# People v. Adams > Appellate Court of Illinois · June 5, 1990 · 198 Ill. App. 3d 74 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714783 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois - **Decided:** June 5, 1990 - **Citations:** 198 Ill. App. 3d 74; 144 Ill. Dec. 402; 555 N.E.2d 761; 1990 Ill. App. LEXIS 847 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Dunn - **Judges:** Reinhard, Dunn - **Cited by:** 15 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714783 ## Opinion text JUSTICE DUNN, specially concurring: I concur with the majority’s result; however, I write specially because I believe the Act constitutes punishment under the United States and Illinois Constitutions, though not unconstitutional punishment. In deciding this issue, the majority, relying on Trop v. Dulles (1958), 356 U.S. 86 , 2 L. Ed. 2d 630 , 78 S. Ct. 590 , stated that the test for deciding whether the Act constitutes punishment is whether the legislative purpose behind the Act was punishment or some other legitimate purpose. I believe the stated purpose of the Act is only one of several factors that must be considered in addressing this question. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963), 372 U.S. 144 , 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 , 83 S. Ct. 554 , cited by defendant, the Supreme Court listed several factors that have traditionally been applied to determine whether an Act is penal or regulatory in character. The Court stated: “Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in different directions.” Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 , 9 L. Ed. 2d at 661 , 83 S. Ct. at 567-68 . The majority declined to address all the Kennedy factors, reasoning that Kennedy was a due process case, not an eighth amendment case, unlike Trop, the case upon which it relied. I fail to see that this distinction bears any significance to the issue at hand. In Kennedy, the court addressed whether divestiture of citizenship for persons who flee the country to evade the draft constituted a penal sanction under which the due process clause would require affording the safeguards of a criminal prosecution. (Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 164 , 9 L. Ed. 2d at 658 , 83 S. Ct. at 565 .) The issue in Kennedy is the same as the issue presented here and in Trop. Is the statute penal in nature? I doubt very much that the Kennedy court would have offered a different set of tests had the issue been over the eighth amendment. Applying the Kennedy factors to the Act, I find they point in different directions. On the one hand, the Act has an alternative rationale purpose, aiding law enforcement in protecting children against child abuse, and I do not believe the Act is excessive in relation to that purpose. On the other hand, I find the Act imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, it comes into play on a finding of scienter, it applies to behavior that is criminal, and, regardless of the legislature’s stated intent, it will promote traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence. I believe the presence of these factors requires finding that the Act is punishment. I am not convinced that the Act imposes no more of a constraint on liberty than civil disabilities associated with convicted felons such as limitations on possessions of firearms, the right to vote, or the right to hold public office. In my opinion, the Act imposes a more significant affirmative disability or restraint than is stated by the majority. It is a disability that necessarily entails a loss of privacy. Defendant, if he chooses to start a new life in Illinois after his release from custody, must announce himself as a habitual child sex offender to law enforcement in his community. For 10 years he must live his life knowing that local law enforcement has been made aware of his past child sex abuse convictions. I am not persuaded that defendant suffers no more of a loss of privacy than he would by the public record of his convictions. The Act ensures a certain and direct intrusion that may not necessarily result from defendant’s public record. Nor am I persuaded that the confidentiality provision negates finding a loss of privacy. I find the significant intrusion to be the process under the Act itself, not whether the information may be leaked to the community. For the above reasons, I find that the Act does constitute punishment under the United States and Illinois Constitutions, though I agree with the majority that it is not unconstitutional punishment. Finally, I note that the. California Supreme Court, in its determination of whether its registration requirement for sex offenders constituted punishment, addressed the issue by analyzing each Kennedy factor and concluded that its registration requirement was punishment. In re Reed (1983), 33 Cal. 3d 914, 919-22 , 663 P.2d 216, 217-20 , 191 Cal. Rptr. 658, 660-62 . --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714783. Public record. Not legal advice.