates entirely to the so-called zoning regulations.
This litigation was instituted by the town, which alleged in its complaint that the town planning and zoning commission had adopted zoning regulations, and it sought to enjoin the defendant from constructing buildings on his property in violation of them. In order to prevail it was incumbent on the town to prove that valid zoning regulations had been adopted. I maintain that the regulations which were adopted are not zoning regulations and that the town failed in its burden of proof.
The opinion quotes the definition of a comprehensive plan from Miller v. Town Planning Commission, 142 Conn. 265, 269 , 113 A.2d 504 , and State v. Huntington, 145 Conn. 394, 399 , 143 A.2d 444 , to be “a general plan to control and direct the use and development of property in a municipality ... by dividing it into districts according to the present and potential use of the properties.” The opinion then attempts to evade the requirements of that definition by holding that the failure to prescribe uses *199 and provide districts in Lebanon is meaningless. It completely ignores another holding in Huntington, su pra, 398, that “[t]he ultimate object of zoning regulations is to confine certain classes of buildings and uses to designated localities or districts.” See also Thayer v. Board of Appeals, 114 Conn. 15, 23 , 157 A. 273 ; State ex reí. Chatlos v. Rowland, 131 Conn. 261, 266 , 38 A.2d 785 .
All of our cases, until now, and all of the recognized text writers hold that the regulation of the use of property is the keystone of the zoning arch. Zoning is a product of the twentieth century. It was conceived to prevent the indiscriminate and haphazard use of property without respect to orderly development. As Metzenbaum, Zoning (1930), p. 6, puts it: “Zoning does no more than apply the rules of good housekeeping to public affairs. It keeps the kitchen stove out of the parlor, the bookcase out of the pantry and the dinner table out of the bedroom.” Justice Hinman incorporated that quotation in his opinion in Chudnov v. Board of Appeals, 113 Conn. 49, 53 , 154 A. 161 . Yokley, in volume one of Municipal Corporations § 120, p. 321, gives this court credit for providing a very sensible definition of “zoning” in Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 540 , 45 A.2d 828 , wherein we quoted from State ex rel. Spiros v. Payne, 131 Conn. 647, 652 , 41 A.2d 908 , and used the definition which the opinion in this case attributes to the Miller and Huntington cases as the definition of a “comprehensive plan.”
Let me quote from authoritative text writers. “Zoning is governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts and zones.” 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev.) § 25.01, p. 11. “Though zoning is composed of a *200 variety of restrictions or limitations, its chief and principal characteristic — as distinguished from other restrictive legislation — is the provision which places the restriction upon the use of property.” 1 Metzenbaum, Zoning (2d Ed.), p. 12. “ ‘[Z]oning relates to the regulation of the use of property — to structural and architectural designs of buildings; also the character of use to which the property or the buildings within classified or designated districts may be put.’ ” 1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning § 2, p. 1-7 (quoting from Seligman v. Belknap, 288 Ky. 133, 135 , 155 S.W.2d 735 ). “ ‘Zoning’ is a technical term broadly signifying a scheme of regulation of land uses, in exercise of the police power, which entails the division of the corporate area of a municipality into zones or districts and the prescribing of the types of land uses that are permitted in each zone or district to subserve the public health, safety, morals or public welfare of the community. Zoning is a legal restraint on an owner’s use of his property based upon the police power to serve the public interest or police power objectives, and through the exercise of the zoning power the use of land and buildings and the bulk and height of buildings are regulated to promote the welfare of. the community as a whole, by protecting and preserving the true character of a neighborhood through exclusion of new uses incompatible with the defined uses prescribed for the neighborhood.” Rhyne, Municipal Law § 32-1, p. 811.
The trial court held that the regulations divided the town into two residential districts, but the opinion does not agree with this conclusion. Actually, these regulations do not set up any districts. As the preamble indicates, the stated purpose of the regulations is to regulate minimum lot sizes. They *201 establish a minimum lot size of one acre throughout the town and then make an exception for seasonal properties within 500 feet of the high-water mark of any body of water. Any type of structure, from a woodshed to an apartment house, can be built, and any kind of use, residential, commercial or manufacturing, can be conducted on any lot in town which is one acre or more in area regardless of where it is located or the nature or use of the adjoining properties. Thus, an automobile junk yard or a mink ranch can legally be established next door to the First Congregational Church, and a slaughterhouse or noxious chemical plant can be built adjacent to the town hall. No attempt is made to control the use to which property in the town is to be put, although one of the essential purposes of zoning regulation is to stabilize property uses. Strain v. Mims, 123 Conn. 275, 287 , 193 A. 754 ; Abbadessa v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 134 Conn. 28, 34 , 54 A.2d 675 ; Smith v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 142 Conn. 88, 94 , 111 A.2d 552 ; Zoning Commission v. New Canaan Building Co., 146 Conn. 170, 175 , 148 A.2d 330 ; Kimball v. Court of Common Council, 148 Conn. 97, 101 , 167 A.2d 706 . Zoning is concerned primarily with the use of property. Abbadessa v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 32; State ex rel. LaVoie v. Building Commission, 135 Conn. 415, 419 , 65 A.2d 165 ; Del Buono v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 673, 679 , 124 A.2d 915 ; Purtill v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 146 Conn. 570, 572 , 153 A.2d 441 ; Ferndale Dairy, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 148 Conn. 172, 176 , 169 A.2d 268 . Zoning consists of a general plan to control and direct the use and development of property in a municipality or a large part of it by dividing it into districts according to the present and potential use of the property. *202 State ex rel. Spiros v. Payne, 131 Conn. 647, 652 , 41 A.2d 908 ; Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 540 , 45 A.2d 828 .
The object of zoning is to adopt measures to regulate property uses in conformance with a comprehensive plan in a manner to advance the public welfare. Steiner, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 149 Conn. 74, 75 , 175 A.2d 559 . General Statutes § 8-2 requires the zoning regulations to be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan. The trial court found that the town had never formally adopted a comprehensive plan but that the regulations present a reasonable comprehensive plan. The opinion, by negating all of the case law in this state which has repeatedly held that the regulation of the use of property is the fundamental purpose of zoning, has also disregarded the portion of General Statutes § 8-2 which provides: “Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration as to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.” (The italics are mine.) “Shall” as used therein is mandatory and not permissive. See Blake v. Meyer, 145 Conn. 612, 616 , 145 A.2d 584 . Furthermore, no part of a statute should be treated as insignificant or unnecessary. McAdams v. Barbieri, 143 Conn. 405, 419 , 123 A.2d 182 .
Qn several occasions prior to "Woods’ advent into Lebanon, the voters refused to adopt zoning. When they woke up to what he planned, they changed their attitude and submerged their “independence” in the desire to block his development. That was the obvious purpose of these regulations. Had they *203 been properly drafted, I would agree to them. But I do not feel that the law on zoning as it has been developed in this state should be undermined to accommodate the particular objective of the citizens of the town of Lebanon in this case. Naturally the requisites of an adequate zoning law for a large urban area should be more detailed and complex than that needed to properly zone a farming community such as Lebanon. The standards by which all regulations are measured, however, do not vary from town to town. And while liberality is extended to the local legislative body, it cannot substitute its standards for those set out in the statute. Interim regulations must be measured by the same yardstick as regular ones. By no stretch of the imagination can these regulations be construed as maintaining or preserving the residential character of the town. In Lebanon, one can do anything he chooses with his property so long as it is not less than one acre in size except near a water hole. The pigs can make themselves comfortable in the parlor, the geese can do their honking in the bedrooms, and the cows can placidly chew their cuds in the guest rooms. That is not good housekeeping, and these regulations do not measure up to the standards of good zoning. They should be declared invalid.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9715883. Public record. Not legal advice.