# Kolitch v. Lindedahl

> Supreme Court of New Jersey · July 22, 1985 · 100 N.J. 485

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714859

## Case

- **Full name:** Stephen Kolitch, Administrator Ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Alan Kolitch, a Minor, Deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Stefan R. Lindedahl, Estate of Marilyn Bradley and John A. Bradley, Defendants, and State of New Jersey, Defendant-Appellant; John A. Bradley, as Administrator Ad Prosequendum for the Heirs-At-Law of Philip M. Bradley, Deceased, David M. Bradley, Deceased, and Marilyn B. Bradley, Deceased; As Administrator of the Estates of Philip M. Bradley, Deceased, David A. Bradley, Deceased, and Marilyn B. Bradley, Deceased; And Individually, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Stefan R. Lindedahl, Defendant, and State of New Jersey, Department of Transporation, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 22, 1985
- **Citations:** 100 N.J. 485; 497 A.2d 183; 1985 N.J. LEXIS 2364
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by O'Hern
- **Judges:** Clifford, O'Hern
- **Cited by:** 152 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714859

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining a plaintiff bringing a negligence action against a public entity "must first establish the predicates for liability, and later avoid application of any provision granting the sovereign immunity"
- recognizing in dicta no liability for failing to post a traffic sign
- stating that claim under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 is evaluated under standard of palpably unreasonable conduct and not by standard of ordinary negligence

## Opinion text

O’HERN, J.,
concurring.
It would be less than candid not to admit how close is the call in this case. Justice Handler’s compelling dissent points out how contradictory are the signals of the Tort Claims Act. The liability that the Act concedes for a dangerous condition of property under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 is withdrawn when the condition is caused by an immune act such as the design of the road, N.J.S.A. 59:4-6, or the legislative determination of the proper speed limit. N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(b).
The bitter irony is that the very posting of the immune legislative statement may have contributed to this fatal accident. Indeed, the posted speed may have conflicted with other speed control laws. Yet the comment to N.J.S.A. 59:2-1 makes clear that the statute is “intended to insure that any immunity provisions provided in the act or by common law will prevail over the liability provisions.” Immunity is the dominant consideration of the Act. See, e.g., Malloy v. State, 76 N.J. 515, 518-19 (1978).
The conflicting interplay of the provisions of the Act in this case may present one of those rare occasions that will commend itself to consideration as a legislative claim. See P, T & L Const. Co. v. Comm’r Dept. of Trans., 55 N.J. 341, 342 (1970).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714859. Public record. Not legal advice.
