# People v. Montanez > Appellate Court of Illinois · June 30, 1995 · 273 Ill. App. 3d 844 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9709242 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACQUELINE MONTANEZ, Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois - **Decided:** June 30, 1995 - **Citations:** 273 Ill. App. 3d 844; 210 Ill. Dec. 295; 652 N.E.2d 1271; 1995 Ill. App. LEXIS 506 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by DiVITO - **Judges:** Hartman, Divito - **Cited by:** 40 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9709242 ## Opinion text JUSTICE DiVITO, dissenting: The majority judgment in this case cannot be reconciled with well-established Illinois law. I therefore respectfully dissent. The majority errs because (1) it ignores the standard that a trial judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress a confession should not be reversed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and (2) it ignores the standard that the voluntariness of a confession is determined by the totality of the circumstances and that not having either a parent or a youth officer present for a juvenile’s confession is merely a consideration which does not automatically render that confession inadmissible. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW "The established standard of review of a trial court’s finding on a question of the voluntariness of a confession is whether the finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” (People v. Melock (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 423, 448 , 599 N.E.2d 941, 951 .) Our supreme court has repeatedly stated that "[t]he finding of the trial court on the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed unless it can be said that it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” (People v. Davis (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 1, 20 , 452 N.E.2d 525, 534 .) This standard of review applies to a trial court’s ruling concerning the admissibility of a juvenile’s confession as well. In re Lamb (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 383, 388 , 336 N.E.2d 753, 756 , cert. denied (1976), 425 U.S. 938 , 48 L. Ed. 2d 180 , 96 S. Ct. 1672 . The majority pays no heed to this standard; indeed, it totally ignores it despite its significant application in both People v. Brown (1989), 182 Ill. App. 3d 1046 , 538 N.E.2d 909 , and In re J.O. (1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 853 , 596 N.E.2d 1285 , cases upon which it relies and which are discussed below. The classic explanation of the application of the standard, repeated numerous times by our courts, is provided in In re Application of County Collector (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 494 , 375 N.E.2d 553 : "In order for a finding to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite conclusion must be clearly apparent.” Application of County Collector, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 499 , 375 N.E.2d at 557 . Application of this standard in this case would have mandated affirmance, for it cannot be said that a conclusion opposite that drawn by the trial judge is clearly apparent. As will be demonstrated below, the trial judge’s ruling was correct and the per se rule applied by the majority is inconsistent with precedent and unjustified by Illinois law. II. TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES STANDARD Our supreme court has stated that "this court has long looked to the 'totality of the circumstances’ to determine the voluntariness of any confession.” (People v. Prude (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 470, 475 , 363 N.E.2d 371, 373 , cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 930 , 54 L. Ed. 2d 291 , 98 S. Ct. 418 .) It has stated that "[t]he determination of the question whether or not a confession is [voluntarily given] depends not on any one factor, but upon the totality of all the relevant circumstances.” (People v. Johnson (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 463, 468 , 256 N.E.2d 343, 347 , cert. denied (1970), 400 U.S. 958 , 27 L. Ed. 2d 266 , 91 S. Ct. 356 .) This standard applies to statements of juveniles as well as to those of adults. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d at 468 , 363 N.E.2d at 373 ; In re Lamb, 61 Ill. 2d at 388 , 336 N.E.2d at 756 . Every Illinois court that has addressed the issue (Knox, discussed below, being the single exception because it does not address the issue) has applied the totality of the circumstances test and rejected the per se rule regarding a minor’s opportunity to consult with a parent or other person before being questioned: In re Stiff (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 971, 978 , 336 N.E.2d 619, 625 (citing supreme court "totality of circumstances” test, explicitly rejected invitation to adopt per se rule when parent is not notified and juvenile is not taken to youth officer); In re Bertrand (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 703, 705 , 382 N.E.2d 660, 662 (totality of circumstances test applied to affirm admission of juvenile’s admission to two armed robberies before any effort was made to contact juvenile’s parents or youth officer); People v. Baxtrom (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 653, 660-61 , 402 N.E.2d 327, 332 (totality of circumstances test applied; even violation of Juvenile Court Act would not render statement inadmissible); In re S.D.S. (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1012 , 431 N.E.2d 759, 762 , cert. denied (1982), 459 U.S. 869 , 74 L. Ed. 2d 128 , 103 S. Ct. 153 (per se rule not to be followed; voluntariness of confession to be gleaned from totality of circumstances); In re J.S. (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 927, 936-37 , 460 N.E.2d 412, 418-19 (totality of circumstances test applied; failure to notify parent and youth officer merely a consideration in determining voluntariness; juvenile’s confession properly admitted); People v. Clements (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1007-08 , 482 N.E.2d 675, 680 , cert. denied (1986), 476 U.S. 1106 , 90 L. Ed. 2d 361 , 106 S. Ct. 1952 (totality of circumstances test applied; failure to notify guardian of juvenile with below average IQ did not render confession inadmissible); People v. Stachelek (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 391, 402-03 , 495 N.E.2d 984, 990-91 (totality of circumstances test applied; failure to notify parents did not render statements of juvenile inadmissible; statute "is not meant to immunize minors from police investigation and interrogation”); People v. Holcomb (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 158, 171-72 , 548 N.E.2d 613, 623-24 (unavailability of youth officer does not prevent police from interviewing juvenile, for police have a duty to investigate crimes even where juveniles are involved). In People v. Bobe (1992), 227 Ill. App. 3d 681 , 592 N.E.2d 301 , appeal denied (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 634 , 602 N.E.2d 459 , the court held that the statement of a 16-year-old defendant was voluntary, even though the defendant’s father and another testified, without contradiction, that his father was not permitted to see him, a juvenile officer was not present during all interviews, and the defendant was handcuffed, unfed, and alone in a room for several hours. Bobe, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 705 , 592 N.E.2d at 316 . Although some courts have held that the statutory requirement that a parent or a youth officer be notified does not apply when a juvenile is charged as an adult, because the juvenile is not subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court but to that of the criminal court (People v. Sevier (1992), 230 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1084 , 598 N.E.2d 968, 978 ; People v. Green (1988), 179 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13 , 535 N.E.2d 413, 420 , appeal denied (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 627 , 545 N.E.2d 120 ; People v. Visnack (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 113, 126 , 481 N.E.2d 744, 753 ), most courts addressing the issue, as indicated in the preceding two paragraphs, hold that failure to comply with the statutory requirement is merely a consideration in determining admissibility of a juvenile’s statements in either juvenile or adult proceedings. The majority’s decision here is not defensible under either line of cases. In People v. Zepeda (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 23 , 265 N.E.2d 647 , in construing the section of the Juvenile Court Act requiring parental notification and surrender of the minor defendant to a juvenile officer, our supreme court held that the juvenile defendant’s statements in that case were properly admitted despite being taken out of the presence of parents and a juvenile officer. The court held that because the statements of the juvenile had been voluntarily given and with due regard for his constitutional rights, "even if it be assumed that there was a failure to reasonably comply with [the relevant statute] and that such failure caused defendant to be unlawfully detained,” those facts would not in themselves invalidate a confession. Zepeda, 47 Ill. 2d at 27 , 265 N.E.2d at 649 . In People v. Steptore (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 208 , 281 N.E.2d 642 , the police concededly did not comply with Juvenile Court Act provisions that required notice to a parent and surrender to a juvenile officer. Nevertheless, our supreme court held that because the juvenile defendant was told of his rights to silence and to have counsel present and he understood them, "[u]nder the circumstances failure to comply with [the relevant statute] did not render the statement inadmissible.” Steptore, 51 Ill. 2d at 214-15 , 281 N.E.2d at 645 . Illinois’ rejection of the per se rule is understandable. Although a requested attorney must be present for custodial questioning, there is no requirement — constitutional, statutory, or case law — that a parent or youth officer be present for questioning of a minor. The statute in question here 1 requires only the notification of a parent or guardian and that the minor be taken to a youth officer. As our supreme court said in Zepeda, "Nothing in [the statute], or in any other provision of the [Juvenile Court] Act, imposes sanctions for a failure to comply and, under the rule long adhered to by this court, unlawful detention will not, of itself, invalidate a confession or statement of an accused.” (Zepeda, 47 Ill. 2d at 27 , 265 N.E.2d at 649 .) It is thus not surprising that the well-established standard in Illinois is that any violation of the statute is merely a consideration in weighing the totality of circumstances. Interestingly, the majority does not say it is applying a per se rule. 2 Instead, quoting Knox, it twice says that the alleged refusal to allow defendant’s mother to see defendant was "material” in determining the voluntariness of defendant’s statement. (273 Ill. App. 3d at 852, 854.) If "material” is code for per se, the majority’s judgment, though incorrect, is at least logical. If "material” is merely descriptive of the kind of "consideration” the evidence merits, the majority’s conclusion cannot be justified. In reaching its judgment, the majority ignores every case cited in this section. More important, it ignores the well-established principles supplied by those cases. Inexplicably, it also ignores the fact that even defense counsel, while arguing for suppression of the confession before the trial judge, invoked the totality of circumstances test and conceded that the absence of defendant’s mother and a youth officer was only a factor to be considered. III. DETERMINATION OF VOLUNTARINESS IN THIS CASE (a) The Evidence The evidence is critical in applying the correct standards to a case such as this. For that reason, a summary of the relevant testimony at the suppression hearing and at trial follows. People v. King (1986), 109 Ill. 2d 514, 525 , 488 N.E.2d 949, 955 , cert. denied (1986), 479 U.S. 872 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 173 , 107 S. Ct. 249 (on review, evidence presented at trial may be considered in addition to evidence presented at suppression hearing). At the suppression hearing, four witnesses testified: Detective Ernest Halvorsen, youth officer Robert Pulia, and Assistant State’s Attorney John Dillon for the State; and Sandra Lorenzi, defendant’s mother, for defendant. Detective Halvorsen testified that he contacted the 14th District and requested that a beat car go to the home of defendant’s mother to tell her that defendant was at Area 5. Each of the State’s witnesses testified that he or she had been informed that defendant’s mother had been notified of defendant’s arrest. Detective Halvorsen testified that between 9:30 and 10 p.m. he learned that the youth officer from the 25th District was otherwise occupied and that an Area 5 youth officer would not be available until midnight. Defendant was not handcuffed. The State’s witnesses testified that defendant was sober and coherent, did not appear under the influence of drugs or alcohol, did not smell of drugs or alcohol, understood questions, and was responsive to them. Each of the three State witnesses, at various times, gave defendant Miranda warnings at least once; on each occasion defendant said she understood her rights. She was given cigarettes. She asked for and was given a soda; later she asked for and was given food. She privately told the assistant State’s Attorney that "she had been treated well and she had no complaints.” The youth officer was present for all of defendant’s interrogations except the first. Detective Halvorsen was never told that defendant’s mother wanted to see defendant; when they were in the open area of the police station, none of the three State witnesses was aware of anyone desiring to see defendant. Defendant gave Detectives Halvorsen and Renaldo Guevara an oral statement, which lasted 20 to 30 minutes, starting at about 10 p.m.; she gave the assistant State’s Attorney an oral statement, which lasted 20 to 30 minutes, starting at about 1:15 a.m.; she gave the statement to the court reporter, which lasted about 10 minutes, starting at about 5:15 a.m.; and she read, corrected, and signed each page of the transcribed statement, which was 11 pages long, starting at about 6:20 a.m. The assistant State’s Attorney had her read the first portion of her statement aloud to satisfy himself that she could read English. Sitting next to her, he then read it aloud as she followed along. During this time she made corrections on the statement, initialled the corrections, and signed each page. This process took approximately 15 to 20 minutes. A photograph taken of defendant immediately after she signed the statement, showing her "with a big smile,” was signed by her and admitted into evidence. In her statement to the court reporter, defendant was advised of her Miranda rights and waived them. She said she had been treated well by the police and the assistant State’s Attorney, had not been promised anything, had not been threatened in any way, and had been given food and cigarettes. She said that she was a member of the Maniac Latin Disciples street gang. On the day of the killings, she met with fellow female gang members "Muñeca” and "Tuti” to plan "a mission” to get revenge for the killing of "Mudo,” a fellow male gang member who had been killed by the Latin Kings, an enemy gang, a couple of days before. She had a .25-caliber automatic. They drove in the car of "Rabbit,” the brother of Muñeca, to the area of the Latin Kings. They looked for Latin Kings and finally met Jimmy Cruz, whom she knew, and Hector Reyes, whom she had met previously. They were Latin Kings. They were in another car and agreed to meet in Humboldt Park "to catch a buzz.” At the park, they left their cars and walked. She walked with Cruz until they arrived at a washroom. Reyes said he needed to use the washroom, and she walked in with him. They kissed in the washroom for a couple of minutes. When Reyes turned his back to use the toilet, she shot him in the back of the head. After leaving the washroom, she gave the gun to Muñeca. Tuti, who was walking hand in hand with Cruz, gave Muñeca a signal, and Muñeca went up to Cruz and shot him in the back of the head. Defendant "[s]howed [her] respect” for Cruz and then drove with her friends to her gang’s area. There she told her fellow gang members what they had done and they celebrated with marijuana and beer. Detective Anthony Riccio testified at trial that at about 9 a.m. he took defendant from the interview room. When she saw television cameras outside the room, defendant said, "What is up with these cameras?” She then said "Disciple thing” and gave the sign of the Maniac Latin Disciples, a pitchfork in an upright position. As she entered an office, she said "Maniac” and then "K.K.,” which meant "King Killer.” Riccio testified that defendant was sober, alert, and able to understand directions "completely.” A videotape showing defendant, her actions, and her words was then played for the jury. Defendant’s mother testified that two plainclothes detectives came to her home at about 10 or 10:15 p.m. One of them was a "Spanish guy.” They "pounded” on the door and "came with some guns in their hands.” They scared her and her baby and told them to go into another room because "they needed to talk to [her] husband” for whom they specifically asked by asking him if he was William Burrell. They told him that his daughter called him. When she heard her daughter’s name she came out of the other room and said, "no it wasn’t like that.” The officer said that her daughter had seen a murder and "[t]hat he had her in custody, whatever, protective custody.” He gave her the correct address of the place where she was in custody. The officer then told her that defendant "had called the house and that she seen the murder, and it was a lie because she talked to me.” The officer then told her that defendant was in custody; she was involved in a murder. At the hearing, she testified the police were there about an hour and left "[a]bout 11, 12”; at trial she testified the police were there "maybe an hour, an hour and a half’ and left at "maybe eleven, 11:15.” Defendant’s mother then testified that she waited at home because the police had told her not to go to the police station and that they would call her when she could go. Though she received no call, she went to the police station with a girlfriend at about 2 a.m. About 10 minutes after arriving, she went upstairs and was told by the same Spanish officer who had been to her home that she "couldn’t go in there.” She went downstairs for about l1/2 hours, and at "[a]bout 3:00, 3:15” (she had her watch on so she knew the time), the same officer told her "that I had to get the hell out of there because they were talking to her.” She finally saw her daughter at 8:30 a.m. At first her daughter did not know who she was. Her daughter was gagging and she could not understand her. She could understand her speech "[v]ery little, very little.” Her daughter’s face and eyes "were all pushed out like she would have been high.” She believed her daughter had been on drugs or alcohol that morning. On cross-examination, defendant’s mother testified that defendant did not live at home. She was living in a foster home, but she was a runaway from that home at the time. As for the girlfriend who accompanied her to the police station, "[s]he got beat up with the gangs so she left town” and she had not talked to her for about five months. At trial, when shown the photograph taken of her daughter immediately after the statement to the court reporter, she said her daughter looked worse than she did in the picture, "[h]er hair was all messed up and everything.” Nevertheless, she testified, "[y]ou can tell she was high there too, but not that much.” (b) Cases Cited by the Majority Except for a single aberration, the cases cited by the majority directly support the opposite conclusion or are distinguishable. In People v. Brown (1989), 182 Ill. App. 3d 1046 , 538 N.E.2d 909 (273 Ill. App. 3d at 851), for example, the appeal was brought by the State following the granting of a motion to suppress in the circuit court. "While the majority correctly quotes from the decision (273 Ill. App. 3d at 851), immediately following the quoted portion the appellate court states that the failure to advise a concerned adult was merely a consideration in evaluating the voluntariness of a juvenile’s statement or confession. Using the defendant’s inability to confer with his mother as a consideration, combined with the failure of the police to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights, the court concluded that the trial judge’s finding that the statement was coerced was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Brown, quoted by the majority solely for its out-of-context language, thus does what the majority fails to do: it utilizes the proper standard of review and applies the totality of circumstances test. Proper application of Brown would have supported affirmance of the trial judge’s ruling here, for it too was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The majority says People v. R.B. (1992), 232 Ill. App. 3d 583 , 597 N.E.2d 879 (273 Ill. App. 3d at 853-54), presents "another factual setting similar to the present case.” (273 Ill. App. 3d at 853.) It neglects to point out, however, that there the appellate court concluded that the defendant had been arrested without probable cause. In considering whether sufficient attenuation existed to purge the defendant’s statement from the taint of his illegal seizure, the court concluded that the evidence did not show that the defendant waived his Miranda rights. The court’s discussion of the failure of the police to contact a parent or a youth officer was connected to the attenuation issue and in the context of a juvenile having been illegally arrested. The instant case bears no resemblance to R.B. In re J.O. (1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 853 , 596 N.E.2d 1285 (273 Ill. App. 3d at 854), is another case in which the State appealed the circuit court’s suppression order. On appeal, the State contended that the circuit court had erred in suppressing the juvenile’s confession solely because his parents had been denied the right to see him; the State thus argued that the circuit court had erred by applying a per se rule. The appellate court said that "there is no per se rule that juveniles must be allowed to consult with their parents prior to questioning.” (231 Ill. App. 3d at 854.) The court also stated that "it is well settled that the voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances.” (J.O., 231 Ill. App. 3d at 854 , 596 N.E.2d at 1286-87 .) It then evaluated the circuit court’s ruling using the totality of the circumstances standard, and concluded that the circuit court had applied a totality of circumstances standard and not a per se standard and thus affirmed the circuit court’s suppression order. Again the majority quotes the appellate court’s statement out of context, making it appear to support its position when in fact it does exactly the opposite. Both People v. Cole (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 172 , 522 N.E.2d 635 , appeal denied (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 582 , 530 N.E.2d 253 (273 Ill. App. 3d at 850), and People v. McGhee (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 232 , 507 N.E.2d 33 , appeal denied (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 570 , 515 N.E.2d 120 (273 Ill. App. 3d at 850), are contrary to the majority’s judgment. In Cole, the court suppressed a juvenile’s confession because of an illegal arrest and recognized that failure to notify a parent or to have a youth officer present was properly considered, "but that a violation of the statute was not a per se denial of a juvenile’s constitutional rights.” (Cole, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 181 , 522 N.E.2d at 640 .) In McGhee, the court, in suppressing the confession of a juvenile because of an illegal arrest, applied the totality of circumstances test and said that denying the juvenile’s mother the opportunity to see him and not having a youth officer present "does not per se constitute a denial of the defendant’s rights.” McGhee, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 236-37 , 507 N.E.2d at 35 . People v. Knox (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 808 , 542 N.E.2d 910 , appeal denied (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 630 , 545 N.E.2d 122 , the primary case relied upon by the majority (273 Ill. App. 3d at 852-53, 854-55), is an aberration from the line of cases deciding this issue. In Knox a panel of the appellate court reversed the circuit court, without citation to authority regarding its ultimate holding, without considering the manifest weight of the evidence standard of review, and without reference to the principle that the failure to notify a parent or a youth officer is merely one consideration in the evaluation of the voluntariness of a juvenile’s statement or confession. Without saying so, the Knox court applied a per se rule, contrary to every other case addressing this issue. The majority finds this aberrant case persuasive, but it should not be followed. (c) Application of Correct Standards to This Case The record in this case discloses that the trial judge applied the correct totality of circumstances test in ruling that defendant’s statements were admissible. Our review of the correctness of the judge’s ruling, by application of the against the manifest weight of the evidence test, compels affirmance. The fact that defendant’s mother was allegedly unable to speak to defendant prior to interrogation is one factor to consider in the totality of the circumstances, as is the fact that a youth officer was not present when defendant gave her first statement. These factors are overridden, however, by the remainder of the evidence which showed that defendant’s confession was freely given, without threats, promises, inducements, or physical coercion. Defendant was given food when she requested it, treated well by the police, and had no complaints about her treatment. She could read and understand English, she understood her written statement, she made corrections to it, and she signed it. She did not appear to the officers, the assistant State’s Attorney, or the youth officer to be under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. There was no evidence that she asked to speak to her mother. The clarity of her statements, particularly the detail contained in the statement given to the court reporter, belied the testimony of her mother that she was nearly incomprehensible. The bravado displayed by defendant for the sake of television cameras, a videotape of which was shown to the jury, also belied her mother’s testimony and was consistent with the conscious actions of a defiant person who was in control, not those of a youngster in a coercive environment. The majority relies heavily on the fact that no one was called to rebut the testimony of defendant’s mother. Without regard to the inherent difficulties in proving a negative and without regard to the fact that everyone addressing this issue in the circuit court — judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney — applied the totality of circumstances test and saw the noncontact between mother and defendant as only a consideration, the majority places too much reliance on the fact that the evidence was uncontradicted. The circuit court is in a superior position to evaluate a witness’ credibility when it hears a motion to suppress, and it need not accept the defendant’s version of the circumstances in preference to another version. People v. Cleesen (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 103, 113 , 531 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 . Indeed, much of defendant’s mother’s testimony was incredible. Did the police officers, charged only with the responsibility of notifying the mother of her daughter’s whereabouts, really enter her home with drawn guns? Did they refuse to talk to her and insist only on talking to her husband? Did they stay for at least an hour? Why did the police go to her house at all if they did not want her to know that her daughter was in custody and where she could be seen? Did police deny her access to her daughter until 8:30 a.m., even though all statements had been completed by 6:40 a.m.? At 8:30 a.m., after having given a coherent statement to a court reporter and minutes before performing for television cameras, was her daughter gagging, incomprehensible, and unaware? Although pointing out "the danger of cursory application of principles to facts” (273 Ill. App. 3d at 850), without analysis the majority suppresses all of defendant’s statements, through its broad application of its per se rule. In doing so, the majority leaves important questions unanswered. For example, in view of the evidence that the detectives were talking to defendant at about the same time other officers were visiting her mother, can it be said that defendant’s first statement was tainted by her mother’s allegation that she was told not to go to the police station until she was called? If so, the majority’s unarticulated per se rule is even broader than it first appears. Also, in view of the fact that defendant had already given her oral statement to the assistant State’s Attorney by the time defendant’s mother arrived at the police station at 2 a.m., how was that statement tainted by the alleged rebuff of her mother at the police station? Considering the totality of the circumstances, there is ample evidence in the record to support the trial judge’s determination even if it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that defendant’s mother was denied access to her. Since the opposite conclusion is not clearly apparent, the ruling of the trial judge on the motion to suppress should be upheld and the judgment in this case should be affirmed. The relevant statute reads as follows: "A law enforcement officer who takes a minor into custody without a warrant *** shall, if the minor is not released, immediately make a reasonable attempt to notify the parent or other person legally responsible for the minor’s care or the person with whom the minor resides that the minor has been taken into custody and where the minor is being held; and the law enforcement officer shall without unnecessary delay take the minor to the nearest juvenile police officer designated for such purposes in the county of venue or shall surrender the minor to a juvenile police officer in the city or village where the offense is alleged to have been committed.” 705 ILCS 405/ 5 — 6(2) (West 1992). In response to this dissent, the majority specifically denies applying a per se rule. (273 Ill. App. 3d at 855.) For the first time in its analysis, and only in connection with this denial, does the majority concede the existence of the standard of the "totality of the circumstances test in determining the voluntariness of defendant’s confession.” (273 Ill. App. 3d at 855.) The majority’s additional basis for finding the statements involuntary (that defendant "was interrogated throughout the night as part of a pattern of police conduct designed to elicit a confession”) (273 Ill. App. 3d at 855) is not supported by the record and is contrary to the trial judge’s findings. Indeed, that basis represents nothing more than the per se rule bolstered by conclusional statements designed to comply with the totality of circumstances test. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9709242. Public record. Not legal advice.