# Commonwealth v. Murphy

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · October 28, 1999 · 559 Pa. 71

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714208

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Craig MURPHY, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 28, 1999
- **Citations:** 559 Pa. 71; 739 A.2d 141; 1999 Pa. LEXIS 3249
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Nigro
- **Judges:** Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor
- **Cited by:** 18 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714208

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the charge informing the jury that it could infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body because such instruction is “consistent with long-standing juri…

## Opinion text

NIGRO, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the majority opinion, but write separately to comment on Appellant’s claim concerning the trial court’s charge to the jury on the meaning of “reasonable doubt”. As noted by the majority, the trial court informed the jury that all they could do was determine what “probably happened”. Like the majority, I appreciate the fact that the trial court was attempting to explain to the jury that because they were not actually present during the commission of the crime, they could not know with absolute certainty exactly what happened. However, I cannot condone any language in a jury charge that suggests to the jury that they need not find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict him of the crimes charged. By injecting language such as “probably happened” into a jury charge on the meaning of “reasonable doubt”, a trial court necessarily risks diluting the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Nevertheless, because I agree with the majority that the trial court’s charge in the instant case, as a whole, adequately instructed the jury on the meaning of “reasonable doubt”, I agree that the Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim does not entitle him to relief.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9714208. Public record. Not legal advice.