# Griffiths v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · March 19, 2008 · 596 Pa. 317

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9706232

## Case

- **Full name:** DAVID GRIFFITHS, Appellant, v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (SEVEN STARS FARM, INC.), Appellees
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 19, 2008
- **Citations:** 596 Pa. 317; 943 A.2d 242; 2008 Pa. LEXIS 260
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Eakin
- **Judges:** Castille, Saylor, Eak, Baer, Todd, McCaffery, Petrilla, Griffiths, Eakin
- **Cited by:** 22 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9706232

## Opinion text

Justice EAKIN,
dissenting.
All are sympathetic with claimant David Griffiths’ condition and special needs, but the statutory language at issue does not support the majority’s conclusion a 2000 Ford Windstar is an “orthopedic appliance.” Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
When determining the breadth to be given this term, we must be guided by the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq., and the words of a statute should be interpreted according to their common usage. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903. We should not interpret statutes with disregard of common meaning simply to reward a clever argument or accomplish a comfortable result. Here, the statute requires an employer to pay for “medicines and supplies, hospital treatment, services and supplies and orthopedic appliances, and prostheses____” 77 P.S. § 531(l)(ii). A vehicle is simply not ejusdem generis with the other items in the statute for which the legislature has required an employer to pay. Perhaps we could shoehorn into “orthopedic appliance” the items used to accomplish the retrofitting of a van; however, the van itself simply cannot be made to fit any reasonable understanding of the term.
There is a significant difference between requiring an employer to provide appliances to outfit a claimant’s van, and requiring the employer to buy a van for a claimant in the first place. Under the sweeping decision of the majority, employers must hereafter provide appliances that, the majority holds, include a vehicle. Many claimants will be undoubtedly surprised to find they could use just such an appliance. If there is to be a significant expansion of compensation payable, it should be accomplished by the General Assembly, in clear terms, not by a court calling a van an orthopedic appliance. This claimant undoubtedly could use a van, but the legislature did not require his employer to give him one. It required treatment and supplies, but no vehicle. We, who have no means of knowing the financial and collateral consequences of *349 this expansion of obligation, may not displace the legislature and change the statute to require more.
One may buy an “orthopedic appliance” in many places — the Ford dealership is not one of them.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9706232. Public record. Not legal advice.