# Anzalone v. Westech Gear Corp.

> Supreme Court of New Jersey · July 26, 1995 · 141 N.J. 256

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9705456

## Case

- **Full name:** John Anzalone, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Westech Gear Corporation (Formerly Known as or as Successor to Western Gear Corporation), Defendant-Appellant, and “john Doe” Gear Corporation (A Fictitious Name Being Any Presently Unknown Manufacturer or Distributor of the Gear Mechanism Causing Injury to the Plaintiff; “john Smith” Installation Corporation (A Fictitious Name Being Any Presently Unknown Installer of the Gear Mechanism Causing Injury to the Plaintiff), Defendants
- **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 26, 1995
- **Citations:** 141 N.J. 256; 661 A.2d 796; 1995 N.J. LEXIS 527
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Pollock
- **Judges:** Handler, Pollock
- **Cited by:** 3 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9705456

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12, 108 S.Ct. at 2518-19

## Opinion text

POLLOCK, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the concurrence that “the operative standard for determining whether a significant conflict exists to justify the preemption of state liability law is that expressed by the three elements of the Boyle test.” Ante at 264, 661 A.2d at 800. The Boyle test provides immunity to military contractors in respect of *275 design defects when (1) the federal government approved reasonably precise specifications, (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications, and (3) the contractor warned the government about known risks. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 , 108 S.Ct. 2510, 2518 , 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988).
I disagree, however, with the concurrence’s application of Boyle to this case. Unlike the concurrence, I believe that Boyle provides defendant WesTech Gear Corporation (WesTech) with the government contractor defense to the claim of plaintiff, John Anzalone. In my opinion, the concurrence has misinterpreted Boyle . Consequently, I dissent.
The concurrence has summarized the relevant facts pertaining to the design and manufacture of the ram tensioner that caused plaintiffs injuries: Mr. Hanke, a Navy engineer, originated the concept of the ram tensioner; Sancor Corporation, a Navy contractor, designed and developed the ram tensioner; WesTech contracted to manufacture ram tensioners based on the Navy’s detailed specifications that included Sancor’s final drawings; the ram tensioner provided by WesTech conformed to the Navy’s specifications; and the Navy assiimed complete control over the placement and installation of the ram tensioners. Ante at 265-267, 661 A.2d at 800-01.
Those facts satisfy the first two prongs of the Boyle test. The concurrence candidly acknowledges that WesTech fabricated the ram tensioners based on “very detailed and specific” drawings. Ante at 266, 661 A.2d at 801. In addition, it admits that “the ram tensioner was manufactured and supplied in conformity with those specifications.” Ante at 266, 661 A.2d at 801. Plaintiff, moreover, does not claim that WesTech failed to warn the Navy of known risks. Yet, the concurrence infers that because the Navy did not explicitly forbid WesTech from installing a guard on the ram tensioner, WesTech had a duty to design and provide such a device. That inference stands Boyle on its head.
*276 The Navy participated in the development of the ram tensioner and incorporated the detailed Sancor drawings into the Navy’s specifications. Under Boyle , those facts reflect the Navy’s determination of the appropriate balance “between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.” See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 , 108 S.Ct. at 2518 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 457 . Yet, the concurrence holds that a government contractor who relies on that determination may be liable for resulting injuries. In Boyle , Justice Scalia perceived the problem with that approach. He warned:
The financial burden of judgments against the contractors would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the United States itself, since defense contractors will predictably raise their prices to cover, or to insure against, contingent liability for the Governmentordered designs. To put the point differently: It makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the production.
[ 487 U.S. at 511-12 , 108 S.Ct. at 2518 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 457-58 .]
Justice Scalia then announced the three-part test for identifying those instances when a military contractor is entitled to immunity.
The flaw in the concurrence’s analysis is that instead of applying the three-part Boyle test, it posits its own formula to determine whether the imposition of a duty on WesTech would create.a “significant” conflict with the government’s interests' — precisely the question that Boyle answered. In effect, the concurrence would overrule the United States Supreme Court on an issue concerning the liability of contractors with the federal government.
To achieve that untoward result, the concurrence misconstrues Boyle . In that case, the Court stated in dicta that it could conceive of a case different from Boyle , “in which the duty sought to be imposed on the contractor is not identical to one assumed under the contract, but is also not contrary to any assumed.” 487 U.S. at 509 , 108 S.Ct. at 2517 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 455-56 . The Court then provided two examples in which, unlike in the present case, *277 the government had not participated in the design process. In the first hypothetical situation, the Court stated that:
If, for example, the United States contracts for the purchase and .installation of' an ah' conditioning-unit, specifying the cooling capacity but not the precise manner of construction, a state law imposing upon the manufacturer of such units a duty of care to include a‘ certain safety feature would not be a duty identical to anything promised the Government, but neither would it be contrary.
[ 487 U.S. at 509 , 108 S.Ct. at 2517 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 456 .]
In the second hypothetical, which was similar to the facts of the Boyle case, the Court noted: “If, for example, a federal procurement officer orders, by model number, a quantity of stock helicopters that happen to be equipped with escape hatches opening outward, it is impossible to say that the Government has a significant interest in that particular feature.” Ibid.
In both hypothetical cases, the manufacturer, not the federal government or another contractor hired by the government for that purpose, designed the potentially defective product. Here, in contrast, WesTech agreed to build the ram tensioner in accordance with precise specifications provided by the government.
The Boyle test expressly recognizes the inherent difference between a case in which a contractor designs and manufactures military equipment for the federal government and a case, such as the present one, involving the government’s procurement of military equipment designed by, or in conjunction with, military engineers. The Court stated:
[T]he selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function____ It often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many technical, military, and even social considerations, including specifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness. And we are further of the view that permitting “second-guessing” of these judgments through state tort suits against contractors would produce the same'effect sought to be avoided---- In sum, we are of the view that state law which holds Government contractors liable for design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances present a “significant conflict” with federal policy and must be displaced.
[ 487 U.S. at 511-12 , 108 S.Ct. at 2518 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 457-58 (citation and footnote omitted).]
*278 The very purpose of the Boyle test was to define those “circumstances [involving military design and procurement that] present a ‘significant conflict’ with federal policy....” 487 U.S. at 512 , 108 S.Ct. at 2518 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 458 .
If the United States Navy had manufactured the ram tensioner, it would be immune under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. 2680(a). To impose liability on WesTech for making a product for which the Navy would not be liable if it had made the product itself contravenes that legislative immunity. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Boyle , “[i]t makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the production.” 487 U.S. at 512 , 108 S.Ct. at 2518 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 457-58 .
I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate the summary judgment granted by the Law Division.
Justices O’HERN and GARIBALDI join in this opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER and STEIN-3.
For reversal — Justices POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI-3.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9705456. Public record. Not legal advice.