# Board of Education of Community School District No. 1 v. Compton

> Appellate Court of Illinois · June 25, 1987 · 157 Ill. App. 3d 439

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9708066

## Case

- **Full name:** The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, COLES COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JEFFREY EARLE COMPTON Et Al., Respondents-Appellants; THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, COLES COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JEFFREY EARLE COMPTON Et Al., Respondents (The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, Intervenor and Respondent-Appellant)
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** June 25, 1987
- **Citations:** 157 Ill. App. 3d 439; 109 Ill. Dec. 640; 510 N.E.2d 508; 1987 Ill. App. LEXIS 2724
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Green
- **Judges:** Spitz, Lund, Green
- **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9708066

## Opinion text

JUSTICE GREEN, dissenting:
I disagree with my colleagues’ determination that the circuit court of Coles County lacked jurisdiction to hear the instant matter. I conclude that the circuit court properly proceeded to rule on the merits of the issues before it. Accordingly, I dissent from the decision of the majority. Because the merits of the dispute may be before us later though a different route, I cannot properly address that issue at this time. This dissenting opinion will concern only the issue passed upon by the majority.
The thesis of the majority is that, although the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, pars. 1701 through 1721) did not expressly eliminate the previously used procedure whereby actions might be brought to vacate arbitration decisions arising from collective-bargaining agreements covering educational employers, employees and unions, it implicitly does so. The Act states that the refusal to comply with such an award is an unfair labor practice whether committed by an employer (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1714(a)(8)) or by employees or their organizations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1714(b)(6)). The majority’s theory is that the Act envisions that those having a recognizable complaint against a decision should raise that issue by refusing to obey the award and then defend on that basis in proceedings brought before the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (Board) under section 15 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1715) charging them with an unfair labor practice.
At the outset, some discussion of the history and background of the circuit-court procedure in question is desirable. That is provided by the decision in Board of Education v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 469 , 427 N.E.2d 1199 , which case is to be distinguished from Chicago Board of Education v. Chicago Teachers Union (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d.527, 491 N.E.2d 1259 , cited by the majority. The 1981 case was decided before the enactment of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act. There, the claim of a teacher for back salary was submitted to arbitration pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement. The arbitrator awarded certain sums. The supreme court upheld a circuit court’s subsequent dismissal, on motion, of a complaint by the school board seeking to vacate the award. The supreme court recognized that a circuit court could properly hear such a case but agreed with the trial court that it was apparent from the fact of the record that the school board was not entitled to relief.
The importance to us of the foregoing decision was the recognition that an action to challenge the award existed. Also significant was the statement of that court that, because of the provisions of section 12(e) of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 10, par. 112(e)), the criterion by which the arbitrator’s award was to be examined was not that set forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act, but rather was that existing in the common law before enactment of that legislation. The grounds for attacking, such an award at common law were stated to be “fraud, corruption, partiality, misconduct, mistake, or failure to submit the question to arbitration” (Board of Education v. Chicago Teacher’s Union Local No. 1 (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 469, 474 , 427 N.E.2d 1199, 1201 ). The case of White Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg (1906), 220 Ill. 578 , 77 N.E. 327 , was cited.
At the time of the foregoing supreme court decision, as now, section 12(e) of the Uniform Arbitration Act stated:
“Nothing in this Section or any other Section of this Act shall apply to the vacating, modifying, or correcting of any award entered as a result of an arbitration agreement which is a part of or pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement; and the grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting such an award shall be those which existed prior to the enactment of this Act.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 10, par. 112(e).
Then, as now, section 12(a) of the Uniform Arbitration Act stated: “Vacating an award, (a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any one of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to héar evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the fact that the. relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by the circuit court is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 10, par. 112(a).
As indicated by the. majority, section 8 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act states “[t]he grievance and arbitration provisions of any collective bargaining agreement shall be subject to the Illinois ‘Uniform Arbitration Act’ ” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1608).. Thus, the apparent intent of that legislation was to change the remedy for vacating, modifying or correcting an arbitration award arising from a collective-bargaining agreement covered thereby from. the common law remedy, as stated by section 12(e) of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 10, par. 112(e)) to that set forth in section 12(a) of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 10, par. 112(a)). Here, under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, in the absence of any similar change, the common law remedy would remain, unless, as the majority maintains, that remedy was implicitly eliminated.
Most of the basis for the majority’s inference that the procedure for seeking to vacate an arbitration award arising from a covered collective-bargaining agreement is that to do so would be consistent with the worthy purposes of the Act and its comprehensive scheme. Several factors prevent me from drawing the same inference.
The suggested procedure that the loser before an arbitrator can raise the traditional attack on the decision by refusing to obey the decision and then attacking the decision when proceedings are brought before the Board charging an unfair labor practice cannot be used when the decision does not require the loser to do anything. For instance, if a teacher’s claim for back salary is submitted to arbitration and the teacher loses under circumstances whereby he or she traditionally could seek vacation of the decision, that teacher cannot reasonably commit an act which would violate the decision and raise the issue of whether the refusal to obey the decision was an unfair labor practice.
I have an abhorrence of expanding the situations in which it is necessary for parties, in order to test the propriety of an order of a court or agency, to defy that order and subject themselves to a charge of contempt or other misconduct such as the commission of an unfair labor practice. This procedure is sometimes necessary, but this court has described it as a “distasteful method” in the case of In re M.B. (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 992, 995 , 484 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 . Requiring such a procedure does nothing to further the stated policy of promoting an orderly “relationship between” the parties. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1701.) I cannot easily infer that the legislature intended to provide for such a procedure.
The majority sees no problem arising from determining the criterion by which the decision of an arbitrator may be attacked. However, prior legislators have apparently deemed that there are some differénces between the criteria recognized at common law and those designated in section 12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 10, par. 112) or else they would not likely have voted to have the common law criterion retained when the arbitration concerns a collective-bargaining agreement.
Article VI, section 9 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 9) states that, with exceptions not applicable here, “[cjircuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters.” The remedy seeking vacation of an arbitration decision which the majority would deem to have been rendered nonjusticiable by implication is not the statutory remedy of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 10, par. 101 et seq.) but the common law remedy as described in Board of Education of Chicago v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 469 , 427 N.E.2d 1199 . While I concede that the legislature can destroy a common law remedy, we should require a stronger inference to destroy a common law remedy than to replace one statutory remedy with another.
I do not dispute the worthy purpose of the Act, its intent to make expertise available for the solving of the serious problems involved nor its intent to channel many proceedings through tribunals which would have an opportunity to acquire familiarity with those problems. However, I cannot infer that the legislature intended, without saying so, to (1) deprive those subject to arbitration decisions that merely denied them relief and did not require them to do anything, from any available procedures to test the decisions, (2) require others wishing to test the decisions of the arbitrator to defy the decision, and (3) destroy a time-honored common law remedy.
The action of the legislature in making arbitration decisions under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act subject to the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1608) while making no similar provision in the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act does not necessarily indicate an intention to eliminate procedures in the circuit court to test arbitration decisions under the Act. The legislature could just as well have intended that, under the Hlinois Labor Relations Act, such decisions were to be subject to the Uniform Arbitration Act rather than, as previously, under the common law, while such decisions under the Act should continue to be tested under the common law.
Because of the frailty of the inference drawn by the majority, I dissent.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9708066. Public record. Not legal advice.