# People v. Dorsey > Appellate Court of Illinois · December 1, 2005 · 362 Ill. App. 3d 263 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9711452 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TROY A. DORSEY, Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois - **Decided:** December 1, 2005 - **Citations:** 362 Ill. App. 3d 263; 298 Ill. Dec. 457; 839 N.E.2d 1104; 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 1182 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Steigmann - **Judges:** Cook, Appleton, Steigmann - **Cited by:** 9 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9711452 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding the three-day-notice requirement in section 2- 107.1(a-5)(1) was violated because the respondent failed to receive both a copy of the petition and notice of the hearing no later than three days prior to the hearing ## Opinion text JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: Because I do not agree that this court should reduce defendant’s conviction of possession of a methamphetamine-manufacturing chemical with the intent to manufacture 30 to 150 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine to the lesser offense of possession of a methamphetamine-manufacturing chemical with the intent to manufacture less than 15 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine, I dissent. The crux of this offense is defendant’s intent, not his ability, to commit the crime charged. The majority interprets section 401(a)(6.6)(A) to include an additional element — namely, that a defendant possess not just the intent to manufacture 30 to 150 grams of methamphetamine, but that he also have the present ability to do so. Thus, the fact that defendant, at the time of his arrest, did not possess enough of the necessary chemicals to manufacture 30 to 150 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine simply does not matter. Usually, the trier of fact is called upon to determine a defendant’s intent from the circumstances surrounding his conduct. However, in this case, the State presented direct evidence regarding defendant’s intent through the testimony of police officers Carpenter and Eck. They testified that defendant told them that he and a friend were going to gather the necessary ingredients to manufacture 100 grams of methamphetamine. In light of this testimony, I fail to see how this court can conclude that no reasonable juror, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find that the State had proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the specific intent as charged — that is, to manufacture 30 to 150 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. In this time of concern about terrorism, it is easy to imagine a case in which a defendant is charged with possession of explosive equipment with the intent to blow up a building and kill people. (For purposes of this hypothetical, it does not really matter if the charge would be attempted murder or some other offense in the criminal code that would best fit these facts.) Assume in this hypothetical that, at the time of his arrest, the defendant was in possession of some bomb-making equipment but, at that specific moment in time, he did not have all he needed for a working bomb because he had not yet acquired blasting caps. Assume further that he told two police officers that the reason he had this equipment was because he intended to make a bomb to blow up a governmental facility and kill the people inside. Under these circumstances, I do not believe any court would set aside his conviction merely because at the time of his arrest the defendant did not possess all he needed to make a working bomb. I believe this scenario applies to the case before us. Defendant had some of the makings for methamphetamine but, at the time of his arrest, did not yet possess all he needed to make as much methamphetamine as it was clearly his intent to make. If the jury believed the testimony of the officers (as it was entitled to) that defendant intended to manufacture 100 grams of methamphetamine, then the only conclusion to be drawn from the circumstances of this case is that the police arrested him before he was able to obtain all the chemicals needed to meet his goal. This good police work does not reduce defendant’s culpability — or criminal liability — for the crime he was charged with and intended to commit. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9711452. Public record. Not legal advice.