# Keith v. Mendus

> Indiana Court of Appeals · February 12, 1996 · 661 N.E.2d 26

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9715704

## Case

- **Full name:** Scott N. KEITH, D.P.M., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Mary MENDUS, D.O., Mark Rybczynski, D.O. and Richard Krejsa, D.O., Appellees-Defendants
- **Court:** Indiana Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** February 12, 1996
- **Citations:** 661 N.E.2d 26; 11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 671; 1996 Ind. App. LEXIS 73; 1996 WL 53796
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Barteau
- **Judges:** Rucker, Najam, Barteau
- **Cited by:** 51 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9715704

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that the trial court’s statements that there was a “complete lack of evidence” and the jury’s verdict was “not warranted by the evidence,” revealed the court’s belief that the jury verdict was clearly erroneous rather than against the weight of the evidence, and the…
- stating that “an officer or director of a corporation will not be held independently personally liable for inducing the corporation’s breach of its contract, if the officer or director’s action is within the scope of his official duties on behalf of the corporation”
- holding that where the evidence gave rise to conflicting inferences that were later resolved by the trier of fact, summary judgment was inappropriate
- holding that “the denial of a motion for summary judgment is reviewable on appeal following a final judgment entered after trial on the merits[]”

## Opinion text

BARTEAU, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the length of employment we use to gauge losses incurred by an at-will employee whose contract has been wrongfully interfered with may not stretch on ad infinitum. As the majority notes, “we leave to the jury the task of determining what amount of time is a ‘reasonable time.’ ” Slip op. at 11 (citing Remington Freight Lines, Inc. v. Larkey, 644 N.E.2d 931, 942 (Ind.Ct.App.1994)).
Tort damages, such as those assessed in cases of retaliatory discharge and, now, tor-tious interference with an employment contract, are within the province of the jury, and they will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Larkey, 644 N.E.2d at 942 ; Stivers v. Stevens, 581 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind.Ct. App.1991), reh’g denied; Kavanagh v. Buto-rac, 140 Ind.App. 139 , 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966). An abuse of discretion occurs when the award of damages is not supported by the facts and circumstances before the court. See Hunsberger v. Hunsberger, 653 N.E.2d 118, 121-22 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), reh’g denied.
Dr. Keith testified that, at the time his contract was terminated, he was 40 years old and that he expected to work until he reached the age 65. The hospital argued that Family Medical Services closed in January, 1993, rendering Dr. Keith’s employment beyond that time impossible. However, Dr. Keith asserted that Family Medical Services merely relocated, and that his employment would have endured had his employment relationship with the hospital not been tortiously severed.
Despite this conflicting testimony, the majority concludes:
[Tjhat upon the record before us twenty-five years is not a reasonable time upon which to base future prospective employment. While the jury has the responsibility of determining a “reasonable time”, the “presumed ‘prospective employment’ of the discharged at-will employee is not infinite.”
Slip op. at 12 (citing Haas Carriage, Inc. v. Berna, 651 N.E.2d 284, 290 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995)). Clearly, twenty-five years is not an infinite length of time, and the jury’s award is not against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Dr. Keith offered into evidence his proposed computation of the length of his employment, and the hospital rebutted this proposal with an opposing estimate. We have held that the testimony of a discharged employee is sufficient to allow the jury to ascertain the amount of damages to be awarded. Stivers, 581 N.E.2d at 1255 . It was completely within the province of the jury to accept or reject either or both of the parties’s computations.
What is necessary is that the jury’s measure of damages fall within the parameters of a “reasonable” time period. Larkey, 644 N.E.2d at 942 . For example, a measure awarding Dr. Keith damages for lost employment over a thirty-year period would defy the logic and effect of the facts before the court because no evidence was presented that Dr. Keith would continue to practice medicine until the age of 70. However, the jury found reasonable Dr. Keith’s expectation of practicing medicine for twenty-five years until he retires at age 65, and this was within the parameters of a reasonable time period and supported by the evidence.
Such is not to say that in all cases of tortious interference with an at-will employment contract the injured party is entitled to receive compensation measured from the tor-tious act through the time the party expects to retire. The jury must determine the length of time the injured party would have remained employed but for the tortious act. In this case, the jury rejected the hospital’s position and accepted Dr. Keith’s claim that *39 he would have remained employed with the hospital for twenty-five years.
I respectfully DISSENT.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9715704. Public record. Not legal advice.