# Wangen v. Ford Motor Co. > Wisconsin Supreme Court · June 27, 1980 · 97 Wis. 2d 260 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714263 ## Case - **Full name:** Terri Wangen, a Minor, by Her Guardian, Charles R. Wangen, Charles R. Wangen, Special Administrator of the Estate of Christopher DuVall, Deceased, Charles R. Wangen, Special Administrator of the Estate of Kip Wangen, Deceased, Charles R. Wangen, Individually and Ramona M. Wangen, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Ford Motor Company, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, and Robin DuVall, Patrick J. Hawley, Allstate Insurance Company, American Family Mutual Insurance Co., Thomas J. Curran, Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., and Republic National Life Insurance Co., Defendants. [Case No. 77-893.]; Robin DuVall, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ford Motor Company, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, and Patrick Hawley, Allstate Insurance Company, Thomas Curran and Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., Defendants. [Case No. 77-894.] - **Court:** Wisconsin Supreme Court - **Decided:** June 27, 1980 - **Citations:** 97 Wis. 2d 260; 294 N.W.2d 437; 13 A.L.R. 4th 1; 1980 Wisc. LEXIS 2637 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Day - **Judges:** Shirley S. Abrahamson - **Cited by:** 207 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714263 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding "under sec. 895.01(1), Stats., causes af action for the recovery of 'damage to the person,' that is, personal injury actions, survive" as property of the estate - applying Delaware law, but in the absence of a determination of this issue by the highest court of that state - stating that the "jury may consider compensatory and punitive damages ... already imposed on the defendant or likely to be imposed on the defendant" - holding that the jury may consider punitive damages, fines, and forfeitures already imposed on the defendant - explaining that gross negligence is an appropriate standard to assess whether punitive damages are available ## Opinion text DAY, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part). I concur in the majority opinion except I dissent from the holding that punitive damages are not available in wrongful death actions. I would hold punitive damages may be assessed in a proper case. The whole theory of punitive damages as set forth in the majority opinion is to serve to punish one who engages in outrageous 1 conduct and as a deterrent to future such conduct by the defendant or by those who might otherwise engage in such conduct. *320 While it is true, as the majority opinion states, that the legislature has historically limited the kinds of damages which could be awarded in wrongful death actions and has limited the amount of recovery, there exists no express limitation in sec. 895.04, Stats., on the right to recover punitive damages in a wrongful death action, and no such limitation should be read into the statute. The supposition in the majority opinion that the legislature did not intend to allow the award of punitive damages because the legislature “. . . has feared that passion would run high where the wrongdoer causes death and that huge damage awards would be imposed on the wrongdoer” {supra, p. 314) is unsupported. No legislative intent can be discerned from the statute, and the majority cites no current legislative history to support its theory of legislative intent, except for now defunct limitations on wrongful death recovery. (There is, however, still a $10,000 limitation for loss of society and companionship.) As one noted writer has observed: “The arguments in favor of limited awards in death actions at bottom turn on a fear of excessive awards. The fact is, however, that there is no more sympathy danger in death cases than in many personal injury cases, and in any event there are many devices for controlling excessive jury verdicts, such as the grant of remittiturs or new trials. In addition there are various forms of debtor-protection devices. . . . “Apparently the case against arbitrary limits on recoveries in death actions has impressed legislatures, since a dwindling number of states now impose such limits.” D. Dobbs, Law Of Remedies, §8.5 (1973). Indeed this argument has impressed our own legislature, for all dollar limitations have been lifted in wrongful death actions except as noted earlier, the limitation for loss of society and companionship. Because the focus of punitive damage awards is upon the conduct of the wrongdoer and not upon the victim, there is no reason *321 in policy or logic for this court to foster an “anomalous” (supra, p. 314) result in the present wrongful death statute. As that term is defined in the majority opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714263. Public record. Not legal advice.