# Commonwealth v. Pierce

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · June 9, 1987 · 515 Pa. 153

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704971

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Charles PIERCE, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 9, 1987
- **Citations:** 515 Pa. 153; 527 A.2d 973; 1987 Pa. LEXIS 729
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Hutchinson
- **Judges:** Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos
- **Cited by:** 1,816 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704971

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that to succeed on a claim asserting the ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must establish: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice a…
- stating that in reviewing counsel’s stewardship, we do not employ a hindsight evaluation of the record to determine whether other alternatives were more reasonable; rather, counsel will be deemed effective so long as the course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis desig…
- concluding that “the identical textual and policy considerations” in Pennsylvania precedent and Strickland “logically lead us to hold that together they constitute an identical rule of law in this Commonwealth”

## Opinion text

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion but write separately to respond to Mr. Justice Zappala’s query as to how our test for ineffectiveness “compares” with the harmless error test we set forth in Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391 , 383 A.2d 155 (1978). Dissenting op. at 175 n. 1. The answer is that such a comparison is not necessary.
In Story , this Court applied the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), to errors involving state law, specifically to errors by the trial judge in admission of evidence. The burden of proving the harmless nature of such errors rests with the Commonwealth. Story, 476 Pa. at 406 n. 11, 383 A.2d at 162 n. 11. Neither Story nor Chapman bear on the instant matter, claimed ineffectiveness of counsel. They relate to errors by the court, and the court’s conduct of the trial is judged on specific deviations from law. This case involves errors by counsel, which are judged under a general standard of due diligence. The failure to perceive the difference in treatment required by this distinction is what heretofore posed *170 much of our difficulty in dealing with ineffectiveness. Indeed, the tendency of courts to focus on individual errors by counsel in applying Commonwealth ex rel Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599 , 235 A.2d 349 (1967), noted by the dissent, is, in my judgment, a result of the failure to make this distinction.
Confusion in this area arises because our test for ineffectiveness contains a “performance” component. Majority op. at 6. To the extent a deficient performance is equated with ineffective assistance, further inquiry might appear to require a harmless error analysis. This equation, however, is incorrect. It ignores the reason we have recognized a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and thus mischaracterizes that right.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2062-63 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As noted in Strickland , the United States Constitution guarantees a fair trial through its Due Process Clause, but defines the elements of a fair trial through the Sixth Amendment. Id.
Our test for ineffectiveness acknowledges the purpose of an accused’s right to counsel. We require a defendant to show his counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced his defense. Unless a defendant proves both, we cannot say his counsel was ineffective in failing to provide “the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. at 2067 .
Strickland properly recognizes the nature of the right to counsel and thus places the burden of proving ineffectiveness upon the defendant seeking relief. It is not, nor does it embody, a harmless error analysis.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704971. Public record. Not legal advice.