# Aldrich v. State

> Court of Appeals of Texas · August 25, 2009 · 296 S.W.3d 225

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9706226

## Case

- **Full name:** Allen John ALDRICH, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, State
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** August 25, 2009
- **Citations:** 296 S.W.3d 225; 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6777; 2009 WL 2650611
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Cayce
- **Judges:** Sue Walker
- **Cited by:** 46 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9706226

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that counsel’s action — failing to timely designate experts in part because his client was indigent — rendered counsel ineffective when the record “affirmatively reflect[ed]” that he “repeatedly recognized the need for defense experts”
- holding that counsel’s action— failing to timely designate experts in part because his client was indigent— rendered counsel ineffective when the record ―affirmatively reflect[ed]‖ that he ―repeatedly recognized the need for defense experts‖
- holding that counsel's action—failing to timely designate experts in part because his client was indigent—rendered counsel ineffective when the record "affirmatively reflect[ed]" that he "repeatedly recognized the need for defense experts"
- holding that appellant=s failure to show that he would have accepted plea offer if adequately conveyed to him did not satisfy second Strickland prong
- holding that counsel’s continued misunderstanding of the law constituted deficient performance

## Opinion text

JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice,
dissenting and concurring on rehearing.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s holding that Aldrich has established by a preponderance of the evidence that, but for counsel’s performance, the result would have been different. While I agree with the majority’s holding that counsel’s performance was deficient, I do not believe the preponderance of the evidence shows that his conduct so undermined the functioning of the adversarial process that the trial produced an unjust result. I would, therefore, overrule Aldrich’s first point. Because I concur with the majority’s disposition of the second point, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a new punishment trial. I would affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9706226. Public record. Not legal advice.