# Parks v. Kownacki

> Illinois Supreme Court · August 10, 2000 · 193 Ill. 2d 164

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9712036

## Case

- **Full name:** GINA TRIMBLE PARKS Et Al., Appellees, v. RAYMOND KOWNACKI Et Al., Appellants
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 10, 2000
- **Citations:** 193 Ill. 2d 164; 249 Ill. Dec. 897; 737 N.E.2d 287; 2000 Ill. LEXIS 1212
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Freeman
- **Judges:** Rathje, Freeman, Harrison
- **Cited by:** 134 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9712036

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress where plaintiff alleged that diocese should have assessed the possibility that contacting her to discuss possible sexual abuse she endured as a child might cause her emotional distress

## Opinion text

JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
I agree with the result in this case. I write separately because I do not endorse the reasoning by which the majority arrives at its conclusion. The majority determines that the victim’s claims for childhood sexual abuse are time-barred based solely on Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603 (2000). I continue to adhere to my belief that Clay was wrongly decided. See Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 615-22 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Harrison, C.J.). Nevertheless, the facts in this case differ so dramatically from the facts in Clay, that I concur that dismissal is appropriate here.
As the majority correctly holds, it is impossible to conclude that the victim in this case was, as she contends, unaware of any injury until early 1995. The victim specifically alleges in her complaint that she was “filled with shame and guilt and horror” at the thought of moving in with her abuser in 1971. Her abuser at various times held a knife to her throat, threatened her with a gun, beat her with his hands and a metal chair and engaged in sexual activities with her by force. Moreover, after becoming pregnant plaintiff aborted the fetus as a result of physical assault by her abuser and, when taken to a hospital, was informed that she had very nearly died. These facts differ markedly from those alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint in Clay. Cf. Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 608-09 (victim alleged that the sexual contact with her abuser was not forcible and that she was never physically harmed). Accordingly, the rule illegitimately applied in Clay correctly operates to bar plaintiffs complaint in this case. See Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 611-13 (“discovery rule” delays commencement of limitations period only until the plaintiff becomes aware of some injury, not until the plaintiff realizes the full extent of her injuries), citing Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353 (1995).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9712036. Public record. Not legal advice.