# Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Jeter

> Court of Appeals of Maryland · August 17, 2001 · 365 Md. 279

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9713478

## Case

- **Full name:** ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. Michael A. JETER
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Maryland
- **Decided:** August 17, 2001
- **Citations:** 365 Md. 279; 778 A.2d 390; 2001 Md. LEXIS 497
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Harrell
- **Judges:** Bell, Harrell
- **Cited by:** 29 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9713478

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that “given the court’s findings that the respondent did not intend to defraud and that the respondent was remorseful, the appropriate sanction is an indefinite suspension with a right to reapply for admission to the Bar in six months”
- finding violations of MRPC 1.5, 1.15, and Maryland Rules 16-603 and 16-604; indefinite suspension with right to reapply after six months

## Opinion text

HARRELL, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the Majority opinion regarding everything, including the sanction, save for the overruling of Petitioner’s exception to the hearing judge declining to conclude that Respondent violated Rule 8.1(b). I would sustain Petitioner’s exception on this point. Even though it does not change the sanction, in my view, this disagreement compels me to write separately because the reasoning of the Majority opinion in this regard is counter-indicated by our recent cases and the need for appropriate consistency in the application of Rule 8.1(b).
I perceive that the Majority (Maj. op. at 289) mischaracterizes what this Court should be focused on in the hearing judge’s Memorandum Opinion And Order of 7 March 2001 and, therefore, applies the wrong standard of review. It is beyond debate that the hearing judge made no true findings of fact on the matter of Rule 8.1(b). 1 Instead, after neutrally *295 reciting some of the other evidence adduced by the parties, the hearing judge proceeded directly to “not find a violation of Rule 8.1” (Memorandum Opinion and Order, at 7). As the Majority gently puts it (Maj. op. at 288-89), the hearing judge “did not elaborate on the reason” for this conclusion. Despite the hearing judge’s use of a negative form of the verb “to find” in announcing his ultimate recommendation regarding Rule 8.1(b), and the Majority being seduced by the use of that term, it is clear that what the hearing judge did in this case is offer us a conclusion of law, bereft of any supportive fact-finding or analysis. As such, the hearing judge’s conclusion of law is not entitled to review under the clearly erroneous standard applied by the Majority (Maj. op. at 288-89). Rather, the hearing judge’s conclusion of law is reviewed de novo by this Court. As Judge Battaglia recently summarized:
As holder of original and complete jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings, the ultimate decision as to whether a lawyer has violated professional rules rests with this Court. Under an independent review of the record, this Court determines whether the findings of the hearing judge are based on clear and convincing evidence. The “hearing court’s findings of fact are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.” The conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Clark, 363 Md. 169, 180-81 , 767 A.2d 865, 871-72 (2001) (citations omitted).
Turning to the substantive analysis of the Rule 8.1(b) charge, I note that the Court, particularly of late, has made a point of sending a clear and consistent message, in a variety of factual circumstances, to the Bar of Maryland that an attorney’s unjustified failure to respond or cooperate with the office of Bar Counsel in its investigations will not be overlooked. See, e.g., Atty. Griev. Comm’n v. Oswinkle, 364 Md. 182, 187 , 772 A.2d 267 (2001) (failure to respond to repeated inquiries of Bar Counsel is a violation of 8.1(b)); Atty. Griev. Comm’n v. *296 Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 228 , 768 A.2d 607, 618 (2001) (“failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel is a serious violation”); Atty. Griev. Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 253 , 760 A.2d 1108, 1118 (2000) (“belated cooperation with Bar Counsel does not excuse Respondent’s failure to respond to the previous five letters sent by Bar Counsel”); Atty. Griev. Comm’n v. Bridges, 360 Md. 489, 512-14 , 759 A.2d 233, 245-46 (2000) (holding refusal to provide requested documents sought by Bar Counsel by letter and later by subpoena, and to appear at an Inquiry Panel hearing, violated Rule 8.1(b)); Atty. Griev. Comm’n v. Shaw, 354 Md. 636, 644-46 , 732 A.2d 876, 880-81 (1999) (violation of Rule 8.1 found when respondent failed to respond to two letters, two telephone calls, and a request for Admission of Facts); Atty. Griev. Comm’n v. Hallmon, 343 Md. 390, 407-08 , 681 A.2d 510, 519 (1996) (refusal to be interviewed by Bar Counsel’s investigator found to violate Rule 8.1(b)). As we summarized in Fezell , this Court has a long history of holding that an attorney violates 8.1(b) by failing to respond to letters from Bar Counsel requesting information. See Fezell, 361 Md. at 249-250 , 760 A.2d at 1116-17 (listing this Court’s prior consistent holdings that Bar Counsel’s letters requesting information are lawful demands that compel a timely response).
Although we are not bound to conclude that a violation of Rule 8.1(b) has occurred merely because Bar Counsel levels such a charge, the record in the present case amply supports that such a violation occurred. Respondent’s letter requesting an extension of time and alleging that Ms. Schulman ultimately was paid was, at best, only a partial response. See Atty. Griev. Comm’n v. Webster, 348 Md. 662, 674 , 705 A.2d 1135, 1141 (1998) (dilatory and partial response to Bar Counsel’s requests for bank records is a violation of 8.1(b)). As the Majority notes (Maj. op. at 282-85), much more potentially was at stake under the Rules of Conduct, as implicated by the complaint in this case, than whether Respondent eventually paid the therapist. A partial response, by parity of reasoning, should impart only a partial defense. For example, we concluded in Webster that an attorney violated 8.1(b) even though *297 he eventually provided some of the information requested by Bar Counsel. Id. Likewise, in the present case, the remaining matters for which no timely, written response was forthcoming support the charge of a violation of 8.1(b).
The Majority also seems to ground its reasoning on the premise that “the Rule does not, by its terms, indicate that a written response is mandated or even that there is a preference for such a response” (Maj. op. at 288). That is a weak justification for excusing Mr. Jeter’s failure to make a full and substantive response. If Bar Counsel requests, directs, or demands a written response, as its first line of inquiry to an attorney regarding a complaint, we should not become involved in second-guessing whether that decision properly invokes the protection afforded an investigation under Rule 8.1(b). We, in the past, have shown no such inclination and sensibly have allowed Bar Counsel to specify the response required. See, e.g., Fezell, 361 Md. at 252-53 , 760 A.2d at 1117-18 (letters from Bar Counsel qualify as lawful demands for purposes of rule 8.1(b)); Hallmon, 343 Md. at 407-08 , 681 A.2d 510, 519-20 (holding that attorney violated Rule 8.1 when he refused to meet with an Assistant Bar Counsel to discuss an investigation after being requested to do so in a letter from the Assistant Bar Counsel); Atty. Griev. Comm’n v. Kenney, 339 Md. 578, 587 , 664 A.2d 854, 858 , (1995) (holding that attorney violated Rule 8.1 when he failed to provide records of his escrow accounts and other information after being requested to do so by Bar Counsel).
If the Court were inclined to engage in fact-finding, I note that Respondent, in his Response To Petitioner’s Exceptions (at 2) filed with us, asserts that he submitted to an inperson, oral interview by Bar Counsel’s investigator on 3 August 1998, which date fell within the last deadline given by Bar Counsel for him to respond, in writing, to Petitioner’s lawful demands. Assuming this to be a fact, it bears, I think, on the sanction, not on whether violations occurred earlier. See, e.g., Fezell, 361 Md. at 253 , 760 A.2d at 1118 (belated cooperation does not excuse a prior failure to respond); Webster, 348 Md. at 674 , 705 A.2d at 1141 (eventual production of some of the request *298 ed information is not a timely response to Bar Counsel’s request). If we were to conclude further that the content of Respondent’s interview by the investigator on 3 August was responsive fully to the complaint (a conclusion with which some doubt is associated as the investigator nonetheless reportedly informed Respondent at the end of the interview that Respondent still needed to respond to Bar Counsel’s letters in writing), that would be, in my view, an appropriate basis for at least not increasing the sanction imposed by the Majority. That is why I do not argue for a greater sanction here, even though I conclude there was proven a violation of Rule 8.1(b).
The clear message that has been sent, and should continue to be sent, is that attorneys must make timely and complete responses to all lawful and reasonable demands made by Bar Counsel for information, not that they may avoid being found in violation of Rule 8.1(b) by dent of half-hearted or dilatory (or, worst, obfuscatory) efforts at partial obeisance to the requirements of the Rule.
. Nonetheless, it appears undisputed on this record that Bar Counsel established, in writing, three separate written response deadlines (13 July, 28 July, and 5 August 1998) for Respondent by which to answer the complaint and that Respondent’s only written response to any of these deadlines was to request a further extension and allege that Ms. Schulman, the therapist, ultimately had been paid (attaching a photocopy of an impliedly corroborative cashier’s check). Respondent alleged in his Response To Petitioner’s Exceptions (at 2) in this Court, *295 assumedly for mitigation purposes, that Respondent ultimately was interviewed by Petitioner’s investigator on 3 August 1998.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9713478. Public record. Not legal advice.