# Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co.

> Wisconsin Supreme Court · November 8, 1955 · 270 Wis. 488

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704960

## Case

- **Full name:** Kuhl Motor Company, Appellant, vs. Ford Motor Company, Respondent
- **Court:** Wisconsin Supreme Court
- **Decided:** November 8, 1955
- **Citations:** 270 Wis. 488; 71 N.W.2d 420; 55 A.L.R. 2d 467; 1955 Wisc. LEXIS 293
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Gehl
- **Judges:** Martin, Gehl, Currie
- **Cited by:** 44 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704960

## Opinion text

Gehl, J.
(concurring). I would affirm upon the sole ground that, in so far as the statute may be construed to authorize the relief demanded by plaintiff, it is unconstitutional and void as infringing upon the right to contract.
Although it is not expressly reserved in either, “the right of free contract is one of the inherent rights guaranteed to the citizen by our constitution as well as by the national constitution,” State ex rel. Time Ins. Co. v. Smith, 184 Wis. 455, 470 , 200 N. W. 65 ; State ex rel. Ornstine v. Cary, 126 Wis. 135 , 105 N. W. 792 . “The right to contract is a property right protected by both the state and federal constitutions,” although the right is not stated expressly in either document, 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, p. 1156, sec. 339.
True, the right to make contracts is not absolute. It is subject to certain limitations which the state may impose in the exercise of its police power.
“Under the limitations of the equal-protection clause, in order to justify the interposition of the authority of the state in enacting police regulations, it must appear that the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require such interference, for it is a rule *497 that police power cannot be invoked to protect one class of citizens against another class unless such interference is for the real protection of society in general.” 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, p. 1000, sec. 263.
When a restriction is made under the authority of the police power “it must appear that the interests of the public generally require the restriction, and not the interests of private individuals.” Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 366 , 94 N. W. 354 .
“. . . whether a given situation presents a legitimate field for the exercise of the police power placing restraints upon the use of property or upon personal conduct, depends upon whether the situation presents a reasonable necessity for the imposition of restraint in order to promote the public welfare, and whether the means adopted bear a reasonable relation to the end sought to be accomplished. It goes without saying that the legislature may not, in the exercise of its police power, pass a law expressly prohibited by the constitution. It is also accepted doctrine, we think, everywhere that laws imposing restraints interfering with the use of property or personal liberty, in the absence of some public necessity therefor, cannot be sustained. The cases cited emphasize the judicial duty .and function to determine whether a given exertion of the police power is a reasonable exercise thereof.” (Emphasis supplied.) State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 152 , 196 N. W. 451 .
I am not convinced that the interests of the public require that any particular Ford agency be continued in business. I do not believe that the welfare of the public would be affected by the substitution by Ford of the “XYZ” Motor Company for the Kuhl Motor Company as its agent. I doubt that I could be convinced that the interests of the public would be affected by the cancellation of the Kuhl contract and Ford’s omission to grant a substitute franchise. I doubt that it can properly be said that the public is affected solely because Ford is a large institution and Kuhl is a relatively small one. If *498 the relative size of the parties to the contract is to be held controlling, at what stage does a contracting party become too large to be permitted to require that it may terminate its contract upon giving a sixty-day notice, and when is the other party to be considered too small to be allowed to consent that cancellation may be so made although by the terms of the contract it is given the right to terminate without notice?
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Broadfoot and Mr. Justice Steinle join in this concurring opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704960. Public record. Not legal advice.