# Commonwealth v. Bomar

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 30, 2003 · 573 Pa. 426

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9706070

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Arthur BOMAR, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 30, 2003
- **Citations:** 573 Pa. 426; 826 A.2d 831; 2003 Pa. LEXIS 920
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Nigro
- **Judges:** Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor, Former
- **Cited by:** 395 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Disapproved by Commonwealth v. Stollar, 624 Pa. 107 (2014).
- Negative treatments: 6
- Distinguished by: 1
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9706070

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that Grant did not apply since the ineffectiveness claims were raised in a post-sentence motion and fully developed at a hearing in the trial court, the trial court addressed the issue in its opinion, and appellate review therefore was not hampered
- holding that direct appellate review of ineffective assistance of counsel is permitted where the issues were raised in the trial court, a hearing was held at which trial counsel testified, and the trial court passed on those claims
- stating “that a trial judge’s competency determination should be afforded ‘great deference’ because the judge has the opportunity to personally observe the defendant’s behavior.” (emphasis added)
- emphasizing that it is “not the obligation of this Court to pore over the lengthy record [to] identify specific instances in the record that may support [an] appellant's generic, unsubstantiated claim”

## Opinion text

*479 JUSTICE NIGRO
CONCURRING.
I join the majority opinion with the limited exception of its discussion regarding the “bring-down” order used to transfer Appellant from the prison to the CID offices for questioning regarding the Willard murder case.
Although I fully agree with the majority that the “bring-down” order was undoubtedly erroneous, I cannot agree with the majority’s seemingly dismissive approach to the misuse of that erroneous order. To that end, the majority notes that Appellant does not cite to any evidence of record establishing that the error in the order was anything other than a mere “mistake” or “oversight.” While that may be true, it still remains that the order only authorized the transfer of Appellant for a hearing and not for what it was ultimately used for-the questioning of Appellant regarding the Willard case. In my view, the Commonwealth should simply not be allowed to use a court order for one purpose when that order explicitly authorizes its use only for a different purpose. See Commonwealth v. Karash, 513 Pa. 6 , 518 A.2d 537, 542 (1986) (“The misuse of a court order is an affront to the court issuing that order.”) Nonetheless, I ultimately agree with the majority that Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim because the transfer did not, under the circumstances here, implicate Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9706070. Public record. Not legal advice.