# Kimberlin v. DeLong

> Indiana Supreme Court · June 13, 1994 · 637 N.E.2d 121

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9710762

## Case

- **Full name:** Brett Coleman KIMBERLIN, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Sandra Sue DeLONG, Personal Representative for Carl David DeLong, Deceased, and Sandra Sue DeLong, Appellees (Plaintiffs Below)
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 13, 1994
- **Citations:** 637 N.E.2d 121; 1994 Ind. LEXIS 64; 1994 WL 250431
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Shepard
- **Judges:** Dickson, Sullivan, Debruler, Givan, Issue, Shepard
- **Cited by:** 86 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9710762

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding, in a civil action for wrongful death, the trial court was correct to grant summary judgment on the issue of the defendant’s liability based on the application of offensive collateral estoppel, where the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the charges…
- noting that liability for intentional torts extends beyond merely foreseeable harms because “it is better for unexpected losses to fall upon the intentional wrongdoer than upon the innocent victim”

## Opinion text

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
concurring in result.
To the casual reader, this case may seem to present a dispute about whether the victims of Brett Kimberlin’s violence will be compensated by receiving the proceeds of his upcoming book. For the present parties, that is a very important question.
For the rest of Indiana’s residents, however, the dictum in Justice Dickson’s opinion represents an effort to use this case as a vehicle for quite a different agenda: formulating a policy about who should pay for violent crime.
*131 When the perpetrator of a crime is found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of intentionally inflicting injury on his victim, should the costs of that injury be paid by the perpetrator? Or should the costs be borne by thousands of law-abiding citizens through their own insurance premiums? Insurance contracts containing clauses denying coverage for intentional acts (like Kimberlin’s bombing) are designed to keep the rest of us from paying for acts intended by their perpetrators. Such clauses represent a respectable policy concerning allocation of responsibility: criminals like Kimberlin pay for their crimes, and law-abiding persons are still protected by their insurance when they negligently cause damage or injury.
Justice DICKSON’s opinion represents a veiy different judicial policy. It contemplates two trials with rather different results. In the first trial, the jury finds the defendant guilty of intentional crime, and he is convicted arid/or incarcerated. Such was the case of Brett Kimberlin. In the second trial (a trial on insurance coverage or victim compensation) the jury would be entitled to find that the perpetrator did not intend to harm his victim. The perpetrator would still be in jail notwithstanding the fact that the second jury found he did not intend his crime, but he would be shielded financially by this second verdict.
A judicial policy which promotes two trials on the same issue, contemplates conflicting outcomes, and apportions financial responsibility for crimes to law-abiding policyholders is not a very attractive policy. Moreover, the dictum on this subject is especially superfluous in a case where it is clear that the victims can receive compensation from the actual perpetrator.
GIVAN, J., joins in this opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9710762. Public record. Not legal advice.