# In Re the Marriage of Stariha

> Indiana Court of Appeals · June 29, 1987 · 509 N.E.2d 1117

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9712539

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re the MARRIAGE OF John STARIHA, Respondent-Appellant, and Rebecca Stariha, Petitioner-Appellee
- **Court:** Indiana Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** June 29, 1987
- **Citations:** 509 N.E.2d 1117; 1987 Ind. App. LEXIS 2786
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Staton
- **Judges:** Ratliff, Neal, Staton
- **Cited by:** 32 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9712539

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding question of whether father was denied due process when he was jailed for thirty days for indirect contempt without being informed of his right to counsel at the hearing was of great public importance, likely to recur, and likely to continue to evade review
- holding that a father’s appeal of his contempt conviction for failure to pay child support was not moot, even though his sentence had been served, because of “possible collateral consequences”
- noting that Lassiter does not require the court to address the Mathews factors where the litigant risks the loss of physical liberty
- holding that "we will not reverse a trial court's determination 'where absolutely no change in the status quo will result.""
- holding that the case was not moot because appellant's conviction and sentence had collateral consequences

## Opinion text

STATON, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the Majority that an indigent defendant has a due process right to legal counsel where there is a possibility that he may be incarcerated. However, I am troubled with the mechanics of identifying the fundamental right in civil cases prior to a hearing or trial. The presump *1124 tion is that it is not necessary to appoint counsel in civil cases. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981), 452 U.S. 18 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 ; Kennedy v. Wood (1982), Ind.App., 439 N.E.2d 1367 . To avoid the unnecessary waste of judicial time as well as other resources, some guidelines should be offered to the trial court.
When an indigent defendant appears before the trial court, the trial judge would be well advised to review the pleadings before him and the applicable law to determine whether the possibility of incarceration exists. If the trial judge determines that the possibility exists, he should satisfy himself of the indigencey and appoint legal counsel for the defendant. If the defendant insists on going pro se then the trial judge should employ the same or similar procedure used for criminal defendants. See Shelton v. State (1979), 181 Ind.App. 50 , 390 N.E.2d 1048 , trans. den.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9712539. Public record. Not legal advice.