# Commonwealth v. Evans

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · June 27, 1995 · 443 Pa. Super. 351

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9705506

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Alfred EVANS, Appellee
- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 27, 1995
- **Citations:** 443 Pa. Super. 351; 661 A.2d 881; 1995 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1784
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Hoffman
- **Judges:** Wieand, Beck, Hoffman
- **Cited by:** 16 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9705506

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that officer had probable cause when appellee opened the car door and officer saw a brick-shaped object covered in plastic, the brick-shaped object was partially concealed under the driver’s seat, and appellee had nervous demeanor”

## Opinion text

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
The resolution of this case as noted by the majority, turns on the distinction between suspicion and probable cause to believe that criminal activity is afoot. In our recent decision in Benton, this court stated that an officer’s suspicion that criminal activity has occurred is not sufficient to establish probable cause. Commonwealth v. Benton, 440 Pa.Super. 441 , 655 A.2d 1030 (1995). Instead, there must be reasonable and articulable grounds to support the ensuing search or seizure. Id. Our holding today directly contravenes this basic tenet to the Fourth Amendment and paves a foundation for random searches by authorities. Commonwealth v. Collini, 264 Pa.Super. 36 , 398 A.2d 1044 (1979) (“If subjective good faith alone were the test [for probable cause] the protection of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.”). Not only does Officer Snyder’s testimony demonstrate that he was unable to ascertain that the object under the driver’s seat of appellant car was narcotics, but the circumstances surrounding appellant’s arrest were not consistent with drug activity. Compare Commonwealth v. Mallory, 418 Pa.Super. 614 , 614 A.2d 1174 (1992), appeal denied 533 Pa. 632 , 621 A.2d 578 (1993) (probable cause found where defendant observed standing next to identified drug dealer, holding clear plastic baggie in an area known for drug activity) with Commonwealth v. Kelly, 487 Pa. 174 , 409 A.2d 21 (1979) (no probable cause where nature of vial was not immediately apparent to police and there was no indication of *369 drug related activity). In my view, the principles encompassed in the Fourth Amendment and recently reiterated by this court in Benton require that we affirm the order of trial court. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, I must respectfully dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9705506. Public record. Not legal advice.